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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the existence of cartel pricing and anticompetitive behavior 
by the Big4 international providers of auditing services (resulting from the halving in the 
number of such providers from the Big8 to Big4). Increased audit market concentration, both 
globally and in Australia, together with the focus by the Big4 in servicing primarily large 
clients, raises concern about a lessening of competition in the audit marketplace. Using both 
a composite and dis-aggregated measure for auditor attributes (namely, auditor reputation, 
industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and auditor tenure), this study 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the association between four pivotal auditor attributes 
and the quantum of audit fees and changes in audit fees paid by Australian publicly listed 
firms during a five-year time frame. The final usable sample includes 600 firm-year 
observations as data points for the 2001, 2003 and 2005 calendar years (200 firm-years for 
each year in the aforementioned observation window) and is obtained entirely from publicly 
available sources, specifically annual reports. Main results from both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal multivariate analysis indicate that there is no significant association between the 
four auditor attributes utilized in this study with both audit fees and variation in audit fees. 
Robustness and sensitivity testing completed also largely support the non-significance of the 
association between both constructs. This study, therefore, finds no evidence of cartel pricing 
and anti-competitive behavior by Big4 auditors resulting from increased audit market 
concentration. Results from this study have clear implications for regulators, investors, 
scholars, corporate management/firms and auditors. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The significant reduction in the number of international providers of auditing 
services (that is, the Big8 to Big6 to Big5 to Big4)1
Audit fees
 since 1989 has enormous implications for 
the competitiveness of auditing services and on the quantum of audit fees charged by 
auditors (Hamilton, Li, and Stokes 2008). The halving of audit services providers since 1989 
has raised serious questions about whether audit markets remain competitive or if there is 
cartel pricing and, therefore, anticompetitive behavior by the Big4 auditors (Hamilton et al. 
2008; Simon 1995). Increased audit market concentration, globally and in Australia, together 
with the Big4 auditors’ focus on servicing large clients, therefore, raises concerns of a 
lessening of competition in the audit marketplace (Chan and Li 2008; Hamilton et al. 2008). 
2
In the early years of the new millennium, a number of major accounting frauds 
generating huge media attention erupted around the world (for example, Enron and 
WorldCom in the United States of America (USA), Parlamat in Europe and HIH in 
Australia). In the wake of the high profile scandals, regulatory changes were made 
worldwide to improve the quality of corporate governance practices (Joint Committee on 
Public Accounts and Audit 2002; National Association of Corporate Directors 1996; 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2000). One major set of reforms is the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 (SOX 2002) introduced in the USA. SOX 2002 also provided the basic template for 
corporate governance reforms in other nations including Australia in the shape of the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 
 warrant study for three reasons: (1) to assess the competitiveness of audit 
markets (especially given the small number of international providers of such services); (2) 
to examine issues relating to contracting between the auditor and client (auditee); and (3) to 
examine matters relating to auditor independence (Chan and Li 2008; Hay, Knechel, and 
Wong 2006; Simunic 1980). The rationale in this study, therefore, is to examine audit fees 
and the changes in audit fees in order to determine the competitiveness of the audit market 
given the increase in the concentration of international providers of auditing services. 
                                                     
1  Initially the Big8 accounting firms were: Arthur Andersen & Co.; Arthur Young & Co.; Coopers & Lybrand; Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells; Ernst & Winney; Peat Marwick Mitchell; Price Waterhouse; and Touche Ross. Subsequent to two major 
mergers in 1989, the Big8 firms were reduced to the Big6. This resulted from the merger between Ernst & Winney and 
Arthur Young & Co. to become Ernst & Young and Deloitte Haskins & Sells with Touche Ross to become Deloitte Touche 
Ross. As a result of another merger in 1998 between Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse to form 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the Big6 was reduced to the Big5. Finally, the dissolution of Arthur Andersen & Co. in 2002 as a 
result of the Enron aftermath reduced the Big5 to the Big4. 
2  The term audit fee/s is used in this study to refer only to the external audit fee paid by firms to the firm’s external auditor 
for the provision of external attestation services. All non-audit fees, therefore, are excluded when the term ‘audit fee’ is 
used in this study. 
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2004 (also known as CLERP 9) and the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (ASX CGC 2003). CLERP 9 and ASX CGC 2003 reforms were designed 
to rectify deficiencies in the corporate environment in Australia highlighted by pivotal local 
corporate collapses such as HIH, OneTel and Harris Scarfe. 
The USA’s General Accounting Office (GAO) characterizes international audit 
providers (namely Big4 auditors) as an oligopoly consisting of a few businesses with 
significant risks of becoming even more concentrated (Koehn and Del Vecchio 2004). 
Furthermore, the GAO believes that since none of the Big4 has expertise in every industry, 
some market segments are actually dominated by just one or two of the Big4 firms. Audit 
fees reported by the Big4 have increased from 25% to 33% in the USA as a result of the Big4 
assisting clients with complying with SOX 2002 requirements. There are ominous indications 
that audit fees may continue to rise in the short-term (Koehn and Del Vecchio 2004).3
Changes in audit fees resulting from a reduction in competition between auditors 
also impact on the contracting relationship between the auditor and auditee. In addition, 
changes in audit fees also raise concerns and questions
 The 
increase in the domination by the Big4 potentially has an adverse flow-on effect on the 
nature of the audit market and the quantum of audit fees in Australia. 
4
Gay and Simnett 2007
 about the independence of the 
auditor; a major hallmark underlying the auditor’s role and responsibilities (Parkash and 
Venable 1993; Simunic 1984; Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou 2007). Research into the relationship 
between the auditor and auditee is necessary given the critical role that auditors play in the 
information and capital marketplace ( ). 
Consistent with the tenets of agency theory, auditors and auditees interact (that is, 
contract with one another) in a manner that affects audit fees (Ho and Ng 1996; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). An audit firm may wish to maximize audit fees charged and, therefore, 
profitability whereas auditees generally wish to mitigate increases in audit fees by making 
strategic self-interest decisions such as creating an internal audit function. In a world of 
costly contracting, a major role of the independent auditor is to monitor auditee compliance 
with the conditions of contracts between the principal (that is, firm shareholders) and agent 
(that is, firm owners) (Williamson 1984). The complex contracting relationships between the 
                                                     
3  Audit fees are expected to continue to rise post-2005 as a result of ongoing assistance to firms (by the Big4) in complying 
with post - SOX 2002 regulations and, to a lesser extent, as a result of the oligopolistic nature of the Big4 (which is partially 
the subject of interest of this study). 
4  Such questions relate primarily to a potential reduction in audit quality as a result of reduced competition among Big4 
auditors and pressure from the auditee on the quantum of audit fees charged by the Big4. 
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auditor and auditee, therefore, clearly impact on the quantum of audit fees charged by the 
auditor. 
The contractual relationships between an auditor and an auditee are generally of a 
medium to long term nature rather than a single year. Thus, auditor attributes may influence 
changes in audit fees across time thus making longitudinal empirical analysis useful when 
examining the relationship between auditor attributes and audit fees. For example, auditor 
tenure is cited as a prominent auditor attribute that may influence audit fees (Beck, Frecka, 
and Solomon 1998a; DeBerg, Kaplan, and Pany 1991; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; 
Simon and Francis 1988). It is generally maintained that the longer an auditor services an 
auditee, the resulting familiarity by the auditor with the auditee’s operations and accounting 
system may prompt a reduction in audit fees (Beck et al. 1998a; DeFond and Subramanyam 
1998; Simon and Francis 1988). If an auditor deems that extended tenure is detrimental to 
their (the auditor’s) interests, auditors may strategically seek short appointments. Similarly, 
if the auditee is continuously switching auditors and/or renegotiating engagements on an on-
going basis, audit fees may remain persistently high. 
The influence of auditor attributes, therefore, provides additional intrigue to the topic 
of audit fees since the auditor determines the quantum of the audit fee. The high profile 
corporate scandals of the early 2000, combined with the demise of Arthur Andersen, have 
renewed interest in the relationship between auditor attributes and audit fees (Abbott, Parker, 
Peters, and Raghunandan 2003b; Beatty 1993; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam 1998; Krishnan 2003; Palmrose 1986a; Zhou and Elder 2002). Despite the 
development of a wealth of knowledge on the determinants of audit fees, greater 
understanding is still needed since regulators and corporate governance reformists around the 
world continually seek to make adjustments/changes to regulations surrounding the auditing 
environment in an effort to ensure that corporate failures are minimized (Blue Ribbon 
Committee 1999; Securities and Exchange Commission 2000). Whilst the moral aim of 
regulators and corporate governance reformists is to improve standards to protect investors, 
such steps taken without sufficient understanding may lead to adverse rather than positive 
outcomes. Examining the influence of auditor attributes on changes in audit fees across time 
can provide valuable insights into the long-term impact of regulations governing auditors. 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, there has been no other study undertaken 
which has sought to determine if there is any evidence of cartel pricing and, therefore, 
anticompetitive behavior by the Big4. Such research is important in order to accurately 
identify demand and supply side audit fee determinants. For example, attempted reforms on 
4 
 
auditor tenure may have a minor influence in the short term but manifest into a more 
significant issue across time. 
Auditor attributes may also have a significant bearing on how contractual 
arrangements between auditors and auditees evolve and the resulting audit fees paid. For 
example, an auditor specializing in a specific industry (another auditor attribute) can 
influence audit fees (Lim and Tan 2008). The auditor may determine that development of an 
industry specialization can enable a premium to be charged (due to higher audit quality) on 
auditing services provided. The premium to be charged leads to higher fees paid by the 
auditee relative to paying for such services from a non-specialist auditor (De Belde 1997; 
Hogan and Jeter 1999; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Zhou and Elder 2002). Using another 
example, auditees may choose an auditor perceived to be of a higher quality (that is, 
typically noted as a Big4 auditing firm). Due to the perceived quality and reputational capital 
of a Big4 audit firm, auditor-auditee contractual arrangements may be more complex and 
elaborate, thereby, leading to higher audit fees (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a). 
The identification of audit fee determinants in the past literature has generally been 
of a cross-sectional nature or spanning a two to three-year examination period (Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, and Riley 2002; Felix, Gramling, and Maletta 2001; Karim and Moizer 
1996; Naser and Nuseibeh 2007; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2003; Thinggaard and 
Kiertzner 2008). To the best knowledge of the researcher, empirical literature published to 
date into audit fee modeling has as yet not adopted a five-year or more time-series analysis 
nor utilized a comprehensive range of auditor attributes in examining audit fees. In addition 
to auditor attributes, corporate governance mechanisms within firms also impact on the 
amount of audit fees paid by the firms (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a). 
Past audit research has investigated the impact of corporate governance features 
(such as an external audit) on financial report superiority, earnings quality and the level of 
audit fees (Brody, Golen, and Reckers 1998; Elliot and Korpi 1978; Firth 1985; Lim and Tan 
2008; Wilson 2003). From a theoretical perspective, the separation of ownership from 
control within firms creates agency problems which impact on the quality of the firm’s 
financial report. Specifically, since managers are not normally owners, there are always 
incentives for managers to pursue self-interest at the expense of the owners/shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The situation highlights the critical role that quality audits play 
as a check to the opportunistic management behavior in the information marketplace.5
                                                     
5  The demand for such attestation services and for superior quality audits are viewed to be an efficient means of managing 
the costly contracting problems (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 
 Strong 
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governance mechanisms include high-quality audits which mitigate agency costs and the 
likelihood of  fraudulent financial reporting but lead to higher audit fees (Mitra, Hossain, and 
Deis 2007). Thus, the concept of monitoring holds a key position in motivating auditee 
demand for high-quality audits. The importance of the monitoring role by auditors of firms is 
supported by legislation and although auditors have a contractual duty to the agent (firm 
management), the auditors also have a greater statutory responsibility to principals (firm 
shareholders) (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 
1.2 OBJECTIVES, AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since Simunic’s (1980) seminal study, a common methodology has developed for 
identifying the determinants of audit fees. A regression estimation model is normally derived 
(on a cross-sectional basis) by regressing audit fees against a number of measures (both 
within and outside a firm) hypothesized to relate in some way to audit fees (for example, 
Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam 1993; Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Gonthier-Besacier and 
Schatt 2007; Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006; Ho and Ng 1996; Karim and Moizer 1996; 
Naser and Nuseibeh 2007; Taffler and Ramalingam 1982; Ward, Elder, and Kattelus 1994). 
If the coefficients on the independent variables are significant, the hypothesized relationships 
are deemed to exist. Simunic’s (1980) approach has resulted in the population of explanatory 
variables explaining audit fees growing significantly. 
As highlighted in Section 1.1, there are gaps in the literature in relation to examining 
auditor attributes from a composite perspective and using a longitudinal time horizon. An 
important gap with unanswered questions, relates to the existence of cartel pricing and, 
therefore, anticompetitive behavior by the remaining Big4 audit firms. The public debate on 
the matter of auditor concentration and the possibility of cartel pricing and anticompetitive 
behavior in Australia by the Big4 has resulted in the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) examining the issue and agreeing that the international accounting 
firms mergers raises concerns for competition in the Australian audit market (ACCC 1999). 
The national concern about reduced competition, therefore, makes this study and its results 
important. 
A study encompassing the Australian audit and business environment using a 
longitudinal focus is also of significance. Specifically, new corporate governance regulations 
introduced in Australia following the implementation of CLERP 9 pertaining to auditors may 
have considerable influence on audit fees. A feature of this study is that this study can 
provide insights into whether changes to regulations governing auditors under CLERP 9 
influenced auditor attribute/audit fee insights. Such insights can aid in determining what 
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impact future changes to corporate governance regulations in Australia may have on 
auditors, auditees and audit fees. 
This study investigates both the existence and extent of competitive audit pricing in 
the Australian audit services market during a five-year time frame to determine if there is 
any evidence of cartel pricing and, therefore, anticompetitive behavior by the Big4 during the 
five-year period. Since increased supplier concentration by itself is not sufficient evidence of 
cartel pricing (and therein, anticompetitive behavior), this study initially adopt Simunic’s 
(1980) seminal audit pricing model to investigate audit market competition. Utilizing 
Simunic’s (1980) model can provide evidence on the extent to which the Big4 (by examining 
four pivotal auditor attributes) are influential predictors of audit fees/variation in audit fees. 
Apart from examining audit fees on a cross-sectional basis, the prior empirical 
literature has evaluated auditor attributes only in isolation (that is, individually). There is also 
no published research which has evaluated important auditor attributes on an aggregate basis 
(and across time). The aggregated/holistic basis adopted by this study can, therefore, 
evaluate (four) important auditor attributes simultaneously across a five-year observation 
window when examining the impact on audit fees. 
Overall primary objectives of this study are twofold. First, this study seeks to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the association between four pivotal auditor attributes 
(that is, auditor reputation, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
auditor tenure) and audit fees paid by Australian publicly listed firms. Though studies of 
auditor attributes and audit fees are not unique, prior research usually focus on auditor 
attributes in isolation (Choi, Kim, and Zang 2005; Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995; 
Davis, Ricchiute, and Trompeter 1993; Francis 1984; Simon and Francis 1988). The novelty 
of this study is that this study looks to consider the influence of key auditor attributes in 
unison, and the association, if any, with audit fees. Specifically, this study will investigate 
the influence of four pivotal auditor attributes in aggregate (and on a dis-aggregate basis) 
with audit fees. 
Second, this study seeks to determine if the four aforementioned auditor attributes 
are influential determinants of changes in audit fees paid by Australian publicly listed firms. 
The second objective is original as prior auditor attribute/audit fee research concentrates on 
associations within a single time period without considering changes in audit fees across 
time. The longitudinal aspect is important because changes in auditor attributes and the 
associated impact on audit fees, if any, provides important evidence on the extent to which 
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auditor attributes truly impact on changes in audit fees and on the long-term impact on 
regulations governing the conduct of audits.6
Consistent with the two main research objectives, this study’s two main research 
questions are identified as follows: 
 
RQ1
RQ2: Are auditor attributes associated with changes in audit fees paid by 
Australian publicly listed firms? 
: Are auditor attributes associated with audit fees paid by Australian publicly 
listed firms? 
Aside from investigating the primary objectives and research questions, another 
objective of this study is to consider a number of important secondary research questions. 
For example, as described in Section 1.1, new corporate governance regulations impacting 
on the auditor were recently introduced in Australia in the form of CLERP 9. A secondary 
aim of this study is to determine if associations between auditor attributes and audit fees pre-
CLERP 9 persist post-CLERP 9 thereby providing insight on the extent of the success of 
CLERP 9. The following, therefore, is a list of the major secondary research questions this 
study seeks to answer: 
SRQ1: Did the association between auditor attributes and audit fees charged to 
Australian publicly listed firms change following the introduction of CLERP 
9? 
SRQ2: Did the association between auditor attributes and the change in audit fees 
charged to Australian publicly listed firms change following the introduction 
of CLERP 9? 
SRQ3: Do different key auditor attributes (that is, (a) Big4 auditor, (b) a specialist 
industry auditor, (c) non-audit fees, and (d) auditor tenure) have varying 
influences on audit fees charged to Australian publicly listed firms? 
SRQ4
                                                     
6  In addition, Australia is also an ideal environment to undertake this study as there has been no research undertaken 
examining a composite score representing auditor attributes (neither on a cross-sectional and longitudinal basis) and the 
impact on audit fees. 
:Do different key auditor attributes (that is, (a) Big4 auditor, (b) a specialist 
industry auditor, (c) non-audit fees, and (d) auditor tenure) have varying 
influences on changes in audit fees charged to Australian publicly listed 
firms? 
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In addition to answering this study’s primary and secondary research questions, a 
number of other important research objectives shall also be investigated. Given that 
alternative measures of auditor attributes will be used (for example, alternative measures of 
auditor specialization and the use of different metrics for auditor attributes such as auditor 
tenure and non-audit fees), the results can provide valuable insight into the continued 
appropriateness of using the attributes to reflect key auditor characteristics.  
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
Results from this study make several important contributions. First, researchers will 
be able to determine how much of the variation in audit fees (both cross-sectionally and 
longitudinally) of an auditee is directly associated with auditor traits and, importantly, the 
quantum of the impact. The determination will provide empirical evidence about suggestions 
of cartel pricing and anticompetitive behavior by auditors who provide such services 
nationally and internationally (Dopuch and Simunic 1982; Hamilton et al. 2008; Kwon 
1996). The resulting empirical evidence, therefore, has important consequences for the 
efficient and effective operation of capital markets, auditor and auditee operations. 
Second, though there have been a number of studies examining specific auditor traits 
and audit fees (for example, Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang 2003; Beatty 1989; Carcello, Hermanson, and McGrath 1992), no study to the author’s 
knowledge has studied the relationship between a number of composite auditor attributes and 
audit fees. By focusing on the supply side of the demand for auditing, this study also 
provides a much deeper understanding of an important monitoring mechanism (that is, 
auditing) and the extent to which it promotes the integrity of reported information by firms. 
Third, the results from this study will also be used to determine the extent to which 
CLERP 9 regulations are successful in achieving the objectives of using the statutory 
external auditing process to improve the quality of reported earnings by firms. Therefore, 
results from this study will build on the existing literature on the success (or lack of) recent 
legislation such as SOX 2002 in USA and CLERP 9 in Australia (ASX CGC 1999). 
Fourth, in spite of wide-ranging research on auditor traits (for example, Ashbaugh et 
al. 2003; Beatty 1989; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Francis 2006), there is still little evidence on 
which auditor attributes most influence audit fees and, therefore, are most important 
attributes in improving the integrity of a firm’s financial reporting process. Research on the 
relative importance of auditor traits has economic consequences for both legislators and 
auditors in the respective roles as regulators and monitors. 
Fifth, the data collected will capture a cross-section of industries and this study will 
also be able to comment on the impact of auditor attributes on audit fees across all ten main 
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industries in Australia. This will shed important light on the existence of an industry-effect 
on the quantum of audit fees charged by auditors (for example, whether certain industries are 
more expensive to audit than others). A common claim made by auditors and researchers has 
been that certain industries are more difficult to audit than others (DeFond, Francis, and 
Wong 2000; Gerrard, Houghton, and Woodliff 1994; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). For 
example, telecommunication services and utilities have relatively large assets but may be 
easier to audit compared to firms with extensive receivables and inventories such as 
manufacturers (DeFond et al. 2000; Gerrard et al. 1994; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). 
Overall, this study will benefit a number of key stakeholders. For example, 
policymakers and regulators will be able to determine the effectiveness of legislation 
introduced to improve the quality of financial reporting by firms. This has a flow-on effect of 
minimizing poor corporate reporting and, potentially, subsequent corporate failure thereby 
benefiting capital market participants. Auditors will also be able to determine the optimal 
composition of (the examined) auditor attributes which could maximize audit fees. For 
example, auditors will know which combination of the four attributes examined (that is, 
auditor reputation, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and auditor 
tenure) can benefit the auditors most. Finally, firms will also benefit from knowing which 
demand-side characteristics firms exhibit either increase or decrease the audit fees firms pay. 
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
While this study has a number of strengths, it is not without limitations. First, this 
study only looks at four specific auditor attributes, and though the attributes selected are the 
most commonly used and referred to in the prior empirical literature (Balsam et al. 2003; 
Carcello et al. 1992; Francis 2006; Kim, Chung, and Firth 2003), this is acknowledged as a 
limitation given that other auditor attributes (though of lesser importance) impact audit fees 
as well. 
Second, sample firms in this study are the same for each of the calendar years 
examined. This raises a possible concern with independence of samples (that is, repeated 
measures) issue (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 1995). However, this is not considered 
detrimental to this study for two reasons. First, the independence of samples issue only 
applies to the longitudinal Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models used. Second, 
almost all of the published past literature (in both accounting and finance fields) using firm-
year observations for multivariate testing suggest that there is no other parsimonious way to 
undertake longitudinal analysis where the changes in selected firm’s results are of interest to 
the researcher/s (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Gigler and Hemmer 2001; Krishnan 2003; Lara, 
Osma, and Mora 2005; Pae 2007; Reynolds and Francis 2001; Wallace 1984). 
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Third, in order to test the hypotheses, data for all of the variables used in this study 
were collected from annual reports of firms. This limits the amount and type of data that can 
be collected. For example, other alternative firm-specific measures may exist for the 
variables used in this study but are excluded from this study given the proprietary nature of 
the measures. 
Fourth, this study uses data from only one country, namely Australia. This has the 
potential to adversely affect the generalizability of this study’s empirical results. Australia 
has a mature and well developed capital market with active participation by regulators, 
investors and auditing firms, and is also a leader in audit fee modeling research (Craswell 
and Taylor 1991; Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Goodwin 2003). Therefore, this 
study’s results will provide useful points of reference to other countries and economies 
which are (or may be in the future) grappling with issues of cartel pricing and 
anticompetitive behavior by Big4 auditors. 
Fifth, this study only uses data from public firms. Private firms are excluded from 
the sample since a large number of private firms do not require external auditing in Australia 
and, therefore, pay no audit fees. Notwithstanding this limitation, given the stratification of 
the sample across all firms listed on the ASX and partitioning when undertaking data 
analysis, smaller public firms are included in the final sample. Therefore, the results from 
this study will not be overwhelmed/driven only by the largest firms and will have some 
applicability to non-public firms; both large and small. 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of the chapters is this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two 
begins with a review of the monitoring role of the auditor in the financial reporting system 
and briefly identifies the underpinning agency theory to this study. The chapter also provides 
the background to the association between the auditor and the regulatory environment in 
Australia. Specifically, the auditing market in Australia is detailed with references to the type 
and size of the auditing service providers which exist. References are also made to key 
regulators such as the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) and the 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Setting Board (AuASB) and to key legislation such as 
CLERP 9 and the ASX Listing Rules. Chapter Two provides a detailed examination of 
Simunic’s (1980) seminal study on audit fee modeling and goes on to outline the major 
empirical research papers identifying factors which determine audit fees (including a number 
of key auditor attributes). 
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical underpinnings of this study by detailing 
agency theory tenants. The chapter begins by outlining the theoretical framework of 
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corporate governance and discusses the five main underlying theories (that is, institution 
theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory, stewardship theory and agency 
theory). After establishing the link between corporate governance and audit fees, the four 
key auditor attributes of this study (that is, auditor reputation, industry specialization, 
provision of non-audit services and auditor tenure) are detailed, leading to the testable 
hypotheses. A conceptual schema is provided to illustrate the key relationships examined in 
this study.  
Chapter Four outlines the sample collection and selection process, justifies the 
selection of the time period and details the primary research methodology utilized, namely 
the use of multiple regression. In particular, measures for audit fees (dependent variable), 
auditor attributes (independent variables) and use of control variables (all supported by prior 
empirical literature) are detailed. The statistical tests and models adopted for this study are 
also detailed; namely, the basic test model (when examining auditor attributes in isolation), 
the comprehensive cross-sectional model (when examining composite auditor attributes) and 
the longitudinal model (when examining the impact of auditor attributes (both composite and 
dis-aggregate) on changes in audit fees) are defined. 
Chapter Five reports on the descriptive statistics and univariate results. Initially, 
steps taken to ensure the normality of data collected and the validity of assumptions for the 
subsequent multiple regressions are outlined, including basic sample descriptive statistics 
(such as mean, median, standard deviation, 0.25 percentiles and 0.75 percentiles). Then, t-
tests of key descriptive characteristics (both cross-sectional and longitudinal) and Spearman 
and Pearson correlation analyses are provided.  
Chapter Six presents the results of the OLS regressions (both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal variations) testing the relationship between audit fees and the composite auditor 
attributes examined in this study. Subsequently, individual key auditor attributes and the 
extent of the association with audit fees is also examined.  
Chapter Seven details the robustness and sensitivity tests completed. This includes 
partitioning the sample by auditee characteristics (on the basis of firm size, complexity, risk 
and industry) and corporate governance features (such as board of director’s independence, 
number of board of director meetings annually, and the presence of a financial expert on the 
audit committee). The selection of alternative measures/proxies for both audit fees and 
auditor attributes is also discussed in Chapter Seven. An analysis of pre- versus post-CLERP 
9 implications is then provided. 
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Chapter Eight ends this study by summarizing the conclusions to the major 
hypotheses of this study and summarizing its key findings. Implications, contributions, 
limitations and a summary of the research results are also provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter One provided the background and motivation to this study. The research 
questions and objectives of this study were specified in detail. In addition, the significance 
and limitations of this study were also identified. 
Chapter Two discusses the empirical literature surrounding audit fee modeling. The 
chapter begins with an identification of the theoretical underpinnings of an audit and the role 
of the auditor in a financial reporting system. The link between the auditor and the regulatory 
environment in Australia is then reviewed. The regulatory environment in Australia is 
discussed in terms of corporate governance development and auditing. A comprehensive 
overview is then provided of the key prior literature identifying audit fees determinants. 
Finally, a summary of the Chapter Two is provided. 
2.2 ROLE OF THE AUDITOR IN THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM 
It is clear that the audit function plays a critical role in the information marketplace 
(Gay and Simnett 2007; Jubb, Topple, Schelluch, Rittenberg, and Schwieger 2008; Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986). A central definition of auditing is that it is a professional service 
which involves an independent and objective examination of a subject matter with the 
purpose of forming an opinion on the subject matter’s credibility (Leung, Coram, and 
Cooper 2007). Auditing practices have changed substantially over the past two decades, 
primarily in response to changing public expectations on the accountability and complexities 
associated with the technological and economic development of firms. Specifically, due to 
the complexity of the information needs of users, auditors not only enhance the credibility of 
the financial information prepared by management but also provide additional value-added 
services such as identifying business risks, reporting on internal control weaknesses and 
providing other non-audit services such as risk management assessments and tax advisory 
(Gay and Simnett 2007; Hamilton et al. 2008; Spira and Page 2003; Turpin 1995; Zhang et 
al. 2007). 
Essentially, the audit function provides independent assurance to a reader on the 
integrity and fairness of a firm’s presented financial information (Becker et al. 1998; 
Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker 2004; Collier and Gregory 1996; Simunic 1980, 
1984). The audit function is squarely premised on agency theory (that is, when one or more 
principals engage others as agents to perform a service on behalf of the principals, a 
principal-agent relationship arises) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In the case of firms, the 
owners or shareholders (principals) appoint directors and managers (agents) to conduct the 
firm’s business in the interests of the owners. The managers of the firm assume a 
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stewardship function and are, therefore, expected to manage the firm in the best interests of 
the principals. However, given the information asymmetry between principals and agents 
and each parties differing interests (such as financial rewards and employment 
opportunities), agents may pursue self-interest objectives to the detriment of the firm and the 
principals.7
As a result of the reservations about the reliability of information produced by 
agents, principals require mechanisms (an external audit is one important example) to reduce 
potential conflicts and align the interests of agents with their (principal’s) own interests. 
Auditors, therefore, conduct an independent examination of the financial statements 
generated by management, form an opinion on the credibility of management’s financial 
statements and issue an audit report formally expressing their (auditor’s) view (Collier and 
Gregory 1999; Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). The audit function serves a 
fundamental purpose in increasing confidence and validating the financial information 
reported by management. This, in turn, plays a wider role in the information marketplace, 
where economic and financial decisions can be made based on information that has been 
audited and, therefore, viewed as more useful for decision-making purposes. 
 The concern about information asymmetries and differing motivations of agent 
and principal, therefore, leads to reservations about the reliability of information produced by 
the agents. 
2.3 THE AUDITOR AND AUSTRALIA’S REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
An auditor undertakes his duties and responsibilities within the confines of rules and 
regulations. The Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act) establishes the 
accountability process in which the directors of a firm are held responsible for the 
preparation and presentation of financial reports, with an independent audit function 
appointed by shareholders reporting on the prepared financial reports (Gay and Simnett 
2007). Australian firms are also regulated pursuant to the Corporations Act. Other relevant 
rules and regulations include the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX CGC 2003), accounting 
standards which have the force of law and the Australian government’s CLERP and the 
Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council (ASX CGC) was established in August 
2002 as a collaborative, industry-based body set up to develop international best practice 
corporate governance recommendations. The ASX CGC includes representatives from more 
than 20 businesses, shareholder and industry groups from disparate business backgrounds 
                                                     
7  For example, agents may pursue opportunities which benefit themselves (agents) and not principals and/or bias information 
flows to principals. 
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each offering valuable guidance and information specific to stakeholder constituencies and 
industry (ASX CGC 2003). On 1 January 2003, the ASX CGC introduced a number of 
significant amendments to the ASX Listing Rules to enhance compliance with corporate 
governance best practice. Three months later, the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 
2003 were released by the ASX CGC representing the most comprehensive statement of best 
practice in Australia (ASX CGC 2003). The adoption of this framework represented a major 
evolution in corporate governance practices in Australia. 
Notwithstanding the groundbreaking nature of the ASX CGC’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 2003, the principles are, 
nevertheless, guidelines and not prescriptions. ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 provides that a firm 
must include in the firm’s annual report a statement disclosing the extent to which the firm 
has complied with the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 during the reporting 
period (ASX CGC 2003). If the firm has not complied with any one of the recommendations 
then it must provide reasons for the non-compliance. This process is commonly referred to as 
an ‘if not, why not’ policy (ASX CGC 2003). It is considered an effective approach because 
it allows listed firms a degree of flexibility to consider a range of means to address corporate 
governance issues and avoid particular recommendations that might be particularly onerous 
for firms to comply with (ASX CGC 2003). 
The Australian government’s CLERP was announced in 1997 as an initiative to 
improve the regulation of firms operating in Australia. CLERP is an ongoing program that 
seeks to ensure that Australia’s business regulation is consistent with international best 
practice and provides an appropriately secure environment for investment in Australia. The 
program is specifically aimed at enhancing the transparency of financial information and the 
accountability of market participants by modernizing the regulation of fundraising, 
takeovers, director’s duties, corporate governance, financial reporting, financial markets and 
investment products (Commonwealth Government of Australia 2004). The policy 
frameworks that have been developed under the CLERP initiative since 1997 have prompted 
the enactment of legislation in all key areas of firm regulation.  
Given the wide-ranging impact of the ASX CGC’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 2003 and CLERP 9 on the audit function 
and on listed firms to implement appropriate policies and procedures over risk management 
and financial reporting processes, the corporate governance practices of listed Australian 
firms and the auditing practices of audit firms are expected to improve. 
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2.3.1 Australia’s corporate governance environment 
The public accounting profession was widely criticized during the past decade for 
failing to protect investor interests (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2000). Such failures by the profession were significant and included: HIH 
Insurance Ltd, OneTel Ltd and Harris Scarfe Ltd in Australia and Enron Ltd, WorldCom 
Ltd, Global Crossing Ltd and HealthSouth Ltd in the USA. The Australian government 
responded to the corporate failures in Australia by initiating several inquiries (for example, 
Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit 2002; Ramsay 2001), instituting the HIH 
Royal Commission in 2003 and enacting CLERP 9. 
The corporate failures of the past decade represented failures across all parts of the 
corporate governance mosaic. The corporate governance failures represented not just failures 
of management and auditors but also most parts of the corporate governance system (for 
example, audit committees, professional accounting bodies, standard-setters, regulatory 
bodies and stock exchanges (Jubb et al. 2008)). A corporate governance system has a number 
of important but diverse participants and the inter-relationships between the participants are 
important in achieving effective corporate governance practices within and across firms. 
The ASX was listed on 13 October 1998, and began operation as a public firm 
operating as the main national stock exchange for equities, derivatives and fixed-interest 
securities (Gay and Simnett 2007). Pursuant to Section 769 of the Corporations Act, the ASX 
develops or adopts Listing Rules in the interests of the public thus making the ASX part of 
the regulatory regime within which listed firms disclose required financial information. 
Although the ASX does not have a direct role in the oversight of the audit function, the ASX 
does prescribe the form and nature of corporate disclosures through Listing Rules and a 
continuous disclosure regime backed by the Corporations Act. Specifically, the ASX CGC’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 2003 is an example 
of regulatory changes initiated by the ASX.  
The recommendations by the ASX CGC come in the form of ten principles and 28 
recommendations for effective corporate governance in Australia. A number of the ASX 
CGC principles and recommendations have an impact on the audit function. Specifically, 
Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3 of Principle 2 titled ‘Structure the board to add value’ 
recommend that the board of director’s should consist of a majority of independent directors 
and that there be no Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality.8
                                                     
8  CEO duality refers to a situation where the CEO of the firm is also the Chairman of the board of directors (Carcello, Neal, 
Palmrose, and Scholz 2006; Donaldson and Davis 1991). 
 Furthermore, 
Recommendations 4.2 and 4.3 of Principle 4 titled ‘Safeguard integrity in financial 
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reporting’ requires listed firms to establish an audit committee and stipulates the audit 
committee’s composition (ASX CGC 2003). The principles and recommendations have been 
designed to strengthen the independence of the audit function by having independent 
directors and appropriately structure audit committees which will be able to make unbiased 
decisions in the event of auditor-management disputes. 
On 6 March 2006, the ASX CGC released the results of a user survey issued on 
November 2005 designed to understand the relevance of corporate governance disclosure to 
the investment and analyst community. The results of the 2006 ASX survey prompted a 
formal review of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations 2003 and the subsequent changes to existing recommendations became 
effective from 1 July 2007 onwards. Among the changes affecting the audit function was the 
right of a firm’s audit committee to seek access and explanations from the auditors and to 
make recommendations for the appointment and where necessary, removal of the external 
auditor. In addition to the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations 2003, CLERP 9 also plays a significant role in the corporate governance 
debate and the audit function. 
CLERP 9 has made a significant impact on the audit function. Specifically, CLERP 9 
amended the Corporations Act in several ways to deal with the issue of audit standard-
setting and auditor independence. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is charged with 
oversight over auditor independence. This is achieved by providing the FRC oversight over 
the auditing standard-setting process and reconstituting the previous Australian Auditing 
Standards Board (AASB) to become the AuASB effective 1 July 2004, a statutory entity with 
a government-appointed chairperson reporting to the FRC (Jubb et al. 2008). In essence, 
CLERP 9 changed the auditor-auditee relationship and moved the process of setting auditing 
standards from the private sector to the public sector. 
Specifically, CLERP 9 amended the Corporations Act dealing with auditor 
independence by, among other things: 
1. requiring the auditor to make annual declarations to the board of 
directors of auditees that the auditor has maintained independence to the 
client; 
2. strengthened restrictions on the employment opportunities between the 
auditor and auditee; 
3. imposing new restrictions on financial relationships between the auditor 
and auditee; 
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4. mandatory disclosure in the annual report of the categories of non-audit 
fees received by the auditor from the auditee; and 
5. making audit lead engagement and review partner rotation compulsory 
after five years (Commonwealth Government of Australia 2004). 
Corporate governance research has focused mainly on four key parties, namely: 
board of directors, audit committee, internal audit and external audit. The four groups have 
also been identified as the major stakeholders in the corporate governance mosaic that play a 
significant role in influencing the role and responsibilities of the audit function (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2002). 
2.3.1.1 Board of directors 
Prior research shows that the board of directors plays a vital role in promoting the 
audit function by, among other things, enhancing auditor independence and acting as an 
intermediary between the auditor and management (for example, Andersen, Mansi, and Reeb 
2003; Beasley 1996; Beasley and Salterio 2001; Carcello et al. 2002; Karamanou and Vafeas 
2005; Klein 1998; Kosnik 1987; Vafeas 1999). 
The board of directors is generally vested with the power to manage firms. In turn, 
the board of directors will generally delegate most of the day-to-day tasks and running of the 
firm to executive officers or managers (Carcello et al. 2002; Fama 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Klein 1998; Vafeas and Theodorou 1998). The board of directors is 
essentially one of the mechanisms within firms to manage agency costs. 
Agency theory suggests that, as a result of information asymmetries and self-interest, 
principals lack reasons to trust agents and will seek to resolve the concerns by putting in 
place mechanisms to align the interests of agents with principals. The mechanisms 
implemented, therefore, reduce the scope for information asymmetries and opportunistic 
behavior (Simunic 1980; Watts 2003; Watts and Zimmerman 1990).9
The board of directors is formulated to monitor management and ensure that the 
actions of management are in line with the expectations of shareholders. The board of 
directors has a broad role in overseeing all accountability activities, including relations with 
 Various such 
structures/methods may be used to try to align the interests of agents with principals, and to 
allow principals to measure and control the behavior of, and reinforce trust, in agents 
(Simunic 1980; Watts 2003; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). One such structure is the board of 
directors. 
                                                     
9  Differing motivations and information asymmetries lead to concern about the reliability of information, which affects the 
level of trust that principals will have in agents. 
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the external audit function. However, given the broad scope and severity of the board of 
director’s responsibilities, the board of directors often delegates accountability 
responsibilities for the audit function to a sub-committee, the audit committee (DeFond, 
Hann, and Hu 2005; Kesner 1988; Reinstein and Callaghan 1984). 
2.3.1.2 Audit committee 
The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of directors and ordinarily 
comprises a majority of independent/non-executive directors and represents the owners of 
the firm rather than management. The audit committee is usually assigned the role of 
overseeing the financial reporting and auditing process and, thus, the auditor’s major 
dealings with a firm is through the audit committee (Abbott and Parker 2000; Baxter and 
Pragasam 1999; Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein, and Neal 2006; Collier and Gregory 1999; 
Dezoort 1998; Jamieson 1980; Vanasco 1994). The audit committee, therefore, may have a 
major impact on the audit function. 
The development of audit committees in Australia can be traced to the 1970s 
following the great corporate crashes during the 1970s which undermined confidence in 
Australian firms (Jamieson 1980). However, very little concrete action was taken in terms of 
audit committee formation and operation until 1992 when the ASX released the 1992 
Exposure Draft mandating audit committees for all listed firms (Vanasco 1994). However, 
the ASX decided not to proceed with this initiative because submissions in response to the 
1992 Exposure Draft indicated that such requirements can be onerous for many listed firms 
(Baxter and Pragasam 1999). Instead of mandating audit committee formation, the ASX 
introduced initial requirements regarding audit committees in 1993 through the release of 
two Listing Rules. Specifically, Listing Rule 4.10.2 of the ASX requires a firm to indicate 
whether the firm has an audit committee at the date of the director’s report and if the firm did 
not, an explanation why (ASX CGC 2003). 
Recommendation 4.2 of the ASX CGC’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations 2003 suggests that listed public firms should have an 
audit committee. Furthermore, the top 500 firms on the ASX must also comply with the audit 
committee requirements of ASX Listing Rule 12.7, which requires any firm included in the 
Standard & Poors/ASX All Ordinaries Index at the beginning of its (the firm’s) financial year 
to have an audit committee during that year. The composition, operations and responsibility 
of the audit committee must comply with the best practice recommendations of Principle 4 
of the ASX CGC’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations 2003. 
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It is argued that an effective audit committee takes an active role in overseeing the 
firm’s accounting and financial reporting processes (Abbott and Parker 2000; Carcello and 
Neal 2000; Klein 2002; Turley and Zaman 2007). Also, the audit committee should maintain 
a direct line of communication between the board of directors and the firm’s auditors, 
permitting frank discussions of matters such as controversial accounting issues, 
disagreements with management, weaknesses in the design and/or operation of internal 
control and difficulties experienced by the auditor during the audit. The audit committee 
normally discusses the general scope and timing of the external audit with the external 
auditor but the audit committee does not review the detailed audit work program (Abbott et 
al. 2003b; Collier and Gregory 1996; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Zhang et al. 2007). The 
audit committee is also normally involved in the nomination of the external auditor, reviews 
the reasonableness of the audit fees charged and monitors the provision of non-audit services 
performed by the auditor and the associated impact on auditor independence (Arens, 
Loebbecke, Best, and Shailer 2002; Gay and Simnett 2007). In addition to liaising with the 
external auditor, the audit committee often oversees the operations of the firm’s internal 
audit function (if any). 
2.3.1.3 Internal audit 
Internal audit is an important part of a firm’s corporate governance structure. This 
importance is highlighted by the Institute of Internal Auditor’s (IIA) Practice Advisory 2130-
1 which stresses that internal auditors should take an active role in support of a firm’s ethical 
culture and, in this way, help detect misappropriation of a firm’s assets (IIA 2004). 
The high profile corporate collapses in the last decade of companies such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Parlamat and HIH have renewed the emphasis on the relevance of internal 
auditing as part of overall governance processes (Brody and Lowe 2000; Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Raghunandan 2005; Felix et al. 2001; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a). 
Bailey, Gramling and Ramamoorti (2003) and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006b) noted 
that unlike past responses to corporate scandals, many stakeholders are looking to the 
internal audit function as part of the solution to the perceived control, reporting and ethical 
problems in the corporate sector. The IIA certainly sees the objective of internal auditing as 
both supporting and strengthening a firm’s governance mechanisms and evaluating and 
improving the effectiveness of risk management and internal control mechanisms (IIA 
1999). The views of the IIA suggests that the value of internal audit as part of the governance 
structure within a firm is at the operational level rather than as part of a ‘higher level’ 
oversight structure. In Australia, recent changes to the Corporations Act and the ASX Listing 
Rules have strongly emphasized the importance of good corporate governance structure and 
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practices. Given the perceived importance of internal audit as part of good corporate 
governance, the regulatory changes are likely to enhance the role and importance of internal 
audit, both in Australia and overseas. 
Additionally, an effective internal audit function is of considerable benefit to the 
external audit function (Abbott, Parker, Peters, and Rama 2007; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
2006b; Singh and Newby 2010). Australian Auditing Standard 610 titled ‘Considering the 
work in internal audit’ clearly explains the substantial role that internal audit can play during 
the course of an external audit. Specifically, internal audit work completed by the internal 
auditor in the area of internal control evaluation and overall risk management of a firm can 
be used by an external auditor resulting in a reduction in the nature and extent of the 
substantive testing by the external auditor (AuASB 2006). 
2.3.1.4 External audit 
The external audit function serves a vital economic purpose and plays an important 
role in serving the public interest of strengthening accountability and reinforcing trust and 
confidence in financial reporting. Audits, therefore, help enhance economic prosperity by 
expanding the variety, number and value of transactions that stakeholders are prepared to 
enter into with a firm (Jubb et al. 2008; Leung et al. 2007). 
The role of an external audit to provide assurance on the quality of publicly reported 
accounting information limits the firm’s ability to manipulate accounting information. This, 
in turn, reduces the firm’s ability to extract wealth from outside shareholders. For instance, 
an external auditor can note when a controlling owner manages earnings downward to justify 
low cash dividends paid to outside shareholders, or when the controlling owner profits from 
transactions with the firm that the controlling owner manages by manipulating accounting 
numbers to influence the selling or purchase price of the transactions (Fan and Wong 2005). 
In addition, publicly reported accounting information, which measures a firm’s 
financial position and performance, can be used as important input information in various 
corporate governance mechanisms such as managerial incentive plans (Bushman and Smith 
2001). Whether and how reported accounting information is used in the governance of a firm 
depends on the quality and credibility of such information. The external auditor plays an 
important role in verifying the reported financial information. 
As indicated in Section 2.2, the audit function is one mechanism to manage the 
agency costs which arise as a result of the differing interests of owners and managers of 
firms (Collier and Gregory 1999; Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Specifically, the 
audit function enhances the credibility of financial statements prepared by management and 
since key corporate governance responsibilities within a firm include ensuring the integrity 
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of reported financial information and effectiveness of risk management processes by firms, 
the audit function, therefore, is an integral component of an effective corporate governance 
regulatory regime. 
2.3.1.5 Overall summary 
Corporate governance is concerned with the systems of law, regulations and 
practices that promote enterprise and ensure accountability by encouraging transparency and 
probity in corporate affairs. Thereby, corporate governance makes a major contribution to 
improving business standards (Abbott et al. 2007; Daily, Dalton, and Cannella 2003; PWC 
1997; Williamson 1984). There are important factors internal to the firm (such as the board 
of directors, audit committees, internal audit functions) and important external factors to the 
firm (such as external auditing, laws and regulations and competitive markets) which ensure 
the proper functioning of an effective corporate governance system. 
2.3.2 Australia’s auditing environment 
Auditing is a unique profession in the sense that auditing is a private enterprise that 
operates in the public interest and seeks to improve firm operations and practices. In 
addition, auditing is a diverse profession ranging from multinational public accounting firms 
to small one-person accounting offices offering a broad range of assurance services (Jubb et 
al. 2008). Thus, it is unsurprising that there are a number of regulatory/government and 
professional organizations that exist to help regulate audit services provided by members of 
the auditing profession. 
The FRC is a statutory body established under Section 225 (1) of the ASIC Act 2001. 
The FRC was established in 1999 to have a broad oversight over the accounting standard-
setting process. Since introduction of the recent CLERP 9 changes, the oversight 
responsibility of the FRC was expanded to include oversight of the auditing standard-setting 
process, and monitoring auditor independence (Gay and Simnett 2007). 
The ASIC is an independent Commonwealth body established on 1 January 1991 
responsible for the registration of all company auditors. ASIC has the power to investigate all 
serious breaches of the Corporations Act 2001, recover property or damages and to lodge 
criminal prosecutions. Following CLERP 9 amendments, ASIC’s responsibilities were 
enhanced particularly in relation to enforcing auditor independence and registration 
requirements (Arens et al. 2002). The Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board is responsible for the discipline of auditors. ASIC can apply to the CALDB to have an 
auditor’s license suspended or cancelled if there is a breach by that auditor of the 
Corporations Act 2001. 
23 
 
The ASX operates as a listed firm but is also part of the regulatory regime within 
which listed firms disclose required financial information. Whilst not having a direct 
oversight function over the audit function, the ASX nevertheless mandates the form and 
nature of corporate disclosures via Listing Rules and continuous disclosure requirements 
(Jubb et al. 2008; Leung et al. 2007). The ASX, therefore, influences the external audit 
function. 
In addition to regulatory agencies that play a role in monitoring the audit function, 
there are also a number of professional organizations that represent the public accounting 
profession in Australia. These include: CPA Australia; the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia (ICAA); and the National Institute of Accountants (NIA). 
Membership to CPA Australia, ICAA or the NIA is necessary to satisfy the registration 
qualifications for auditors and liquidators. Also CPA Australia, ICAA and the NIA provide a 
broad range of services to respective members to ensure that the members serve the public 
interest when performing quality professional services (Hay, Knechel, and Ling 2008; Leung 
et al. 2007). 
The public accounting profession in Australia comprises a broad range of 
practitioners that can be classified into four groups: international, national and regional and 
suburban/local. International accounting/auditing firms have offices in major cities 
throughout the world and dominate the practice of public accountancy having the resources 
needed to service multinational firms. The largest firms among the international practices are 
(currently) commonly referred to as the Big4 and comprise of PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC), KPMG, Ernst & Young (EY) and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT) (Leung et al. 
2007). 
The Big4 auditors dominate the auditing services of the top firms listed in the ASX. 
In August 2006, Business Review Weekly (BRW) published details of the total fees and 
professional services provided by the Big4 to the top 200 ASX listed firms. Specifically, 
according to the BRW (2006): PwC had a 31% share with billings of $99.88 million and 63 
clients of the top 200 ASX listed firms (as clients); KPMG had a 27% share with total billings 
of $127.42 million and 55 clients audited; EY had a 24% share with billings of $102.87 
million and 47 clients; and DTT had a 11% share with billings of $28.24 million and 22 
clients. Meanwhile, smaller firms serviced the final 7% with billings of $3.25 million and 13 
clients audited (2006). 
National firms have offices in major cities in Australia and service mainly medium-
sized and small clients (Business Review Weekly 2006). Many national firms have some 
association with similar-sized firms in other countries to handle the international needs of 
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clients (PWC 1997). There are also regional and local firms whose size and type depends on 
the services provided and the needs of clients. Generally, regional and local firms serve small 
businesses and individuals in a restricted geographical area in the city or country and can 
range from individual practitioners with no professional staff to partnerships with five or 
more partners and between 15 to 20 professional staff (Business Review Weekly 2006). 
The widespread corporate collapses and subsequent audit reforms at the beginning of 
the 21st Century has resulted in the accounting and auditing profession revisiting core values 
and objectives, identifying major changes and initiatives for regaining public trust and 
safeguarding public interest. As a result of this paradigm shift, the role and functions of the 
auditing profession has diverged from the previous roles with a much sharper focus on 
safeguarding the integrity of a firm’s financial information with legally enforceable and 
internationally aligned auditing standards (Gay and Simnett 2007; Leung et al. 2007). The 
various private and public sector regulatory agencies and professional accounting 
organizations in Australia collectively play a critical role in ensuring the successful transition 
of the audit function into this current environment by focusing on factors such as standard 
setting, quality control and government regulation (Arens et al. 2002). 
2.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING AUDIT FEES 
Determining an audit fee which is mutually acceptable to auditors and auditees is a 
dilemma common to both parties due to the multiple conflicting business environment 
relationships. For instance, auditors deserves fair compensation for services provided and 
auditees should be assured key stakeholders are getting appropriate value from auditors for 
audit fees paid (Maher, Tiessen, Colson, and Broman 1992). Regulators, meanwhile, are 
responsible for protecting the interests of the investing public whilst independent auditors 
help maintain confidence in the marketplace (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Much of the research in audit fee markets (Felix et al. 2001; Hay et al. 2006) has 
followed the seminal work by Simunic (1980) and investigated a number of firm and auditor 
attributes associated with audit fee variation such as firm size, complexity, risk and auditor 
size and specialization. Such attributes have consistently been found to influence audit fees 
across various studies, sample sizes and countries (Hay et al. 2006). In fact, a common 
methodology has developed from the literature examining the determinants of audit fees, 
largely based on Simunic’s (1980) original work. Typically, an estimation model is created 
by regressing audit fees against a range of measures which proxy for attributes hypothesized 
to increase or decrease audit fees (Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt 2007; Ho and Ng 1996; 
Thinggaard and Kiertzner 2008).  
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Simunic (1980) initiated the research on audit fee modeling by investigating the 
level of competition in the USA audit market for publicly held firms using a multiple 
regression model with ten independent variables classified into three audit cost categories 
(that is, loss exposure, loss sharing and auditor production function) and a dichotomous 
variable for firm type (Big8 versus non-Big8 auditor). The audit fee was the dependent 
variable. Data was collected from 397 firms that responded to a 1977 survey. Details of the 
independent variables in each category of his seminal study are provided in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1:  
 Audit Cost Categories in Simunic’s (1980) Study 
Loss exposure Loss sharing Auditor production function 
Total assets at year-end Net income divided by total assets Number of years auditee has used 
current auditor 
Number of subsidiaries Dummy variable given the value of 1 
if auditee incurred a loss in any of the 
last 3 years, and 0 otherwise 
 
Industry classification Dummy variable given the value of 1 
if auditee received a qualified audit 
opinion, and 0 otherwise 
 
Foreign assets divided by total assets 
at year-end 
  
Accounts, loans and notes receivable 
divided by total assets at year-end 
  
Inventories divided by total assets at 
year-end 
  
The Simunic (1980) study revealed that the market for audit services was 
competitive in the USA for both large and small auditee segments, with larger audit firms 
having economies of scale. However, there were no overall price differences between Big8 
and non-Big8 auditors of both large and small auditees. This suggested that the higher 
charge-out rates of Big8 audit firms counteracted any economies of scale (hence, the cost 
savings were not passed onto auditees). The seminal study by Simunic (1980) led to 
numerous replications and extensions in the audit markets of other countries to test for what 
is often referred to as ‘quality-differentiated’ audit pricing. Simunic’s (1980) seminal study 
also represents one of the first audit fee studies attempting to distinguish between the various 
theories explaining the higher pricing of audits by brand name audit firms. 
Essentially, Simunic (1980) presented a production perspective of the auditing 
process in which he (Simunic 1980) believed that there were certain common drivers 
associated with the variation of audit fees.10
1980
 The number of explanatory drivers/variables has 
grown substantially since the work of Simunic ( ). In a competitive market with 
homogeneous products and audit production processes, a strong association of cost and audit 
fees is unsurprising. 
                                                     
10  Simunic (1980) deemed that the identified drivers caused the auditor to alter the number and type of audit procedures used 
during the audit. 
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The number and extent of audit procedures applied should be the primary 
determinants of audit fees since the auditor determines the audit fee (Chan et al. 1993; 
Chung and Lindsay 1988; Hay et al. 2006; Simunic 1980; Taffler and Ramalingam 1982; 
Turpin 1995). However, since most audit procedures cannot be observed explicitly when 
undertaken or appropriate access to auditor working papers achieved, alternative measures 
are needed to proxy for the audit procedures. For example, the literature has formulated 
various firm attributes such as size, complexity and risk as appropriate proxies for the 
number and extent of audit procedures completed by the external auditor. This study adopts a 
similar approach and uses a number of attributes to proxy for audit work undertaken by the 
auditor. 
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the empirical literature 
impacting audit fees.11
2.4.1 Firm size 
 The literature is classified under the various proxies/measures that 
have been used to investigate the association between the firm and auditor attributes and 
audit fees. Table 2.2 at the end of the chapter provides details of the studies in chronological 
order. 
It is often argued (and empirically found) that the larger the firm being audited, the 
greater the audit fee charged to the firm (Abbott, Parker, Peters, and Raghunandan 2003a; 
Caneghem 2010; Carcello et al. 2002; Karim and Moizer 1996; Mitra et al. 2007; Naser and 
Nuseibeh 2007; Redmayne, Bradbury, and Cahan 2010; Simon and Francis 1988; 
Thinggaard and Kiertzner 2008; Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008). It is logical 
given that, (ceteris paribus), the larger the firm the greater the number of work processes and 
amount of transactions require audit attention. This will manifest itself in the form of 
increased audit procedures that will, in turn, increase audit fees (Carcello and Nagy 2004; 
Francis 1984). Firm size is typically measured by total assets, although researchers have also 
used total sales, net assets and number of employees as alternative measures (Pfeffer 1973; 
Reynolds and Francis 2001; Zhou and Elder 2002). Studies using firm size as a determinant 
of audit fees are detailed below under the headings of the proxies/measures used. 
2.4.1.1 Total assets 
Virtually every study (beginning with Simunic (1980)) examining audit fee 
modeling, regardless of country and period of study, has documented a significant positive 
relationship between a firm’s total assets and audit fees (Al-Harshani 2008; Beasley and 
Petroni 2001; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Chan et al. 1993; Dunmore and Shao 2006; Wang 
                                                     
11  The groupings/headings used in the following paragraphs (that is, firm size, complexity, risk and audit firm characteristics) 
are purely for exposition purposes and are not necessarily intended to be categories used in subsequent analysis. 
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and Sewon 2009; Zang, Choi, and Kim 2010). The empirical results of prior research clearly 
indicate that larger firms require greater audit effort thereby resulting in higher audit fees. 
Three studies deserve individual attention given that the studies occurred in 
Australia. The studies in question were undertaken by Francis (1984), Gerrard, Houghton 
and Woodliff (1994) and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006a). Francis (1984) adapted 
Simunic’s (1980) model for use in studying the Australian audit market. Francis (1984) used 
a random sample of 30 industrial firms listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange from each of 
the years 1974-1978, totaling 150. Seventy-one (71) firms employed Big8 accounting firms 
and 79 employed non-Big8 firms. This is consistent with the fact that Big8 firms audited 
approximately half the publicly-traded firms in Australia at that time. The sample was 
partitioned into ‘small’ and ‘large’ auditees (based on the median auditee asset value) to 
assess the joint effects of product differentiation and economies of scale. One of two 
hypotheses tested, suggested that audit practice size had no effect on audit prices in 
Australia. The audit practice size hypothesis was rejected, supporting the existence of 
product differentiation by the Big8 audit firms in the Australian audit services market. 
Francis (1984) found that Big8 firms were associated with higher audit fees for large 
auditees, consistent with the perception that the larger audit practices provide higher quality 
audits. 
Gerrard, Houghton and Woodliff (1994) sought to determine the extent to which 
audit fees could be explained by variables already identified in the prior literature. Firms 
selected for inclusion in this study were the 300 largest publicly-listed firms (by asset size) in 
Australia during the 1980s. The authors selected 13 alternative measures of auditee size, four 
measures of firm complexity, internal audit, type of auditor and industry differences as 
possible explanatory and control variables (Gerrard et al. 1994). The results indicated that 
auditee size (particularly total assets) and complexity were clearly significant, with various 
alternative measures for both auditee size and complexity achieving high levels of 
explanatory power also. 
Finally, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006a) published the results of a study 
conducted in Australia which examined the relationship between the number of employees in 
an internal audit function  and audit fees. The data was collected from a survey of all 
Australian publicly listed firms in October 2000, from which there were 406 usable 
responses.12
                                                     
12  Additional information on the 406 firms was also obtained from the firm’s annual reports. 
 The results of this study suggest a significant positive association between the 
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internal audit function and audit fees (with the highest explanatory variable in the regression 
model being the firm’s total assets). 
2.4.1.2 Total sales 
Other studies sought to examine if sales was a significant predictor of audit fees. 
Taylor and Baker (1981), after examining the regression estimation model for audit fees first 
formulated by Simunic (1980), sought to determine if firm size continued to have a 
significant relationship with audit fees if a firm’s total sales was used as a proxy/measure for 
firm size instead of total assets. The Taylor and Baker (1981) study (and others (for example, 
Chan et al. 1993; Chaney, Jeter, and Shivakumar 2004; Clatworthy and Peel 2007; Firth 
1985)) using a firm’s total sales as a proxy for firm size concluded that firm’s total sales was 
also a significant explanatory variable for audit fees. 
2.4.1.3 Net assets and number of employees as proxies for firm size 
Firth (1985) utilized net assets of a firm whilst Naser and Nuseibeh (2007) used total 
number of employees within a firm as alternative measures to investigate the extent of the 
association between firm size and audit fees. In both cases, results from Firth (1985) and 
Naser and Nuseibeh (2007) indicated that a firm’s net assets, or number of employees, were 
significant surrogates for firm size in explaining the variation in audit fees (although the 
explanatory power for net assets and number of employees was less than that of total assets 
and sales). Subsequent studies have also indicated the positive relationship between the 
number of employees and audit fees (Choi, Kim, Kim, and Zang 2010; Mitra, Deis, and 
Hossain 2009; Zang et al. 2010). 
2.4.2 Firm complexity  
The more complex the nature of the firm, the more difficult the firm will be to audit. 
More time, therefore, will be needed to complete the audit. This resulting task complexity 
will, in turn, increase the audit effort to first, understand, and second, develop appropriate 
audit procedures to manage the complexity. The increase in audit effort will, naturally, 
translate into higher audit fees (for example, Anderson and Zeghal 1994; Chan et al. 1993; 
Choi et al. 2005; Chung and Lindsay 1988; Firth 1985; Francis 1984; Francis and Simon 
1987; Ho and Ng 1996; Karim and Moizer 1996; Low, Tan, and Koh 1990; Simon, 
Ramanan, and Dugar 1986; Simunic 1980; Taffler and Ramalingam 1982; Taylor 1997).  
Firm complexity has been measured in a number of different ways by researchers 
(Maher et al. 1992; Thinggaard and Kiertzner 2008). The most typical measures include: 
number of domestic subsidiaries; number of foreign subsidiaries; the number of business and 
geographic segments; and certain types of general ledger balances. Overall, while the choice 
of proxies measuring firm complexity has varied across studies, the empirical evidence 
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clearly supports a significant positive relationship between firm complexity and audit fees. 
Studies using firm complexity as a determinant of audit fees are detailed below under the 
headings of the proxies/measures used. 
2.4.2.1 Decentralization and diversified operations 
A decentralized and diversified firm has much greater complexity of operations than 
a firm that operates as a single entity in one industry and location. Published studies have 
suggested that audit fees are higher when a firm has: (a) a greater number of domestic and/or 
foreign subsidiaries (Dunmore and Shao 2006; Ho and Hutchinson 2010; Redmayne et al. 
2010; Simunic 1980; Taylor and Baker 1981; Thinggaard and Kiertzner 2008); (b) a high 
number of locations and countries of operations (Al-Harshani 2008; Felix et al. 2001; 
Palmrose 1986b; Taylor and Baker 1981; Zang et al. 2010); (c) operates in more than one 
industry (Low et al. 1990); (d) has more than one business segment (Choi et al. 2005; 
Hoitash, Markelevich, and Barragato 2007; Mitra et al. 2009); and (e) conducts foreign sales 
(Clatworthy and Peel 2007). In terms of the impact on audit fee, the complex nature of the 
firm’s operations, result in the auditor spending more time and effort in planning, 
coordinating and executing auditing procedures. In addition, the greater the complexity of 
transactions and processes within the firm, the greater the number and type of difficulties 
expected to arise during the audit (Firth and Liau-Tan 1998; Ho and Ng 1996). 
2.4.2.2 Financial balances of a firm 
Certain general ledger balances within a firm require more time for an auditor to 
verify. Simunic (1980), suggested that accounts receivable and inventory balances pose one 
such difficulty given the need to undertake confirmation, observation and valuation 
procedures. Simunic (1980) indicated that valuation tasks in relation to the two 
aforementioned accounts prove particularly difficult and require a forecast of future events 
which proved difficult and time-consuming for the auditor to verify (for example, the 
likelihood of non-receipt of bad/doubtful debts for accounts receivable and determining the 
net realizable value for inventory). 
Other research utilizing accounts receivable and inventory as a percentage of total 
assets has been undertaken in other countries, time-periods and sample sizes (Caneghem 
2010; Iyer and Iyer 1996; Jeong, Jung, and Lee 2005; Wang and Sewon 2009). Results are 
generally consistent with Simunic (1980). The results suggested that accounts receivable and 
inventory balances, when used as explanatory variables for firm complexity, had a 
significant positive association with audit fees (Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt 2007; Hoitash 
et al. 2007; Mitra et al. 2009; Simon et al. 1986). 
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2.4.3 Firm risk 
Audit fees are also thought to be positively associated with the risk of the audit 
engagement as certain parts of an audit may have a higher risk of error (Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent 2006a; Simunic 1980). Examples of such risk indicators include low firm 
profitability, poor liquidity/solvency ratios, operating losses sustained by a firm and the 
issuance of a qualified audit report by the auditor. Such risks require the formulation of 
additional and specialized audit procedures by the auditor in order to prevent the issuance of 
an incorrect audit opinion (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a; Simunic 1980). The auditor 
will, therefore, increase both the number and type of audit procedures in order to ensure that 
the financial statements of the firm truthfully and fairly reflect the financial performance of 
the firm. 
Firm profitability is often considered a measure of risk faced by the auditor as it 
represents the extent to which the auditor may be susceptible to legal exposure if the firm is 
no longer financially solvent (Simunic 1980). Generally, the poorer the financial 
performance of the firm, the greater the risk of manipulation by management (for example, 
in the form of asset revaluations and earnings management) (Menon and Williams 2001; 
Parkash and Venable 1993; Taylor and Baker 1981). This risk increases both the number and 
complexity of auditing procedures employed by the auditor which, in turn, increases audit 
fees. The types of variables normally used in prior studies to measure firm risk are: 
profitability ratios (for example, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)); 
solvency and liquidity ratios (for example, current, quick and debt ratios); the existence of an 
operating loss; and the issuance of a qualified audit opinion in the prior period (Simon and 
Taylor 1997; Solomon, Shields, and Whittington 1999; Taylor and Baker 1981; Turpin 
1995). Studies using firm risk as a determinant of audit fees are detailed below under the 
headings of the proxies/measures used. 
2.4.3.1 Profitability ratios 
Profitability ratios reflect the financial performance of a firm. Poor profitability 
ratios suggest that a firm is not performing well financially. This poor financial performance 
increases audit risk resulting in a greater number of audit procedures and, therefore, a higher 
audit fee. The past literature has used a number of different profitability ratios as a proxy for 
firm risk when assessing impact on audit fees. Such profitability ratios include: ROA; ROE 
and book-to-market-ratio (BTM) (Chan et al. 1993; Choi et al. 2010; Clatworthy and Peel 
2007; Francis 1984). 
Simunic (1980) was the first to utilize ROA as a profitability ratio to proxy for firm 
risk when investigating audit fee variation. The successful use by Simunic’s (1980) of ROA 
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as a proxy for firm risk resulted in other researchers using alternative profitability ratios such 
as ROE (Al-Harshani 2008; Chan et al. 1993; Clatworthy and Peel 2007; Dunmore and Shao 
2006; Francis 1984; Ho and Hutchinson 2010; Naser and Nuseibeh 2007) and BTM (Antle, 
Gordon, Narayanamoorthy, and Zhou 2006; Hoitash et al. 2007; Zang et al. 2010). Most of 
the research using ROE and BTM as proxies for firm risk also resulted in a significant 
association with audit fees. 
2.4.3.2 Liquidity/solvency ratios 
Researchers have also used a wide range of liquidity/solvency ratios to proxy for 
firm risk: including current ratio (Caneghem 2010; Chaney et al. 2004; Francis 1984; Hay et 
al. 2008; Low et al. 1990); quick ratio (Al-Harshani 2008; Antle et al. 2006; Chaney et al. 
2004; Dunmore and Shao 2006; Francis 1984; Mitra et al. 2009); leverage ratio (Antle et al. 
2006; Choi et al. 2005; Clatworthy and Peel 2007; Felix et al. 2001; Givoly and Hayn 2002; 
Ho and Hutchinson 2010; Hoitash et al. 2007; Jeong et al. 2005; Karim and Moizer 1996; 
Naser and Nuseibeh 2007; Redmayne et al. 2010; Simon et al. 1986; Thinggaard and 
Kiertzner 2008; Venkataraman et al. 2008); and debt ratio (Al-Harshani 2008; Chaney et al. 
2004; Dunmore and Shao 2006; Firth 1997; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a; Singh and 
Newby 2010). 
In Australia, Francis (1984) was the first researcher to use the current and quick 
ratios to proxy for firm risk when assessing the joint effects of Big8 auditor product 
differentiation and economies of scale in the Australian audit market. Francis (1984) 
concluded that the current and quick ratios had significant explanatory power in supporting 
the existence of product differentiation by the Big8 audit firms in the Australian audit 
services market. 
Simon et al. (1986) were the first researchers to use the leverage ratio to proxy for 
firm risk when investigating audit fee variation in India. Simon et al. (1986) concluded that 
firm risk variables (proxied by the leverage ratio) were significant in explaining why Big8 
auditors received higher audit fees in the Indian audit market than other firms. Firth (1997) 
used a ‘new’ ratio (debt ratio) to proxy for firm risk when investigating audit fee variation in 
Norway. Firth’s (1997) results showed that although total assets (proxying for firm assets) 
were significant in explaining the variation of audit fees, the debt ratio was not significant. 
The result suggests possibly that long-term assets or liabilities do not play a significant role 
in the determination of annual audit fees (Firth 1997). 
2.4.3.3 Operating loss 
The existence of an operating loss can increase the risk to a firm’s long-term 
survival. A number of researchers have investigated the relationship between loss (proxying 
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for firm risk) and audit fees (Ho and Hutchinson 2010; Low et al. 1990; Venkataraman et al. 
2008). Surprisingly, results have been mixed. A number of studies indicate that the operating 
loss of a firm has no significant bearing on the amount of audit fees charged by auditors 
(Dunmore and Shao 2006; Firth 1985; Venkataraman et al. 2008). Other researchers, 
meanwhile, have discovered a significant positive relationship between the operating loss by 
a firm and higher audit fees charged (Choi et al. 2005; Hoitash et al. 2007; Low et al. 1990; 
Wang and Sewon 2009). Although results appear mixed, generally the empirical results 
suggest that the operating loss by a firm does not have a significant association with the 
variation in audit fees. This suggests that auditors do not consider the operating loss of a firm 
as a major factor in the risk assessment of a firm. 
2.4.3.4 Qualified audit opinion 
Issuance, by an auditor, of a qualified audit opinion to a firm suggests to users that 
the auditor has an unresolved disagreement with management about the true and fair nature 
of the financial statements produced by management. The qualified audit opinion suggests 
that there exist significant uncertainties about the firm’s operations that may result in future 
losses to the firm (Simunic 1980). As is the case for operating losses proxying for firm risk, 
the issuance of a qualified audit report as a proxy for firm risk has received mixed support 
from prior empirical results. Simunic (1980) and Jeong et al. (2005) suggest that a qualified 
audit opinion does significantly increase audit fees (as a result of the higher audit risk). 
However, a number of studies using a qualified audit opinion as a proxy for firm risk 
indicate that audit fees do not alter significantly when a firm is issued a qualified audit report 
(for example, Antle et al. 2006; Fama 1980; Francis 1984; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
2006a; Jeong et al. 2005; Johnson, Walker, and Westergaard 1995; Low et al. 1990). 
2.4.4 Audit firm characteristics 
Higher audit fees might be expected when an auditor is recognized to be of superior 
quality. Generally, researchers have used a dummy variable for auditing firms classified as 
being a Big Firm (Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt 2007; Gore, Pope, and Singh 2001; 
Krishnan 2003). The literature postulates that a Big Firm auditor brings a higher level of 
quality to the engagement and will, therefore, charge a higher audit fee as a result of this 
quality/product differentiation (Basu, Hwang, and Jan 2000; Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 
2008; Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Krishnan 2003; 
Willenborg 2002). Although the literature generally supports this relationship, some studies 
have failed to find a significant relationship between a Big Firm auditor and audit fees 
(Chaney et al. 2004; Firth 1985; Johnson et al. 1995). 
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Industry specialist auditors may also charge higher audit fees. Specialist auditors are 
likely to invest more in staff recruitment and training, information technology and state-of-
the-art audit technologies compared to non-specialist auditors (Dopuch and Simunic 1982). 
In addition to having more resources and expertise compared to non-specialist auditors, 
specialist auditors also enjoy a brand-name reputation which auditors protect. The 
reputational argument is consistent with O’Keefe et al. (1994) that specialist auditors exhibit 
greater compliance with auditing standards than non-specialist auditors in a desire to reduce 
reputational damage and litigation risk. Specialist auditors, therefore, seek to re-coup the 
investment in resources, expertise and reputation by charging a higher audit fee to the 
auditee. 
A third audit firm characteristics used in investigating audit fee variation is the 
provision of non-audit services by the external auditor. Non-audit services may result in an 
increase in audit fees due to two reasons: (1), such services may lead to changes in a firm 
which will then require additional auditing (Hoitash et al. 2007); and, (2), the firm may have 
no choice but to pay a higher audit fee as a result of becoming dependent on such non-audit 
services (Palmrose 1986b). On the other hand, it is also argued that the provision of non-
audit services can lead to lower audit fees as a result of cross-subsidization of fees or 
synergies between audit and non-audit services (Dunmore and Shao 2006; Felix et al. 
2001).13
A fourth audit firm characteristic that has been examined is auditor tenure. It is 
postulated that auditors with longer ties with firms have a greater familiarity with the firm, 
the firm’s accounting system and related internal controls (Beck et al. 1998a; Ghosh and 
Moon 2005). Given that the familiarity reduces firm complexity, the auditor requires less 
effort annually to understand the firm’s operations and the saving in time translates to a 
lower audit fee (Kesner 1988; Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller 2004). 
 
Studies using audit firm characteristics as a determinant of audit fees are detailed 
below under the headings of the proxies/measures used. 
2.4.4.1 Big Firm auditor 
Large international auditing providers may receive a fee premium for services 
consistent with the existence of a quality-differentiated audit. Simunic (1980) was the first 
researcher to investigate and confirm that the existence of a Big Firm auditor increases audit 
fees. Subsequent to Simunic (1980), almost all subsequent audit fee modeling literature has 
                                                     
13  For example, Simunic (1984) suggests that the provision of auditing and non-auditing services to a firm may result in 
knowledge advantages which allow cost savings to be passed on to the firm in the form a lower audit fee. 
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used a Big Firm variable to either assess or control for audit fee variation. The literature 
suggests that Big Firms auditors do have a significant positive relationship with audit fees 
(Antle et al. 2006; Caneghem 2010; Gerrard et al. 1994; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a; 
Karim and Moizer 1996). 
2.4.4.2 Auditor industry specialization 
Bonner and Lewis (1990) found that, on average, more experienced auditors 
outperformed less experienced auditors. Bedard and Biggs (1991 ) observed that auditors 
with more manufacturing experience were better able to identify errors in a manufacturing 
client’s data than auditors with less manufacturing experience. The observation is consistent 
with Johnson et al. (1991) that industry experience is associated with an enhanced ability to 
detect fraud. Maletta and Wright (1996) noted fundamental differences in error 
characteristics and methods of detection across industries. This suggested that auditors with a 
more comprehensive understanding of an industry’s characteristics and trends will be more 
effective in an audit than auditors without such industry knowledge. Specialist auditors are 
also more likely to develop databases detailing industry-specific best practices, industry-
specific risks and errors and unusual transactions, all of which serve to enhance overall audit 
effectiveness (Krishnan 2003). Specialist auditors, therefore, seek higher audit fees in 
exchange for the superior audit quality brought to the engagement (Choi et al. 2010; 
Redmayne et al. 2010). 
2.4.4.3 Non-audit services 
Palmrose (1986b) was the first researcher to provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between fees for audit services and fees for three other categories of non-audit 
services (that is, accounting-related management advisory services (MAS), non-accounting 
MAS and taxation services). The positive relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees 
rested on the premise of joint-supply benefits where the firm perceived (rightly or not) that 
the firm was better off with the joint supply of audit and non-audit services. Subsequent 
research examining the audit fees and non-audit fees relationship also found support for the 
joint-supply theory (Choi et al. 2010; Dunmore and Shao 2006; Felix et al. 2001; Hoitash et 
al. 2007; Lee, Mande, and Ortman 2003a). However, prior empirical literature also points, in 
a few instances, to circumstances where there is a negative relationship between the quantum 
of audit fees and the amount of non-audit services provided to the auditee by the incumbent 
auditor (Antle et al. 2006; Jeong et al. 2005). The suggestion, in the latter case, is that the 
supply of non-audit services is more productive than auditing services. 
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2.4.4.4 Auditor tenure 
Simunic (1980) believed that the greater the length of relationship between the 
auditor and firm, the greater the knowledge and understanding the auditor has of the firm’s 
operations and accounting system. This translated into less audit work and consequently, a 
lower audit fee. Surprisingly, Simunic’s (1980) results indicated that there was no significant 
relationship in auditor tenure for explaining variations of audit fees. One possible reason for 
this is that the auditor may not be passing ‘cost-savings’ derived from the reduced audit work 
to the firm. In fact, subsequent studies examining auditor tenure (in terms of measures such 
as length of years, new auditor or change of auditor) have produced mixed results. Some 
studies have shown a positive relationship between auditor tenure and audit fees (Felix et al. 
2001; Hoitash et al. 2007; Wang and Sewon 2009). Alternative studies show no significant 
association between auditor tenure and audit fees (Antle et al. 2006; Caneghem 2010; 
Johnson et al. 1995). 
2.4.4.5 Other audit firm characteristics 
Over time, a number of researchers have used other proxies to measure audit firm 
characteristics in an effort to determine the association with audit fees (Dunmore and Shao 
2006; Francis et al. 1999). Iyer and Iyer (1996), for example, examined the effects of the 
1989 mergers of four Big8 firms in the United Kingdom (UK) on audit fees. Their (Iyer and 
Iyer 1996) results indicated that there were no differences in the level of audit fees between 
the two periods. Jeong, Jung and Lee (2005), meanwhile, gathered data on firms listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange to investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor 
assignment and the joint provision of non-audit and audit services. They (Jeong, Jung and 
Lee 2005) discovered that assigned auditors charged significantly higher audit fees than 
freely selected auditors suggesting that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor 
independence (as reflected in higher audit fees). 
Hay, Knechel and Ling (2008), in an effort to provide evidence on whether internal 
control and external auditing act as substitutes for one another or complement each other, 
found that a ‘new’ auditor variable had no significant explanatory role in the determination 
of audit fees.14 2007 Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt ( ) sought to research the factors that 
influenced audit fees in France where the law requires a joint auditing process involving two 
separate auditors for firms that publish consolidated financial statements. They (Gonthier-
Besacier and Schatt 2007) used the amount of consulting fees paid by the firm to the auditor 
(as a proxy for the audit firm) and determined that consulting fees did not have significant 
explanatory power in explaining the variation in audit fees. Finally, Venkataraman et al. 
                                                     
14  The ‘new’ auditor variable referred to the firm having appointed a new auditor for the year. 
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(2008) used the initial public offerings (IPOs) setting in USA to examine the relationship 
between auditor exposure to legal liability and audit fees. Venkataraman et al.’s (2008) 
findings support the view that, in an IPO market where significant information asymmetries 
exist, auditors receive higher fees for the increase in litigation risk. 
2.4.5 Corporate governance 
It is suggested in prior research that a number of corporate governance variables 
affect audit fees (Abbott et al. 2003b; Carcello et al. 2002). Subsequent to a number of high 
profile corporate collapses within Australia and overseas in the early part of the century, 
existing rules and regulations were amended/strengthened in a number of countries to 
improve, among other things, the quality of corporate financial reporting processes. 
Specifically, regulatory changes were made to the composition and structure of corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the board of directors and audit committees within listed 
firms (ASX CGC 2003). It was postulated that a firm with better corporate governance 
practices choose to pay higher audit fees given that the external audit is viewed as a 
monitoring activity in improving the overall corporate governance profile of the firm (Abbott 
et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2002; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi 2006; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 2007; Singh and Newby 2010; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt 2003). Studies using 
corporate governance characteristics as determinants of audit fees are detailed below under 
the headings of the proxies/measures used. 
2.4.5.1 Board of directors 
A firm’s board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for accountability matters 
within a firm and report to shareholders. The board of directors also interacts with the audit 
function in an effort to both maintain auditor independence and assist the auditor with any 
problems during the conduct of the audit. A number of studies have attempted to investigate 
the link between board of director’s characteristics and audit fees. Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent (2006a) and Hay, Knechel, and Ling (2008) both determined that firms with 
external/independent board members who met regularly paid higher audit fees to auditors. 
This confirmed the complementary relationship thought to exist between key corporate 
governance mechanisms of firms and external audit. 
2.4.5.2 Audit committees 
The formation of the audit committee is the result of the renewed emphasis on 
corporate governance since early 1990s. While the board of directors is acknowledged as the 
ultimate corporate governance mechanism for monitoring the financial reporting process 
within a firm, responsibility for the general and day-to-day oversight is ordinarily delegated 
to the audit committee (Abbott et al. 2003b; Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Neal 2006; Klein 
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2002). Specifically, one of the key responsibilities of the audit committee is to provide 
oversight over the quality of financial reporting and corporate accountability (Lee and 
Mande 2005; Pincus, Rusbarsky, and Wong 1989). In this respect, the audit committee is 
also the agent between the board of directors and the external auditor. The audit committee 
deals extensively with the external auditor in order to ensure the external auditor’s 
independence and overall audit effectiveness (Hay et al. 2008). In this respect, an audit 
committee is expected to impact positively on the quantum of audit fees charged to the firm. 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006a) published a study conducted in Australia in 
which, among other things, the relationship between several structural and operational 
features of an audit committee were used to assess changes in audit fees. Specifically, 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006a) utilized audit committee member independence, member 
financial expertise and frequency of meetings as proxies for an effective audit committee and 
concluded that firms with effective audit committees tended to pay higher audit fees 
signaling the complementary association between both forms (that is, audit committees and 
external audit) of corporate monitoring. 
2.4.5.3 Internal audit 
The internal audit function is viewed by many scholars as part of the solution to the 
perceived control, reporting and ethical problems in the corporate sector (for example, Brody 
and Kaplan 1996; Brody and Lowe 2000; Carcello et al. 2005; Hayland and Verrault 2003). 
Unlike the audit committee, the internal audit function’s benefit to a firm lies at the 
operational level rather than as part of a ‘higher level’ oversight structure. Research into the 
relationship between internal audit and audit fees has highlighted both a negative and 
positive relationship between the two monitoring mechanisms (Felix et al. 2001; Hay et al. 
2006; Ho and Hutchinson 2010; Singh and Newby 2010). 
Findings showing a negative relationship between internal audit and audit fees 
suggest that internal audit can be regarded, at least in part, as a substitute for external audit, 
as internal auditors can be involved in the actual conduct of an external audit by working as 
assistants under the direct supervision of external auditors (particularly, in the USA) (Felix et 
al. 2001). Alternatively, this relationship could arise from a lower assessment of audit risk 
resulting from internal audit involvement in strengthening controls within the organization 
(Felix et al. 2001; Palmrose 1986a; Wallace 1984). 
Alternatively, findings showing a positive relationship between internal audit and 
audit fees suggest that internal audit and external audit can be regarded as complementary 
means of increasing the overall monitoring in an organization (Gerrard et al. 1994). This is 
consistent with the broader role of internal audit since early 2000, which has evolved from 
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one which was narrowly focused on controls to one which now also embraces risk 
management and corporate governance principles (Anderson and Zeghal 1994; Gerrard et al. 
1994; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a; Hay et al. 2008). Hence, firms more committed to 
a strong corporate governance culture are likely to engage in greater levels of internal 
auditing as well as being prepared to pay for a higher quality external audit (Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent 2006a; Hay et al. 2006). This view suggests that the internal audit function 
is unlikely to be restricted to activities directly related to the external audit and that firms 
which are more committed to strong corporate governance are likely to engage in both 
greater levels of internal auditing as well as external audit. 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent’s (2006a) study (conducted in Australia) examined the 
relationship between the number of employees in an internal audit function (winsorized to a 
maximum of 25) and audit fees. Data was collected from a survey of all Australian publicly 
listed firms in 2000 resulting in 406 usable responses.15
2.4.6 Other measures 
 The results of this study suggest a 
significant positive association between the internal audit function and audit fees, implying 
that firms use internal audit and external auditors as complementary monitoring mechanisms 
rather than viewing internal audit as a substitute for the external audit (Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent 2006a; Hay et al. 2006). 
Other measures exist which are postulated to impact audit fees. A common claim 
made by auditors and researchers is that certain industries are more difficult to audit than 
others (Gerrard et al. 1994; Gramling and Stone 2001; Kwon 1996). For example, 
telecommunication services and utilities have relatively large assets but are easier to audit 
than firms with extensive receivables and inventories, such as manufacturers (Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent 2006a; Simunic 1980). A number of researchers have used industry 
dummy variables to investigate if there is an industry-effect on audit fees (Gerrard et al. 
1994; Gramling, Johnson, and Khurana 2000). Results from published studies are conflicting 
with some studies indicating a significant relationship between industry with audit fees 
(Anderson and Zeghal 1994; Gerrard et al. 1994; Hoitash et al. 2007; Karim and Moizer 
1996; Naser and Nuseibeh 2007; Simunic 1980). Meanwhile, other studies indicate no 
relationship between industry and audit fees (Antle et al. 2006; Caneghem 2010; Clatworthy 
and Peel 2007; Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt 2007; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a; Lee 
and Mande 2005; Palmrose 1986a). 
                                                     
15  Additional information on the sampled 406 firms was also obtained from the annual reports. 
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Studies have also been completed suggesting that the legal regime of a country (Choi 
et al. 2005) and litigation risk (Venkataraman et al. 2008) have a significant positive 
relationship with audit fees. As such, given the riskier auditing environment for auditors, 
additional compensation is sought (in the form of higher audit fees) by auditors for the risks 
which the auditors undertake. 
2.4.7 Summary of audit fee determinants 
This study of audit fee determinants has made significant contributions in several 
areas since Simunic’s (1980) seminal study and led to a greater understanding of differences 
in the worldwide market for audit services. Subsequent research extended variations of 
Simunic’s (1980) model to a number of countries in varying stages of economic 
development. The results of such studies have shown remarkable consistency in the 
groupings/factors that explain audit fees. Specifically, in most studies, firm size, complexity 
and risk measures explain the majority of the variation in audit fees charged by external 
auditors to firms. Table 2.2 provides details of key empirical studies which have investigated 
audit fee modeling over the last 30 years. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of Prior Studies on Audit Fee Modeling: Chronological Order 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
1 Simunic, D. 
(1980) 
USA 1 207 firms 1977 Total assets Number of 
subsidiaries, 
accounts 
receivable and 
inventory 
balances 
ROA and 
issuance of a 
qualified 
opinion. 
Big8 auditor and 
length of auditor 
tenure with client. 
- Industries 
in which 
firms 
operates 
The market for audit services was competitive in 
the USA in both the large and small firm 
segments, with large audit firms having 
economies of scale. However, there were no 
overall price differences between Big8 and 
non-Big8 auditors of both small and large 
auditees, suggesting that the higher charge-out 
rates of Big8 audit firms counteracted the 
economies of scale (hence, the cost savings were 
not passed onto to firms). 
2 Taylor, M. E. and 
Baker, R. L. 
(1981) 
UK 126 firms 1976 and 
1977 
Total assets 
and total 
sales 
Number of 
subsidiaries and 
countries of 
operation 
- - - - Firm size and complexity measures were 
positively associated with audit fees. 
3 Francis, J. 
(1984) 
Australia 150 firms 1974 to 1978 Total assets 
 
Total number of 
subsidiaries 
 
Current ratio, 
Quick ratio, 
ROA, ROE 
and issuance 
of a qualified 
audit 
opinion. 
Big8 auditor 
 
- - Big8 audit firms were associated with higher 
audit fees for both large and small auditees. 
4 Wallace, W. 
(1984) 
USA 32 firms - - - - - Cost of internal 
audit function 
- A significant negative association existed 
between the total monetary resources consumed 
by an internal audit (used as a surrogate measure 
of external auditor’s reliance of the internal audit 
function) and audit fees, suggesting a negative 
relationship between the internal audit 
contribution to the financial statement audit and 
audit fees. 
5 Firth, M. (1985) New Zealand 96 firms 1981 and 
1983 
Total assets, 
net assets 
and total 
sales  
Total number of 
subsidiaries, 
receivables over 
total assets and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss and 
variability of 
profitability 
Big8 auditor - - There was no Big Firm fee premium effect, that 
is, the major audit firms did not charge more for 
their (Big Firm) services when the effects of 
other factors were controlled. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
6 Francis, J. and 
Stokes, D (1986) 
Australia 96 smallest and 
96 largest firms 
1983 - - - Big8 auditor - - Big8 audit prices were significantly higher than 
non-Big8 prices, suggesting the existence of 
product differentiation with respect to Big8 firms. 
Moreover, there are no significant differences in 
audit prices charged by the Big8 versus non-Big8 
firms. 
7 Palmrose, Z. V. 
(1986a) 
USA 361 firms 1980 Total assets Number of 
operating 
locations 
- Total of non-audit 
services 
Extent of 
internal audit 
involvement in 
external audit 
Dummy 
variable 
for all 
industries 
Larger firms were more likely to purchase MAS 
and that audit fees were higher for such firms, 
regardless of whether the MAS were provided by 
the principal auditor or another auditor. 
8 Simon, D. T., 
Ramanan, R. and 
Dugar, A. (1986) 
India 276 firms 1982-1984 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries, 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss and 
leverage 
ratio 
Big8 auditor - - The Big8 firms received higher audit fees in the 
Indian market than other firms, apparently as a 
result of product differentiation. 
 
9 Francis, J. and 
Simon, D. T. 
(1987) 
USA 210 firms 1984-1985 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries, 
total foreign 
subsidiaries 
over total 
subsidiaries, 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
- Big8 auditor - - Big8 audit fees were significantly higher than 
other firm types. 
10 Low, L., Tan, P. 
H. and Koh, H. C. 
(1990) 
Singapore 291 firms 1986 Total assets Number of 
different 
industries 
operating in, 
receivables over 
total assets and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss, current 
ratio and 
issuance of a 
qualified 
audit opinion 
- - - The results of the investigation showed a strong 
association between audit fees and the 
determinants in the audit fees model. 
Specifically, firm size was by far the most 
important factor in the determination of audit 
fees. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
11 Simon, D. T.,  
Teo, S. and 
Trompeter, G. 
(1992) 
Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, 
Singapore 
357 firms 1987 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries 
- Big6 auditor - - There was evidence of a Big6 audit firm fee 
premium in Hong Kong and Singapore but not in 
Malaysia. National regulations on foreign 
ownership and a significant number of family-
controlled firms in Malaysia were considered as 
potential explanations for a lower demand for 
quality-differentiated audits in Malaysia. 
12 Iyer, V. M. and 
Iyer, G. S. (1996) 
UK 150 firms 1988-1989 
and 1990 - 
1991 
Total assets Receivables 
over total assets 
and inventory 
over total assets 
- Auditor involved in a  
merger 
- - Firm size and complexity measures were 
significantly associated with audit fees, but that 
the merger status of the audit firm was not 
significant in either pre- or post-merger periods 
(implying that the mergers had no effect on audit 
fees). The results of the regression model also 
indicated that there were no differences in the 
level of audit fees between the two periods. 
13 Chan, P., 
Ezzamel, M. and 
Gwilliam, D. 
(1993) 
UK 985 firms 1989 Total sales Total number of 
subsidiaries 
ROE Big8 auditor - - A Big8 audit firm fee premium was observed for 
both large and small size auditees and three new 
variables: namely, extent of diversification, 
ownership control and audit location were also 
found to be significant predictors of audit fees. 
14 Gerrard, I. 
Houghton, K. and 
Woodliff, D. 
(1994) 
Australia 300 firms 1980s Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries 
- Big6/8 auditor Internal audit 
existence 
- The results indicated that auditee size and 
complexity were clearly significant, with the 
various alternative measures for both auditee size 
and complexity successfully used in various 
regression models to achieve high levels of 
explanatory power. Additionally, there were 
marked industry differences in the models 
explaining audit fees and also differences 
between particular audit firms within the market 
for audit services. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
  
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
15 Anderson, T. and 
Zeghal, D. (1994) 
Canada 172 firms 1980, 1982 
and 1984 
Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries, 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
 
- Big8 auditor Cost of internal 
audit function 
Dummy 
variable 
for all 
industries 
The results indicated a significant positive 
relationship between audit fees and firm size and 
complexity variables. There was also a significant 
relationship between audit fees and firm 
expenditures on internal auditing for the large 
firm segment of the sample. 
16 Johnson, E. N., 
Walker, K. B. and 
Westergaard, E. 
(1995) 
New Zealand 300 firms 1989 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries, 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
 
Operating 
loss and 
issuance of a 
qualified 
opinion 
Big5 auditor and 
tenure of auditor 
- - The regression results for the large listed and 
small unlisted firm sub-samples also indicated 
large audit firm fee premiums averaging 12% in 
such market segments. However, no large audit 
firm fee premiums were noted in the large 
unlisted and small listed firm sub-samples, 
suggesting that large firm audit services were not 
quality differentiated in the segments of the New 
Zealand market. 
17 Karim, A. K. M. 
and Moizer, P. 
(1996) 
Bangladesh 157 firms 1992 Total assets - Leverage 
ratio 
Big5 auditor - Financial 
sector 
The results show that auditee size is the most 
significant determinant of audit fees. The 
employment of a qualified accountant, auditor 
size and whether the firm was a subsidiary of 
overseas multinational parent firms were also 
found to determine higher audit fees. 
18 Firth, M. (1997) Norway 157 
observations 
1991-1992 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries, 
receivables over 
total assets and 
inventory over 
total assets 
ROA and 
debt ratio 
Name of auditor - Dummy 
variable 
for all 
industries 
The size of the firm (measured by total assets) 
was the major factor in determining the quantum 
of audit fees. 
19 Felix, W. L., 
Gramling, A. A. 
and Maletta, M. J. 
(2001) 
USA 70 firms Not provided Total assets Number of 
operating 
locations 
Leverage 
ratio 
Tenure of auditor and 
provision of non-
audit services 
Extent of 
internal audit 
contribution to 
external audit 
- Internal audit was a significant determinant of 
audit fees and the greater the internal audit 
contribution to the financial statement audit, the 
lower the audit fees. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
20 Lee, H. and 
Mande, V. (2005) 
USA 792 firms 2000 - - - Amount of non-audit 
fee 
Audit 
committee 
member 
independence, 
existence of a 
financial expert 
and number of 
meetings 
Dummy 
variable 
for all 
industries 
Variables proxying for the effectiveness of audit 
committees (specifically, percentage of outside 
members on the audit committee, number of audit 
committee meetings and extent of financial 
expertise of the audit committee) were positively 
associated with audit fees. 
21 Chaney,P. K., 
Jeter, D. C. and 
Shivakumar, L. 
(2004) 
UK 15 255 
observations 
1994-1998 Total assets, 
total assets 
over total 
sales 
- ROA, 
current, debt 
and quick 
ratios 
- - - The results indicated no Big Firm auditor 
differentiation and auditees, when not compelled 
by market pressures to choose a Big5 auditor, 
chose the lowest cost auditor available. 
22 Choi, J., Kim, J. 
B., Liu, X. and 
Simunic, D. A. 
(2005) 
USA 9820 
observations 
2000-2003 Total assets Receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets and 
number of 
business and 
geographic 
segments 
Operating 
loss, ROA 
and leverage 
ratio 
Big4/5/6/8 auditor - Legal 
regime 
Abnormal audit fees and audit quality (measured 
by earnings management) were not significantly 
related to audit fees. 
 
23 Jeong, S. W., 
Jung, K. and Lee, 
S. (2005) 
Korea 2025 firms 1999-2002 Total assets Receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Leverage 
ratio and 
issuance of a 
qualified 
opinion 
Big5 auditor and new 
auditor 
- - Assigned auditors charged significantly higher 
audit fees than freely selected auditors. 
24 Goodwin-Stewart, 
J. and Kent, P. 
(2006a)  
Australia All publicly 
listed firms 
2000 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries and 
ratio of foreign 
subsidiaries to 
total 
subsidiaries 
ROA debt 
ratio and 
issuance of a 
qualified 
opinion 
Big5 auditor Internal audit 
function, board 
independence 
and meetings, 
audit committee 
independence, 
existence of a 
financial expert 
and number of 
meetings 
Mining The results of the study suggest a significant 
positive association between the internal audit 
function and audit fees, implying that firms use 
internal audit and external auditors as 
complementary monitoring mechanisms rather 
than viewing internal audit as a substitute for the 
external audit. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
  
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
25 Antle, R., 
Gordon, E., 
Narayanamoorthy
, G. and Zhou, L. 
(2006) 
UK, USA 2 924 UK firms 
and 1 570 US 
firms 
1992 - 2000 Total assets Receivables 
over total assets 
and inventory 
over total assets 
Operating 
loss, BTM, 
ROA, 
leverage and 
quick ratios 
and issuance 
of a qualified 
opinion 
Big6 auditor and 
auditor tenure 
- High 
litigation 
industry 
By using a system of simultaneous equations, 
there is evidence consistent with knowledge 
spillovers from auditing to non-audit services and 
vice-versa. As part of the overall findings, audit 
fees increase abnormal accruals, consistent with 
the behavioral theories of unconscious influence 
or bias in the auditor-firm relation. 
26 Dunmore, P. V. 
and Shao, Y. S. 
(2006) 
New Zealand 86 firms 2002 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries, 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
 
Operating 
loss, ROE, 
debt and 
quick ratios 
Big4 auditor and 
amount non-audit 
services 
- - In this respect, non-audit fees are not significant 
in explaining the variation in audit fees. 
 
27 Clatworthy, M. A. 
and Peel, M. J. 
(2007) 
UK 51 428 firms 2003 Total assets 
and total 
sales 
Total number of 
subsidiaries and 
foreign sales 
over total sales 
ROA, ROE, 
leverage 
ratio and 
issuance of a 
qualified 
audit 
opinion. 
Big4 auditor. - Dummy 
variable 
for all 
industries 
Firms quoted on the main market are charged the 
highest audit fees whereas private limited firms 
are charged the lowest fees. 
28 Naser, K. and 
Nuseibeh, R. 
(2007) 
Jordan 181 firms 200-2001 Total 
number of 
employees 
Receivables 
over total assets 
and inventory 
over total assets 
ROE and 
leverage 
ratio 
Big4 auditor - Dummy 
variable 
for all 
industries 
Corporate size, status of the audit firm, industry 
type, degree of corporate complexity and firm 
risk were the main determinants of audit fees in 
Jordan. 
29 Gonthier-
Besacier, N. and 
Schatt, A. (2007) 
France 127 firms 2002 Total assets Receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
ROE Big Firm and amount 
of consulting fees 
- Informati
on 
Technolo
gy 
industry 
French audit fees depended on firm size, risk, and 
the presence of two of the Big4 firms. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
30 Hoitash, R. 
Markelevich, A. 
and Baragato, C. 
A. (2007) 
USA 13 830 
observations 
2000-2003 Total assets Number of 
business 
segments, 
existence of 
foreign 
operations and 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss, ROA, 
BTM and 
current and 
leverage 
ratios 
Big5 auditor, non-
audit fees and auditor 
tenure 
- High 
litigation 
industry 
The authors document a statistically significant 
negative association between total fees and both 
audit quality proxies over all years. The results 
(pre- and post-SOX) are consistent with 
economic bonding being a determinant of audit 
behavior rather than auditor reputational 
concerns. Policy-makers should, therefore, note 
that the current restrictions on the provision of 
non-audit services may not sufficiently resolve 
the issue of economic bonding and its impact on 
auditor independence. 
31 Thinggaard, F. 
and Kiertzner, L. 
(2008) 
Denmark 126 firms 2002 Total assets Total number of 
subsidiaries and 
receivables, 
inventory and 
internally 
generated 
intangible 
assets over total 
assets 
Leverage 
ratio 
Big4 auditor - - Joint audits, where both auditors have significant 
stakes in the audit, reduce audit fees compared to 
audits where one auditor is dominant, albeit only 
for the larger firms. This is attributable to 
competition between the auditors. 
 
32 Al-Harshani, M. 
O. (2008) 
Kuwait 49 firms 2005 Total assets Number of 
operating 
locations 
ROE, quick 
and debt 
ratios 
Big Firm - - The results of the study revealed that firm size 
and risk measures were the main determinants of 
audit fees and that firm complexity and auditor 
type were not significant explanatory predictors 
of audit fees. 
33 Hay, D. Knechel, 
W. R. and Ling, 
H. (2008) 
New Zealand 213 firms 1995-2005 Total assets Receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Current ratio Big6 auditor and 
change of auditor 
Internal audit 
function, AC 
existence, 
number of 
external board 
directors and 
major 
shareholder 
existence 
- Measures of internal audit, corporate governance 
and concentration of ownership were all 
positively related to audit fees, consistent with 
the theory that controls (including external audit) 
are complementary. 
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Table 2.2 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
34 Choi, J. H., Kim, 
J. B., Liu, X. and 
Simunic, D. A. 
(2008) 
15 countries 21 559 
observations 
1996-2002 - - - Big4 auditor - Legal 
liability 
regime 
The authors find that: first, the strength of a 
country’s legal liability regime is an important 
fee-increasing factor after controlling for the firm 
specific audit fee determinants and other country-
level and institutional/macroeconomic variables; 
second, given a legal liability regime, Big4 
auditors charge higher audit fees than non-Big4 
auditors after controlling for other fee 
determinants; and third, Big4 audit fee premiums 
decrease when countries legal liability regimes 
change from weak to strong. 
35 Venkataraman, R. 
Weber, J. P. and 
Willenborg, M. 
(2008) 
USA 149 IPOs 2000-2002 Total assets Receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss, ROA 
and leverage 
ratio 
Big5 auditor and 
auditor exposure to 
legal liability 
- Litigation 
risk 
In an IPO market, auditors receive higher fees for 
the increase in litigations risk and the extent the 
litigation risk helps to explain the higher audit fee 
levels. 
36 Wang, K. and 
Sewon, Z. A. 
(2009) 
China 109 firms  with 
both A- and B- 
shares 
2005-2006 Total assets Subsidiaries, 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss and 
qualified 
audit opinion 
Big4, tier2 firms, 
auditor specialization 
and tenure 
- Foreign 
shareholdi
ng 
 
Using annual reports prepared by publicly traded 
firms that issued both domestic and foreign 
shares, results provide evidence of Big4 
premiums for brand name and industry 
specialization in both statutory and 
supplementary markets. In terms of second tiered 
audit firms, only industry specialization proved 
significant for such firms to gain economies of 
scale and reduce audit fees. 
37 Mitra, S., Deis, D. 
R. and Hossain, 
M. (2009) 
USA 1 142 firms 2000-2005 Total assets Foreign 
subsidiaries, 
number of 
business 
segments, 
receivables over 
total assets and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss, ROA, 
leverage 
ratio , quick 
ratio and 
qualified 
audit opinion 
- - Fiscal 
year-end 
31 
December 
Results suggest that audit efforts consistent with 
client-specific business attributes and reflected in 
expected audit fees mitigate financial reporting 
biases, the effect of which is observable (to some 
extent) to some extent in the post-SOX period. 
The test results show no evidence of auditor 
independence problems associated with high 
expected and unexpected audit fees. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
38 Caneghem, V. T. 
(2009) 
Belgium 4 403 
observations 
2007 Total assets 
and asset 
turnover 
Receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Loss, 
leverage 
ratio and 
current ratio. 
Big4 and new 
auditor,  
- Industry, 
listing 
status and 
fiscal 
year-end 
31 
December 
Using the traditional audit fee model composed 
by Simunic (1980), results suggest that Big4 
auditors are able to charge an audit fee premium 
compared to non-Big4 auditors. Nevertheless, 
when allowing the regression coefficients to vary 
across Big4 and non-Big4 auditors and 
controlling for self-selection, the main result does 
not hold. The results, therefore, reveal differences 
in audit fee structures between Big4 and non-Big4 
auditors. 
39 Redmayne, N. B., 
Bradbury, M. E. 
and Cahan, S. F. 
(2010) 
New Zealand 327 public 
sector 
observations 
1998-2000 Total assets Subsidiaries 
and receivables 
and inventory 
over total assets 
Loss and 
leverage 
ratio 
Big4, industry 
specialist, nonaudit 
fees and switched 
auditor 
 Press 
mentions 
for each 
firm 
(political 
visibility) 
Auditors risk-adjust audit fees upwards for 
political visibility. The increase in fees is the 
result of greater audit effort rather than increasing 
the level of expertise within the audit team. The 
relationship between audit fees and press 
mentions appears monotonic suggesting 
‘defensive bolstering’ of the audit opinion as the 
main reason for collecting supplementary 
evidence. 
40 Ho, S. and 
Hutchinson, M. 
(2010) 
Hong Kong 53 non-finance 
firms 
2004 Total assets Subsidiaries Operating 
loss, ROA, 
and leverage 
ratio 
Big4, internal audit 
size and 
qualifications 
 Fiscal 
year-end 
31 
December 
The results of the study suggest that external 
auditors of firms in Hong Kong rely on the 
internal audit function and subsequently charge a 
lower audit fee. Lower audit fees are linked with 
internal audit effort spent on activities reviewing 
financial statements, systems development, issues 
relating to operating efficiency and effectiveness 
and unlimited access to the working papers of the 
internal auditors.  
41 Choi, J., Kim, C., 
Kim, J. and Zang, 
Y. (2010) 
USA 19 499 
observations 
2000-2005 Total assets 
and number 
of employees 
Number of 
business and 
geographic 
segments, and 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss, ROA, 
BTM and 
leverage 
ratio 
Big4, industry 
specialist, nonaudit 
fees, and location of 
auditor 
 Foreign 
income 
tax paid 
and issue 
of either 
debt or 
equity on 
last three 
years 
The office size of the auditor has significantly 
positive relations with both audit fees and audit 
quality even after controlling for national-level 
audit firm size and office-level industry expertise. 
The positive relationship supports the view that 
large local offices provide higher-quality audits 
compared to small local offices. 
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Table 2.2: 
 Summary of prior studies on audit fee modeling: Chronological order (continued) 
 
No. Author/s (year) Country  Sample size 
Period of 
study Firm size 
Firm 
complexity Firm risk 
Audit firm 
characteristics 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics Other Main results 
42 Singh, H. and 
Newby, R. (2010) 
Australia 272 firms 2005 Total assets Subsidiaries, 
receivables and 
inventory 
Operating 
loss, ROA, 
debt ratio 
and qualified 
audit opinion 
Big4 and internal 
audit existence 
Non-executive 
and 
independent 
board members, 
annual board 
and audit 
committee 
meetings and 
financial 
expertise on 
audit committee 
Industry Using publicly available data, the authors 
conclude that a firm’s internal audit function and 
audit fees move in a complementary manner. The 
positive direction of the relationship suggests that 
the two monitoring mechanisms within a firm 
both interact to play a role in strengthening a 
firms overall monitoring/control environment. 
43 Choi, J., Kim, J. 
and Zang, Y. 
(2010) 
USA 9 815 
observations 
2000-2003 Total assets 
and number 
of employees 
Number of 
business and 
geographic 
segments, and 
receivables and 
inventory over 
total assets 
Operating 
loss, ROA, 
BTM, liquid 
and leverage 
ratios 
Big4 and new auditor  Foreign 
income 
tax paid, 
extraordin
ary 
gains/loss
es and 
issue of 
either debt 
or equity 
on last 
three 
years 
Results reveal that the association between 
absolute discretionary accruals and abnormal 
audit fees is asymmetric given the sign of the 
abnormal audit fee. Specially, for observations 
with negative abnormal audit fees, there is no 
significant association between audit quality and 
abnormal audit fee. However, the opposite is the 
case for observations with positive abnormal 
audit fees. The findings suggest that auditors’ 
incentives to deter biased financial reporting 
differ systematically depending on whether 
clients pay more or less than the normal level of 
audit fee. 
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2.5 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
Chapter Two began with a general discussion on the nature of an audit and the 
important role that an auditor plays in the financial reporting system. Australia’s regulatory 
environment and the auditor’s place in it were subsequently discussed within the context of 
corporate governance in general and the four main features of corporate governance (that is, 
board of directors, audit committee, internal audit and external audit). The audit market in 
Australia was then explored with details provided on the key public and private regulators 
and professional accounting bodies involved in the regulation of the auditing profession. The 
determinants of audit fees were then discussed. In this respect, 30 years of published 
empirical research on audit fee modeling was identified, summarized and also tabulated in 
Table 2.2. 
Given that the audit function is premised directly on agency theory, Chapter Three 
will provide an additional theoretical perspective to this study by outlining the five main 
theories underpinning corporate governance: namely agency theory; institutional theory; 
stewardship theory; resource dependency theory; and stakeholder theory. Chapter Three will 
also provide a more focused discussion (by reference to the prior empirical literature) of 
specific auditor attributes that influence audit fees. Subsequently, the four main hypotheses 
of this study are outlined and the rationale for each auditor’s (that is, brand, specialization, 
independence and tenure) attributes expected relationship to audit fees detailed. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Two began with a review of the monitoring role of the auditor in the 
financial reporting system and identified the underpinning agency theory to this study. It also 
provided the background to the association between the auditor and the regulatory 
environment in Australia before detailing the prior literature on audit fee modeling. 
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical framework of this study and the empirical 
literature relating to the hypotheses tested. The five theories underpinning the concept of 
corporate governance are discussed and compared: namely agency theory; institutional 
theory; stewardship theory; resource dependency theory; and stakeholder theory. 
Subsequently, the influence of four selected auditor attributes on audit fees is outlined before 
the general hypothesis of this study provided. The empirical literature relating to each of the 
four key auditor attributes examined in this study is then discussed and the justification for 
each auditor attributes expected relationship to audit fees detailed. A conceptual schema is 
subsequently provided outlining the key relationships examined in this study. Finally, a 
summary of Chapter Three is provided. 
3.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There are five principal theories underpinning the corporate governance research 
literature: agency theory, institutional theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency 
theory and stakeholder theory. The following sub-sections discuss each theory and the 
theory’s link with the corporate governance structures of firms. 
3.2.1 Agency theory 
Perhaps the single most theoretical influence on corporate governance research has 
been agency theory. Agency theory applies to any relationship between a person who 
delegates work (principal) and the person to whom the work is delegated (agent) (Eisenhardt 
1988). Since the work and resulting authority is delegated, the interests of the principal and 
agent will tend to diverge, there arises the probability of under-fulfillment of the principal’s 
wishes (Hendry 2002). This under-fulfillment is termed agency loss (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Agency theory attempts to provide insight into how agency losses can be minimized 
(Pratt and Zeckhauser 1991). In the corporate governance arena, agency theory is concerned 
with aligning the interests of owners and managers (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Stano 1976) and is based on the premise that there is an inherent 
conflict between the interests of a firm’s principals (owners) and agents (managers). 
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The majority of the corporate governance research has been concerned with 
problems caused by the fact that owners are not managers in most firms, particularly publicly 
listed firms. The scope of this principal-agent relationship was initially documented by Berle 
and Means (1932), who set out how managers possessed superior knowledge and expertise 
to the firm’s owners and were, therefore, in a position to pursue self-interested action at the 
expense of the owners. Agency theorists argue that corporate governance structures (for 
example, board of directors, audit committees and the external audit function) are 
mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts (Fama and Jensen 1983; Williamson 1984). Such 
mechanisms are postulated to play a crucial role in monitoring managers in order to 
minimize agency costs and, therefore, safeguarding shareholder wealth (Stiles and Taylor 
2001). 
Interest in agency theory grew with the formalized mathematical model provided by 
economists Jensen and Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that because 
owner’s and manager’s interests are not identical, costs exist within the relationship between 
owners and managers. In particular, Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlighted the costs for 
owners of monitoring managers or of providing incentive payments to managers to align the 
interests of both parties. 
The original agency dilemma presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976) (first 
identified by Berle and Means 1932) has since been elaborated in a string of key articles 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Hendry 2002; Tirole 2001) which 
suggest that management self-interest can be detected in clear and tangible benefits such as 
perquisites (such as large offices, traveling first class) and in less easily identified 
motivations such as the pursuit of growth at the expense of profit. Corporate governance 
mechanisms within firms, therefore, add value by monitoring and controlling management. 
For example, the board of directors and audit committees constantly strive to reduce agency 
costs and protect shareholders from management’s conflict of interest (Fama and Jensen 
1983). 
3.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
A debate exists around the shareholder versus the stakeholder organizational 
perspectives. Whereas agency theorists view the firm in the context of the manager serving 
the shareholder, stakeholder theorists argue that managers of firms have a number of 
additional relationships (that is, stakeholders) to serve. Consequently, stakeholder theory 
considers the firm from a much broader perspective wherein shareholders are only one of 
many potential stakeholder groups (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Freeman 1984; Hill and 
Jones 1992). Other potential stakeholders can include creditors, employees, regulators and 
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even society as a whole. The rationale, therefore, is that key stakeholders are impacted upon 
and also impact the firm. The fundamental argument is that society provides the social 
structure and framework in which firms can prosper and in return, firms which ignore society 
or key members of society will threaten the equilibrium between the firm and society 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995; Freeman 1984). 
One of the original advocates of stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984), identified the 
emergence of stakeholder groups as an important element to a firm, thereby, requiring 
consideration. Freeman (1984) suggested a re-engineering of theoretical perspectives that 
extended beyond the owner-manager position and recognized the existence of numerous 
stakeholder groups. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) provided a more detailed explanation of stakeholder 
theory and the impact of stakeholder theory on the firm. They (Donaldson and Preston 1995) 
explained that stakeholder theory views the firm as an organizational entity through which 
numerous and diverse participants accomplish multiple, though not always congruent goals. 
Further, the central core of stakeholder theory presumes that managers and other agents act 
as if all stakeholder’s interests have intrinsic though not necessarily equal value.  
Stakeholder theory rejects the assumption that the sole important relationship is that 
between principals (owners) and agents (managers). Stakeholder theory offers a framework 
for determining the structure and operation of the firm that is cognizant of the myriad 
participants who seek multiple and sometimes diverging goals (Donaldson and Preston 
1995). In such a stakeholder setting, corporate governance practices of firms are one of the 
key strategies to help firms recognize, appreciate and successfully manage different 
stakeholder relationships. 
3.2.3 Resource dependence theory 
The third major theory of corporate governance is that of resource dependence, 
which maintains that key corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, 
audit committee and external auditors are an essential link between a firm and the essential 
resources which the firm needs to maximize performance (Pfeffer 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). Sociologists have tended to concentrate on three distinct types of links. These links 
are namely between key corporate governance mechanisms of a firm and members of the 
business elite (Useem 1984), access to capital markets (Mizruchi 1988; Stearns and Mizruchi 
1993) and links to competitors (Mizruchi 1992, 1996). In each instance, researchers make 
credible arguments that the link (resource) in question is a key determinant of success 
(Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 2000; Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
54 
 
Management scholars have tended to take a more generic approach with Hillman, 
Cannella and Paetzold (2000) and Palmer and Barber (2001), for example, view the board of 
directors as a potentially important resource for the firm, especially with the board of 
director’s link to the external environment. For example, from major reviews of the board-
performance literature, the ability of the board of directors to link into significant resources 
is seen as one of the board of director’s key roles (Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse, and 
Kouzmin 2001; Zahra and Pearce 1989). There is a clear theoretical argument that a board of 
directors with high levels of links to the external environment will provide the firm with a 
higher level of access to various important and necessary resources compared to board of 
directors without such high levels of risk. 
While undoubtedly agency theory remains relevant to corporate governance 
research, Udayasankar (2006) suggests that agency theory’s value lies in explaining 
relationships between constructs in the corporate governance schema but points out that the 
governance schema is largely imbedded in another theoretical context, that is, resource 
dependency which better relates to a broader tradition based on the view that competitive 
advantage fundamentally arises from firm heterogeneity (Udayasankar 2006). The resource 
dependence view of corporate governance stems from the fundamental logic that various 
elements of corporate governance can act as critical resources for a firm.  
While based on the more general form of the resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978), in the context of corporate governance, resource dependence theory can 
be applied to suggest that effective corporate governance structures within firms can lead to 
the generation of resources. Particularly, boards of director’s contribute to a firm though 
expertise and linkages to other firms and institutions and directors can also contribute to the 
positive valuation of a firm through reputation. Board of directors can be a key source of 
accessing various resources (Pfeffer 1972), based on human capital and social capital (Certo 
2003). The former includes director’s advice and expertise and the latter covers resources 
such as legitimacy (Westphal and Zajac 1994) and links to other firms. Cumulatively, the 
resources are all described as of director’s capital (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). The 
relationship between board of director’s capital and firm performance is well documented 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand 1999; Pfeffer 1972), thereby making the resource 
dependence theory a key theory in corporate governance. 
3.2.4 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory does not emphasize the importance of individual self-interest 
motives. Rather, institutional theory focuses instead on institutional factors or pressures that 
lie beyond the organizational boundary (Hoffman 1999). Institutional theory views firms as 
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operating within a nexus of norms, values and assumptions about what constitutes 
appropriate or acceptable economic behavior (Oliver 1997). 
Scott (1987) points out that institutional theory has many variants. He (Scott 1987) 
identified four formulations of institutional theory based on: the process of instilling value in 
a firm (Selznick 1957); the process of creating a social reality which is seen as validly 
independent of an individual’s own views which are taken for granted (Berger and Luckman 
1966; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987); the premise that firms conform to multiple 
institutionalized belief systems because firms are rewarded for doing so with increased 
legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Scott 
1983); and the traditional view of institutions which focuses on patterned human activities 
that arise and persist in all societies (Scott 1987). In general, institutional theory focuses on 
factors or environmental pressures over which the managers within firms are powerless to 
resist in the long-term, even if the self-interest motives of managers are opposed to the 
decision imposed by the institutional environment. 
Institutional theory, therefore, is a useful paradigm for corporate governance 
research because institutional theory considers how environmental influences, institutional 
and firm pressures constrain accounting choice selection by managers. Constraints exist on 
the choices that managers make in the accounting arena and there can be institutional 
pressures to conform or resist conforming to professionally endorsed accounting and 
auditing practices. The influences can be political, regulatory or legal in nature. 
3.2.5 Stewardship theory 
Despite the predominance of agency theory, research into board of directors and 
agency theory has highlighted problems with the universal application of agency theory 
(Hirsh, Michaels, and Friedman 1987; Perrow 1986; Pfeffer 1997). Calls for a broadening of 
the corporate governance agenda beyond the agency conflict (Daily et al. 2003; Leblanc and 
Gillies 2005) reflect growing criticism of the agency theory paradigm. In particular, several 
of the key assumptions which underlie agency theory are argued to theoretically limit the 
application of agency theory (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Hirsh et al. 1987; Perrow 1986; 
Pfeffer 1997). Specifically, the most widespread concern voiced about agency theory is the 
assumption that all managers are self-interested and opportunistic utility maximizers bent on 
extracting maximum returns from firms (Donaldson 1990). 
The agency theory assumption that managers are economically rational self-
interested and opportunistic maximizers (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; 
Doucouliagos 1994; Frank 1994) is in direct contrast with the assumptions and evidence 
from several other social science disciplines such as sociology and psychology. It is difficult 
56 
 
to reconcile agency theory’s continuously self-motivated actor with the conflicting evidence 
that a manager’s motivation at work often includes intrinsic motivation factors (Benabou 
2003; Donaldson and Davis 1991) such as altruism, beliefs, need for achievement of 
responsibility or even the desire to take part in satisfying work (Gagne and Deci 2005; Wood 
and Bandura 1989). 
As a result of the criticisms, particularly the limited view of human behavior 
envisioned by agency theory, stewardship theory (Davis et al. 1997) has emerged to answer 
calls to reinterpret the relationship between owners and managers (Doucouliagos 1994). 
Stewardship theory posits that managers are not self-interested and opportunistic utility 
maximizers but rather that managers are stewards whose motives are aligned with the 
objectives of owners (Davis et al. 1997). 
Stewardship theory proposes managers are good stewards of organizational 
resources for a number of reasons. For instance, managers can be assumed to be decent 
people who generally try and do the right thing by the firms that managers manage 
(Donaldson and Davis 1991). Also, there is significant evidence that many senior managers 
are incentivized by intrinsic motivations such as achievement and being successful at work 
(that is, self-actualization) rather than by extrinsic motivations such as economic 
remuneration (Benabou 2003; Donaldson and Davis 1991). There is also a strong argument 
that a manager’s reputation is his/her key asset and, as a result, self-interested behavior will 
be balanced against possible damage to this important asset (Barney 1990; Donaldson 1990; 
Donaldson and Preston 1995). 
In a corporate governance arena, stewardship theory indicates that, in the presence of 
intrinsically-motivated managers who strive for job satisfaction and self-actualization rather 
than monetary remuneration, there is less pressure on board of directors in firms to closely 
monitor managers and accounting policy choice selection by the managers. 
3.2.6 A critical analysis of agency theory with other theoretical approaches 
Following the overview of the literature relating to the five theoretical perspectives, 
this study now proceeds with a critical analysis of the five paradigms. The dominant 
theoretical perspective in corporate governance is agency theory and, as such, agency theory 
provides the benchmark against which the other four theories are considered and evaluated. 
3.2.6.1 Agency theory and stakeholder theory 
Agency theory recognizes the relationship between two parties, the principal and 
agent. The stakeholder theory widens the traditional relationship to incorporate other 
stakeholders. Under agency theory, the manager must be controlled to align his/her interests 
with the interests of the principal. The stakeholder theory, however, brings a multi-interest 
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dynamic into the agency model of the firm. The focus of stakeholder theory, therefore, is to 
question the purpose of the firm and who management are responsible to, rather than on the 
control of the manager and manager-interest alignment.  
Hill and Jones (1992) attempted to integrate the stakeholder concept with agency 
theory. They (Hill and Jones 1992) widened the standard principal-agent paradigm of 
financial economics to create a stakeholder agency theory which instituted a generalized 
theory of agency. Donaldson and Preston (1995), citing Hill and Jones (1992), explained that 
managers can be viewed as the agents of other stakeholders. Hill and Jones (1992) explained 
that stakeholders are distinguished by different stakes in a firm in the sense that each 
stakeholder is part of a nexus of contracts with managers being at the centre. Managers are 
the only group of stakeholders who enter into a contractual relationship with all other 
stakeholders. Managers must, therefore, make decisions and allocate resources in a manner 
consistent with the claims of other stakeholders. Hill and Jones (1992) do not suggest that all 
other stakeholders are principals as posited under agency theory but describe the principal-
agent relationship as a subset of the more general class of stakeholder-agent relationship. 
3.2.6.2 Agency theory and resource dependence theory 
Resource dependency theory focuses on the board of director’s resource role. The 
board of directors is well researched as a mechanism of corporate control under the 
perspective of agency theory. In contrast, resource dependency theory focuses on the role 
that directors play in providing or securing essential resources to a firm through linkages 
with the external environment.  
Muth and Donaldson (1998) predicted that higher firm performance is achieved 
when board of directors display independence and high network connections. When 
independence is lacking, managerial waste and inefficiency is anticipated and when network 
connections are sparse, the firm’s ability to co-opt needed resources is limited. A 
combination of low independence and low network connections, therefore, results in low 
overall firm performance. 
3.2.6.3 Comparison of agency theory and institutional theory 
The central agency problem relates to how the principal holds the agent responsible 
for achieving outcomes preferred by the principal. Though institutional theory does look at 
the same issue of principal versus agent and the respective interests, institutional theory 
looks at the relationship via a agency lens in which agencies (that is, firms) may consider the 
agencies own best interests (for example, in a quest for legitimacy) to achieve certain 
objectives which may or may not always coincide with the preferences of the principals of 
the firms (Eisenhardt 1988). 
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3.2.6.4 Agency theory and stewardship theory 
Advocates of stewardship theory challenge the singular view of principals and 
agents, positing a more complex behavioral and contextual model for the two parties. 
Whereas agency theory argues that management actions depart from the actions required to 
maximize shareholder wealth, stewardship theory argues that managers are motivated by a 
desire to achieve, gain satisfaction, successfully perform work and gain the admiration of 
peers and bosses (Benabou 2003; Donaldson and Davis 1991). 
Davis et al. (1997) argued that the choice between agency and stewardship 
perspectives is determined with reference to the principals and managers perceived risk and 
degree of trust towards the other party. The principals and managers behavioral position and 
corporate culture will influence the relationship dynamics. Fit is achieved, therefore, when 
the principals and managers’ selections are aligned, whether pure-stewardship relationship or 
pure-agency relationship. Adversarial implications arise when ‘mixed-motive choice’ occurs 
(Benabou 2003). Specifically, Davis et al. (1997) argued that utility maximization is 
achieved when principals and managers’ choose a steward-principal relationship whereas 
agency costs are minimized when both choose an agent-principal relationship. When both 
parties are individualists, an agent-principal relationship is appropriate and when both parties 
are collectivists, a steward-principal relationship is appropriate.16
3.2.7 Application of theoretical framework in accounting 
 
In attempting to identify the most appropriate theoretical base for this study, it is 
necessary to develop the necessary framework for the literature analysis. Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979) fourfold typology of social science approach provides a useful context for 
analyzing accounting research. Burrell and Morgan (1979) propose that social science 
research is carried out within four research paradigms: namely, the functionalist view; the 
radical-structuralist view; the radical-humanist view; and the interpretive view. 
Each of the paradigms is unique in terms of ontology, epistemology and the 
perception of human nature. Differences between the paradigms also exist in terms of the 
methodological approach adopted by each paradigm. The major features of each of the four 
paradigms, as outlined by Burrell and Morgan (1979) is briefly outlined below: 
3.2.7.1 Functionalist view 
The functionalist view is that reality is an objective and measurable premise which 
can be studied independently. The main features of the view are: (1) society is cohesive and 
well-structured; and (2) research issues encompass the explanation of observed behavior, 
                                                     
16  For a detailed discussion of the fit between principal and agent under both agency and stewardship theories, see Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson (1997). 
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seeking to define cause-effect relationships and generalist laws through the adoption of a 
scientific approach. Theoretical examples of the functionalist view include costly contracting 
and contingency theories. 
3.2.7.2 Radical-structuralist view 
The radical-structuralist view is that reality is an independently observable object 
reflecting the domination of powerful groups in society. The main feature of the view is that 
accounting perpetuates the existing order of things. A theoretical example includes 
accountability-regulation studies. 
3.2.7.3 Radical-humanist view 
The radical-humanist view is that reality is a subjective notion that cannot be 
scientifically measured. The main features of the view are: (1) society (including accounting) 
reflects the dominance of powerful groups; and (2) society is constantly being re-defined. A 
theoretical example includes critical theory. 
3.2.7.4 Interpretive view 
The interpretive view is that reality is shaped and influenced by various factors 
(including accounting). The main features of the view are: (1) accounting is influenced by 
and influences the environment: and (2) reality is defined as uncertain and problematic. 
Theoretical examples of the functionalist view include accountability, legitimacy, 
stakeholder and political theories. 
3.2.7.5 Theory selection 
While there are five main theories underpinning corporate governance practices, the 
theory most relevant to the current study is agency theory given that the focus of this study is 
examining the extent of the association between auditor attributes and audit fees. The core 
benefit from an audit is the ability of an auditor to provide independent assurance to a reader 
on the integrity and fairness of the presented financial information. The existence of the audit 
function is premised on agency theory. Given information asymmetry between principals 
and agents and the differing interests (such as financial rewards and employment 
opportunities), agents may pursue self-interest to the detriment of the firm and the principals 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). This concern about information asymmetries and differing 
motivations between agent and principal, therefore, leads to reservations about the reliability 
of information produced by the agents. 
Given the resulting reservations, principals require mechanisms (an external audit is 
one example) to reduce potential conflicts and align the interests of agents with the 
principal’s interests. Audits, therefore, serve a fundamental purpose in increasing confidence 
and validating the financial information reported by agents. This, in turn, plays a wider role 
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in the information marketplace, where economic and financial decisions can be made based 
on information that has been audited and, therefore, viewed as more useful for decision-
making purposes (Leung et al. 2007). 
3.2.8 Auditing and the corporate governance framework 
As noted in the US Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), the three critical components of 
quality corporate governance structures within firms are board of directors including the 
audit committee, financial management including the internal auditor and the external 
auditor. This trilogy is often referred to as the ‘three-legged stool’ which supports 
responsible financial disclosure and active and participatory oversight (Blue Ribbon 
Committee 1999).17
Clearly, there are corporate governance benefits accruing from the audit function. 
Psaros (
 
2009) suggests three main corporate governance benefits resulting from the audit 
function. First, the original and primary purpose of an audit is still to provide an opinion on a 
set of financial statements produced by a firm. Inherently, the audit process adds value to the 
financial statements in terms of an increase in reliability and, hence, credibility. Second, the 
audit function has a vital role in reviewing the firm’s internal control structure because the 
review will have a bearing on the amount and type of evidence that needs to be collected 
during the audit. If significant deficiencies in the internal control structure within the firm are 
discovered, the auditor reports the deficiencies to management for explanations and also 
follow-ups during the next audit. Finally, the audit function also results in other incidental 
benefits to a firm such as the contribution to the operations of the audit committee, general 
advise on risk management and synergistic operations with the internal audit function 
(Psaros 2009). 
3.3 INFLUENCE OF AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES ON AUDIT FEES 
Simunic (1980) presented a production perspective of the auditing process in which 
he (Simunic 1980) believed that there were certain common drivers associated with the 
variation of audit fees.18
                                                     
17  In Australia, the Ramsay Report (2001) points out the importance of the external audit function to effective corporate 
governance structures within firms. 
 Over time, the literature has identified various auditor and auditee 
attributes (such as auditor location, auditor opinion, audit report lag, firm size, firm 
complexity and firm risk). as appropriate proxies for the number and extent of audit 
procedures completed by the external auditor (Francis and Simon 1987; Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent 2006a; Hay et al. 2006; Simunic 1980). This study adopts a similar approach, using 
a number of attributes to proxy for audit work undertaken by the auditor.  
18  Simunic (1980) deemed the identified drivers caused the auditor to alter the number and type of audit procedures used 
during the audit. 
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As highlighted in Section 1.2, given the gaps in the literature in relation to 
examining auditor attributes from a composite perspective and using a longitudinal time 
horizon, the results from this study will provide answers to important unanswered questions 
about the existence of cartel pricing and, therefore, anticompetitive behavior by the 
remaining Big4 audit firms. 
This study investigates both the existence and extent of competitive audit pricing in 
the Australian audit services market during a five-year time frame to determine if there is 
any evidence of cartel pricing and, therefore, anticompetitive behavior by the Big4 during 
this period. Since increased supplier concentration by itself is not sufficient evidence of 
cartel pricing and, therefore, anticompetitive behavior, this study will adopt (initially) 
Simunic’s (1980) seminal audit pricing model to investigate audit market competition. 
Apart from examining audit fees on a cross-sectional basis, the prior empirical 
literature has evaluated auditor attributes only in isolation (that is, individually) and there is 
also no published research which has evaluated important auditor attributes on an aggregate 
basis (and across time). The aggregated/holistic basis adopted by this study will, therefore, 
evaluate (four) important auditor attributes simultaneously across a five-year observation 
window when examining the impact on audit fees. 
Thus, for the purposes of this study, the following general hypotheses are postulated: 
GH1
GH
: An auditee engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality 
attributes will pay higher audit fees than an auditee engaging an auditor 
with a lower set of quality attributes. 
2
3.4 KEY AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES AND IMPACT ON AUDIT FEES 
: An auditee engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality 
attributes will have higher changes in audit fees across time than an auditee 
engaging an auditor with a lower set of quality attributes. 
This study examines the influence of four pivotal auditor attributes on 
contemporaneous audit fees and changes in the audit fees. The four attributes of interest are: 
(1) audit quality (as defined by Big4 versus non-Big4 status); (2) auditor industry 
specialization; (3) independence (as defined by the provision of non-audit services); and (4) 
auditor tenure. The four auditor attributes were selected as the attributes are frequently cited 
in the extant literature as having a significant influence on audit fees (Abbott and Parker 
2001; Beatty 1989; Beck, Frecka, and Solomon 1998b; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Craswell et 
al. 1995; DeAngelo 1981; Hoitash et al. 2007). Hypotheses related to the four auditor 
attributes are individually developed in the following sub-sections. 
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3.4.1 Audit quality: Big Firm auditor 
Higher audit fees are expected when an auditor is recognized to be of a superior 
quality. The literature postulates that a Big Firm auditor brings a higher level of quality (in 
the form of better audit planning, risk assessment, formulation of audit procedures, collection 
of audit evidence, audit reporting, reduction of mistakes) to the audit engagement and, 
therefore, will charge a higher audit fee as a result of this quality/product differentiation. 
Generally, researchers have used a dummy variable for auditing firms classified as being 
either a Big8/6/5/4 as a proxy for superior audit quality (Simon 1995; Simunic 1980). 
The empirical literature has generally produced mixed results on whether a Big Firm 
auditor does charge a higher audit fee as a result of the higher level of quality from the Big 
Firm auditor. Simunic (1980) was the first researcher to investigate and confirm that the 
existence of a Big Firm auditor increases audit fees. Research post-Simunic (1980) has 
almost always used a Big Firm variable to either assess or control for audit fee variation. 
A significant portion of the literature suggests that the existence of Big Firm auditors 
does have a significantly positive relationship with audit fees (Chan et al. 1993; Choi et al. 
2005; Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Johnson et al. 1995; Karim and Moizer 1996; 
Palmrose 1986a). However, a number of studies have also indicated no significant 
relationship between a Big Firm auditor and the quantum of audit fees paid by firms (Al-
Harshani 2008; Hoitash et al. 2007). The absence of a statistically significant relationship 
between the existence of a Big Firm auditor and audit fees suggests that the Big Firm auditor 
may be selected not on the basis of quality differentiation (to non-Big Firm auditors) but 
perhaps due to economic bonding (Hoitash et al. 2007), market pressures (Chaney et al. 
2004) or the desire by a firm to signal the firm’s quality to the market. 
Given the overwhelming support in the prior literature for the association between a 
Big Firm auditor and audit fees paid by a firm, the following hypotheses are proposed to test 
the extent of the association between a Big4 auditor and audit fees/variation in audit fees: 
H1a
H
: An auditee engaging a Big4 auditor will pay a higher audit fee than an 
auditee engaging a non-Big4 auditor. 
1b
3.4.2 Auditor industry: Specialization 
: An auditee engaging a Big4 auditor will have higher changes in audit fees 
paid across time than an auditee engaging a non-Big4 auditor. 
Auditors with industry specializations and who make investments in developing a 
reputation for performing quality audits in particular industries are especially concerned 
about preserving reputational capital and avoiding reputational damage through litigation 
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exposure (Lim and Tan 2008). Similarly, at the audit firm level, audit firms that make 
strategic choices and invest organizational resources in developing intellectual capital in 
particular industries, have greater concerns about reputation preservation. These audit firms 
are, therefore, less likely to submit to client pressures (Lim and Tan 2008). 
Consistent with this argument, prior research has shown that industry-specialist 
auditors are much more likely to: (a) comply with auditing standards (O'Keefe et al. 1994); 
(b) have clients that are less likely to be associated with regulatory enforcement actions 
(Carcello and Nagy 2004); and (c) have clients with lower discretionary accruals (Balsam et 
al. 2003; Krishnan 2003). Prior literature has also shown that auditors with industry 
specializations have superior knowledge and performance relative to non-specialists 
(Owhoso, Messier, and Lynch 2002; Solomon et al. 1999). The literature clearly suggests 
that industry-specialist auditors (versus non-industry specialist auditors) have the 
background knowledge to more effectively perform the audit of a client from a specialized 
industry and, thereby, increase audit quality. As a result of this investment in time, resources 
and knowledge by auditors, the auditors are more likely to seek compensation from an 
auditee in the form of higher audit fees. 
The following hypotheses, therefore, are proposed to test the extent of the 
association between an industry specialist auditor and audit fees/variation in audit fees: 
H2a
H
: An auditee engaging an industry specialist auditor will pay a higher audit 
fee than an auditee engaging a non-industry specialist auditor. 
2b
3.4.3 Independence: Non-audit services 
: An auditee engaging an industry specialist auditor will have higher changes 
in audit fees across time than an auditee engaging a non-industry specialist 
auditor. 
Non-audit services provided by the external auditor can result in an increase in audit 
fees due to two reasons. First, such services may lead to changes within an auditee which 
will then require additional auditing by the incumbent auditor (Davis et al. 1993). Second, 
the auditee may have no choice but to pay a higher audit fee as a result of becoming 
economically dependent on such non-audit services by the auditor (Palmrose 1986b). On the 
other hand, it has been argued that the provision of non-audit services can lead to lower audit 
fees as a result of cross-subsidization of fees (or synergies) between audit and non-audit 
services (Simunic 1984). 
Palmrose (1986b) was the first researcher to provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between fees for audit services and fees for three other categories of non-audit 
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services (that is, accounting-related MAS, non-accounting MAS and taxation). The positive 
relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees rested on the premise of joint-supply 
benefits where the firm perceived (rightly or not) that the firm was better off with the joint 
supply of audit and non-audit services. Subsequent research examining the audit fees and 
non-audit fees relationship also found similar support for the joint-supply theory (Dunmore 
and Shao 2006; Felix et al. 2001; Hoitash et al. 2007; Lee et al. 2003a). Also, Simunic 
(1984) provided evidence that a firm which employed the same external auditor in the 
provision of both external audit and non-audit services paid a significantly lower audit fee to 
the auditor. He (Simunic 1984) suggests that the provision of auditing and non-auditing 
services to an auditee may result in knowledge advantages/spillovers that allow cost savings 
to be passed on to the auditee in the form a lower audit fee. 
Given the proclivity in the prior literature toward a positive relationship between 
non-audit services and audit fees, the following hypotheses are proposed to test the extent of 
the association between non-audit fees and audit fees/variation in audit fees: 
H3a
H
: An auditee paying higher non-audit fees to the auditor will also pay higher 
audit fees than an auditee paying lower non-audit service fees to the 
incumbent auditor. 
3b
3.4.4 Auditor tenure 
: An auditee paying higher non-audit fees to the auditor across time will also 
have higher changes in audit fees than an auditee paying lower non-audit 
service fees to the incumbent auditor across time. 
The length of the relationship between the external auditor and auditee is thought to 
have an impact on the quantum of audit fees charged by the auditor. Auditors who have 
longer ties with auditees will, in all likelihood, have greater familiarity with the auditee, the 
auditee’s accounting systems, financial records and related internal controls. Given that this 
familiarity reduces auditee complexity and audit risk, the auditor requires less effort annually 
to understand the auditee’s operations and this, in turn, may translate to a lower audit fee. 
However, auditees with longer ties to auditors may, instead, pay higher audit fees due to the 
economic bonding argument suggested by Palmrose (1986b) or, as a result of the increasing 
familiarity with the external auditor, choose not to change auditors. 
Simunic (1980) believed that the greater the length of relationship between the 
auditor and auditee, the greater the knowledge and understanding the auditor has of the 
firm’s operations and accounting system. He (Simunic 1984) believed that this translated 
into less audit work and, therefore, audit fee. Simunic’s (1980) results indicated that there 
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was no significant relationship in auditor tenure explaining variation of audit fees. One 
possible reason for this (suggested by Simunic (1980)) may be that the auditor may not be 
passing ‘cost-savings’ derived from the reduced audit work to the auditee. Subsequent 
studies examining auditor tenure (in terms of length of years, new auditor or change of 
auditor) have produced mixed results. A number of studies show no real significant 
association between auditor tenure and audit fees (Antle et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 1995) but 
a greater number of studies have shown a positive relationship between auditor tenure and 
audit fees (Felix et al. 2001; Ghosh and Moon 2005; Hoitash et al. 2007). 
Given that the prior empirical literature principally supports a positive relationship 
between auditor tenure and audit fees, the following hypotheses are proposed to test the 
extent of the association between auditor tenure and audit fees/variation in audit fees: 
H4a
H
: An auditee engaging an auditor with a longer tenure period will pay higher 
audit fees than an auditee engaging an auditor with a shorter tenure period. 
4b
The general hypotheses and individual hypotheses are conceptualized in the 
following section. 
: An auditee engaging an auditor with a longer tenure period will have higher 
changes in audit fees across time than an auditee engaging an auditor with 
a shorter tenure period. 
3.5 CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA 
Figure 3.1 below provides a conceptual schema underlying the general hypotheses 
and individual hypotheses used in this study: 
Figure 3.1: 
  Conceptual Schema 
Audit fees
Big 4 auditor (BIG4)
 Industry specialist auditor (SPECIALIST)
 Non-audit services (NONAUDIT)
Auditor tenure (TENURE)
Auditor attributes/Auditor attributes over time
H1a&b
GH1&2
H2a&b
H3a&b
H4a&b
Control variables
+
+
+
+
+
 
As suggested by Figure 3.1, the general hypotheses (that is, GH1 and GH2) to be 
tested suggests a positive relationship between auditor attributes (on an aggregate basis) and 
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audit fees. The individual hypotheses (that is, H1a to H4b) suggest a similar relationship but 
on a dis-aggregated basis between the four key components of auditor attributes (that is, 
auditor quality, auditor industry-specialization, non-audit services and auditor tenure) and 
audit fees. 
3.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Three documented the five theories underpinning corporate governance, 
identified the general hypothesis and discussed the prior literature relating to the four 
(auditor) attributes hypotheses tested in this study. The influence of the four auditor 
attributes on audit fees was also discussed before a conceptual schema provided. 
Having provided the theoretical perspective to and hypotheses of this study, Chapter 
Four will provide details of the research method utilized in this study. Specifically, details of 
the sample, documentation and time period is provided along with the measures used to 
operationalize audit fees (the dependent variable), the four auditor attributes (independent 
variables) and control variables. Chapter Four will also specify the basic regression model, 
the comprehensive cross-sectional model and the longitudinal model that will be utilized to 
answer the research questions of this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Three outlined the theoretical framework of corporate governance and 
discussed the five main theories underlying corporate governance including agency theory. 
The four key auditor attributes of this study were then detailed leading to the testable 
hypotheses. 
Chapter Four provides details of the research method used to test the hypotheses of 
this study. The chapter starts with a justification of the sample selected, the source 
documentation chosen and time period analyzed. The subsequent section documents how the 
dependent variable of this study, audit fees, will be measured. Measures to operationalize the 
auditor attributes examined in this study are then provided (that is, measures for auditor 
quality, auditor industry specialization, non-audit fees and auditor tenure). The sensitivity 
tests to be undertaken are subsequently identified before the statistical tests and regression 
models utilized to test the hypotheses are outlined. Finally, a summary of Chapter Four is 
provided. 
4.2 SAMPLE, DOCUMENTATION AND TIME PERIOD 
The following sub-sections provide a justification of the sample firms selected, 
source documentation chosen and time period analyzed. 
4.2.1 Selection justification 
The initial sample comprises all Australian publicly listed firms registered on the 
ASX continuously across the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 2005 calendar years. 
Consistent with prior empirical research, financial institutions, banks and stock brokerages 
are excluded.19
1997
Firms that are not continuously listed on ASX are also excluded in order to 
avoid undue influences of unexpected rise in share price. In addition, consistent with Clifford 
and Evans ( ), unit trusts and foreign firms domiciled outside Australia were excluded 
because their (unit trusts and foreign firms domiciled outside Australia) financial statements 
are not always prepared in accordance with the normal disclosure requirements for other 
firms listed on the ASX. From this initial pool, 100 firms are selected from the top firms (by 
market capitalization) on the ASX as at reporting dates in 2001. Since one of the major 
drivers of firm performance is the need to maximize shareholder value (Gewald and Gellrich 
2007; Lee 1979), this measure is best reflected by the market capitalization of a firm.  
                                                     
19  This is consistent with Simunic (1980). 
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Admittedly, the use of market capitalization as a criterion to select a sample has 
limitations in terms of generalizability. To overcome this limitation and to increase the 
generalizability of this study, a further 100 firms (per year) will be selected using a stratified-
random approach.20
4.2.2 Source documentation justification 
 Each calendar year (that is, 1 January to 31 December) within the 
observation period is considered an individual firm-year for firms included in the sample. 
Data will be collected for each firm selected from each firm-year covered in this study. The 
resulting sample will provide approximately 600 firm-year observations for use as data 
points in the subsequent testing. 
Data for this study are obtained from archival data in the form of listed firm annual 
reports.21 Listed firms were selected since listed entities provide readily available 
information in an appropriate useable form. Australian Accounting Standards Board 101 
(specifically, paragraphs 126.1 and 126.2) requires a detailed breakdown of all fees charged 
by a firm’s auditor in Australia.22
4.2.3 Time period selection 
 The Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd) was 
used to collect the data to construct all the measures for the variables used in this study. 
As a key component of this study is a longitudinal analysis, the time period for 
observation will be the 2001, 2003 and 2005 calendar years. This time frame is selected as 
the time frame will transcend key periods in the financial accounting and corporate 
governance landscape in Australia such as the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), implementation of CLERP 9 recommendations and the ASX CGC’s 2003 
recommendations. The time-frame is also selected to collect the timeliest information 
available. However, in order to avoid the volatility in the market arising from the credit-
crunch in 2007 and 2008 (which had emerged by second quarter, 2007), both 2007 and 2008 
have been excluded from the time frame (Gamble 2008). The time frame selected, therefore, 
will facilitate answering a number of this study’s important research questions. 
In the next sections, measurements for the dependent variable (audit fees) and 
independent variables (auditor attributes) are outlined. 
                                                     
20  This will be done by industry in order to capture an appropriate cross-section of all the industries on the ASX. Additionally, 
the firms will be the same for each of the three years examined. This has adverse implications in relation to the 
independence of samples and this is discussed in Section 8.5. 
21  Archival data was selected due to: the inherent limitations of survey research (Baxter and Pragasam 1999); the ready access 
of annual reports from a variety of electronic databases (that is, the use of data does not suffer from non-response bias); and 
objective measures for all the variables of interest can be obtained from data in annual reports. 
22  This is consistent with the provisions of CLERP. 
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4.3 MEASUREMENT OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
As indicated in Section 4.2.2, data for the dependent variable, audit fees (AF), will 
be obtained from the annual reports of firms sampled.23
Traditionally, in the audit fee modeling literature, data for audit fees normally 
requires transformation due to issues with linearity (Hair et al. 1995; Simunic 1980). 
Ordinarily, a logarithm transformation is necessary to ensure a better linear fit and the 
subsequent OLS regression testing can then be undertaken with confidence.
 This variable will be deflated by 
auditee size (principally total assets (ASSETSt-1)) to control for cross-sectional differences 
associated with larger firms paying higher audit fees purely due to firm size. 
24 Alternatively, 
another way to ensure linearity is to deflate audit fees by auditee size so that any variation in 
audit fees as a result of auditor attributes is unlikely to be due to auditee-size effects.25
4.4 MEASUREMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The 
latter is the approach taken by this study. 
The independent variables of interest are a number of selected auditor attributes. 
Data for the independent variables will be gathered from the annual reports of 200 Australian 
publicly listed firms in Australia (as at the respective reporting dates) for the 2001, 2003 and 
2005 calendar years.26 Measurement proxies for the independent variables are detailed in the 
Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4.27
4.4.1 Auditor quality (BIG4) 
 
Large international Big Firms normally receive a fee premium for services consistent 
with the existence of a quality-differentiated audit. A Big Firm auditor brings a higher level 
of quality to the engagement and, therefore, will charge a higher audit fee as a result of this 
quality/product differentiation. For auditor quality, the proxy BIG4 is used in this study. In 
terms of measurement, therefore, an auditee i is scored one (1) if in time period t the engaged 
auditor is a BIG4 auditor. Otherwise the auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0). 
4.4.2 Auditor industry specialization (SPECIALIST) 
Auditors with industry specializations have superior industry knowledge and, 
therefore, performance compared to non-industry specialist auditors and re-coup the superior 
                                                     
23  Annual reports of firms are also viewed as a better source of data for audit fees since it is the source document prepared by 
the firm compared to other databases such as Who Audits Australia? database (Craswell et al. 1995). 
24  A logarithmic transformation is also applied given that total audit fees are likely to increase at a decreasing rate with firm 
size. 
25  This approach is also supported by the prior literature (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002). 
26  Any issue in relation to the potential problem with how the annual report year-ends fits within each respective calendar 
years is overcome by the fact that alterative years of 2001, 2003 and 2005 are selected. 
27  In terms of scale of measurement, the independent variables used in this study will be represented by two dummy variables 
and two metric variables (BIG4 and SPECIALIST being dummy variables and NONAUDIT and TENURE being metric 
variables). 
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performance in the form of higher audit fees from the auditee (Balsam et al. 2003; DeFond et 
al. 2000; Zhou and Elder 2002). 
Auditee sales are used to estimate the industry market share of the auditors. 
Specifically, the sum of all sales for a particular auditor in each industry is totaled and forms 
the numerator. The denominator is the sales of all clients in all industries summed over all 
audit firms (this will include both the Big4 auditors and other audit firms auditing in the 
industry).28
4.4.3 Non-audit fees (CNON-AUDIT and RNON-AUDIT) 
 Consistent with the prior literature (Craswell et al. 1995; Lim and Tan 2008), an 
auditor with a 20% market share of a given industry is defined as an industry specialist for 
that industry. Thus, for SPECIALIST, an auditee i in industry k is scored one (1) if in time 
period t an auditor defined as an industry specialist in industry k is engaged; otherwise 
auditee i is scored zero (0). 
In order to capture the extent of the economic bonding between the auditor and 
auditee, this study focuses on two different measures of non-audit fees. First, where the 
influence of non-audit fees is considered as a composite component of auditor attributes in a 
holistic manner and individually, a dichotomous variable of CNON-AUDIT is used.29
4.4.4 Auditor tenure (CTENURE and NTENURE) 
 
Specifically, for CNON-AUDIT firm i is scored one (1) for time period t if the ratio of non-
audit fees to total fees is less than 0.25 (Palmrose 1986b). Otherwise, auditee i is scored zero 
(0). Second, this study also focuses on the ratio of non-audit to total fees. Hence, the variable 
RNON-AUDIT represents the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor j by 
auditee i during time period t. Information for non-audit and total fees will be collected from 
the auditee’s annual reports during the observation window. 
The auditor tenure variable is operationalized by reference to the length of time (in 
years) during which the current auditor has been the principal auditor for the auditee. As with 
non-audit services, both dichotomous and continuous measures are applied when considering 
the influence of auditor tenure (in isolation and as a component of auditor attributes as a 
whole). For CTENURE, an auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the number of years 
the incumbent auditor j has been the principal auditor is three (3) or more years (Felix et al. 
2001). Otherwise, auditee i is scored zero (0).30
                                                     
28  The operationalizing of SPECIALIST is consistent with (Lim and Tan 2008). In order to estimate the industry market share 
in a given industry for a particular year in Australia, all 10 main industries in the Standard & Poors July 2002 Global 
Industry Classification Standard will be utilized. 
 In terms of a continuous measure, 
29  For sensitivity purposes, when considering the influence of non-audit fees as an isolated variable, a continuous measure 
will be applied. This is denoted as RNON-AUDIT which is the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees of firm i in time period t. 
30  When used for sensitivity purposes, NTENURE is the number of years the incumbent auditor j has been the principal 
auditor of auditee i as at time period t (up to a maximum of ten years). 
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NTENURE denotes the length of time (in years up to a maximum of 10) during which the 
auditor has remained unchanged for auditee i at time period t. Data to determine both 
CTENURE and NTENURE will be collected from FinAnalysis or DatAnalysis (on-line 
repositories from the Aspect Huntley database). 
4.4.5 Composite auditor attributes (AA) 
To determine the combined influence of the four key auditor attributes on 
contemporaneous audit fees and changes in audit fees across time, a composite score based 
on the four proxy measures for auditor quality, industry specialization, provision of non-
audit services and length of tenure is developed. This composite score is denoted AA. Thus, 
the AA score for auditee i in time period t is equal to ∑  (BIG4it, SPECIALISTit, CNON-
AUDITit, and CTENUREit). 
4.5 MEASUREMENT OF THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
Whilst various analytical techniques will be employed to test the data,31 multivariate 
regression analysis will form the principal means to test the association between the selected 
auditor attributes and audit fees. To minimize cross-sectional influences, a number of control 
variables will also be incorporated into the analysis.32 Prior research suggests auditee 
features and corporate governance characteristics may influence auditee fees. In respect to 
auditee features, control variables will include measures pertaining to: (1) auditee 
complexity: (a) square of number of subsidiaries; and (b) squared number of business 
segments: (2) auditee risk: (a) earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; and (b) 
current ratio: and industry.33 For corporate governance characteristics, controls in the 
multivariate analysis will include: (a) percentage of non-executive directors to total directors; 
(b) frequency of board of directors meetings annually; and (c) the presence of at least one 
financial expert on the audit committee. Table 4.1 specifies the control variables to be used 
in this study and Section 4.5.1 provides a brief justification of the need to include each 
control variable. Some of the variables are subject to (where appropriate) square root or 
logarithmic transformation to provide a better linear fit with the dependent variable.34
  
 
                                                     
31  Such techniques will include t-tests, analysis of variance, bivariate analysis and Pearson correlations. 
32  Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000) point out that the omission of control variables could incorrectly result in the rejection of the 
null hypothesis. 
33  As the dependent variable will be deflated for auditee size, there will be no need to utilize control variables to proxy for 
auditee size (except for robustness purposes). 
34  The use of the control variables in Table 4.1 and the need to transform them (where necessary) is fully supported by the 
audit fee modelling literature. 
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Table 4.1: 
  Details of Control Variables 
Explanatory variable 
(proxy measure) Definition of proxy measure 
Expected direction of 
relationship 
Auditee complexity   
SUBSIDSR Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period 
t. 
+ 
LNNBS Natural log of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at 
time period t. 
+ 
Auditee risk   
ROA Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm 
i at time period t. 
- 
CURRENT Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time 
period t. 
- 
Corporate governance characteristics 
PERNEXBD The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors for firm i at time period t. 
+ 
BODMEET The number of board of directors meetings held during the year 
for firm i at time period t. 
+ 
FINEXPAC A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm 
i at time period t. 
+ 
Other characteristics   
ENERGY A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
energy industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
MATERIALS A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
materials industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
INDUSTRIALS A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
industrials industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
CONSUMERDISC A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
CONSUMERSTAP A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
HEALTHCARE A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
health-care industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
FINANCIALS A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
financial industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
information technology industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
UTIITIES A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
? 
4.5.1 Justification for inclusion of control variables 
Audit fee models used in prior research have included a variety of variables to 
control for cross-sectional differences associated with firm size, firm complexity and firm 
risk (Boo and Sharma 2008; Lee and Mande 2005; Maher et al. 1992; Naser and Nuseibeh 
2007). The regression models used in the prior research (detailed in Section 2.4) have 
provided significant explanatory power and been robust across countries, industries and time 
periods. The prior audit fee models have been used as a basis for selecting the control 
variables used in this study. Sections 4.5.1.1. to 4.5.1.4, which follow, provide a brief 
justification of the need to include each control variable.  
4.5.1.1 Firm complexity 
There are a number of different aspects to firm complexity which may impact on 
audit fees. An increase in firm complexity will equate to greater task complexity and this, in 
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turn, increases the audit effort required for: (a) understanding the higher level of firm 
complexity; (b) coordinating the audit function; and, (c) developing either more 
sophisticated or a greater number of auditing procedures. This increase in effort by the 
auditor, therefore, results in higher audit fees. The measures used are identified below. 
4.5.1.1.1 Number of subsidiaries 
The number of subsidiaries which a firm controls is a common measure of firm 
complexity (Anderson and Zeghal 1994; Chan et al. 1993; Choi et al. 2005; Chung and 
Lindsay 1988; Firth 1985; Francis 1984; Francis and Simon 1987; Ho and Ng 1996; Karim 
and Moizer 1996; Low et al. 1990; Simon et al. 1986; Simunic 1980; Taffler and 
Ramalingam 1982; Taylor 1997). A firm with a high number of subsidiaries will have a 
higher level of complexity in its financial statements due to the need for the firm to, among 
other things, consolidate and eliminate inter-firm transactions and balances. The resulting 
accounting transactions will, in turn, require greater attention from experienced auditors 
(who charge more for such time) and this, in turn, will result in a more costly audit for the 
client. For the purposes of this study, the variable SUBSIDSR represents the square root of 
number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t. 
4.5.1.1.2 Business segments 
Research has also been undertaken using the number of business segments as a 
measure of firm complexity (Choi et al. 2005; Iyer and Iyer 1996). The rationale for this is 
that the greater the number of business segments within which the firm operates, the more 
complex the firm’s operations. This, therefore, has a positive relationship with audit fees due 
to the additional audit resources required to understand the diverse operations and to 
formulate appropriate procedures to audit the operations. For the purposes of this study, the 
variable LNNBS represents the natural log of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i 
at time period t. 
4.5.1.2 Firm risk 
There are a number of different aspects to risk which can impact on audit fees. The 
greater the risk, the greater the concerns of the auditor about firm profitability, solvency and 
incentives for management to manage earnings. This is because the auditor might be sued by 
shareholders/stakeholders who have suffered a negative pay-out, caused (at least in part) by 
the auditor negligently concluding that the auditee’s financial statements were drawn up to 
reflect a true and fair view when this was not the case (Butterworth and Houghton 1995). 
The legal hazard may increase the inherent risk of the audit engagement for the auditor and 
(in accordance with the requirements of the audit risk model) decrease the detection risk 
which the auditor applies to the audit (Leung et al. 2007). The decrease in detection risk, in 
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turn, increases both the number and type of substantive procedures (that is, audit procedures) 
which the auditor can utilize (especially around the year-end of the firm) and hence, audit 
fees. The measures of risk are identified below. 
4.5.1.2.1 ROA and liquidity measures 
This study uses earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets at year-end. 
The lower the return, the poorer the financial performance of the firm. There is, therefore, 
greater pressure on the firm to demonstrate superior financial performance (Frankel et al. 
2002). Hence, there is more incentive for management to misrepresent the financial results of 
the firm. This pressure to exhibit better financial performance increases the risk that the firm 
might not faithfully prepare the financial statements to provide a true and fair view to users. 
This risk increases agency costs such that the auditor devotes resources in the form of 
additional audit procedures (for example, by closely checking discretionary accruals) to 
mitigate this risk, thereby increasing audit fees. For the purposes of this study, the variable 
ROA represents earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time 
period t. 
4.5.1.2.2 Current ratio 
The current ratio is commonly viewed as a liquidity ratio and has been used in the 
prior literature examining audit fee determinants (Chaney et al. 2004; Francis 1984; Low et 
al. 1990). The current ratio is calculated by current assets divided by current liabilities. The 
lower the ratio, the greater the risk that the firm will not be able to continue trading and pay 
the firm’s debts as and when such debts fall due. The increased risk of insolvency to the 
client increases the inherent risk of the audit for the auditor and, in accordance with the 
requirements of the audit risk model (Leung et al. 2007), additional audit procedures will be 
undertaken by the auditor to maintain audit risk at an acceptable level. This will, in turn, 
increase audit fees. For the purposes of this study, the variable CURRENT represents current 
assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t. 
4.5.1.3 Corporate governance characteristics 
Three corporate governance measures will be analyzed to determine the effect, if 
any, on audit fees. The measures are: (1) the percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors for firm i at time period t (PERNEXBD); (2) the number of board of 
directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t (BODMEET); and (3) a 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial 
expert during the year for firm i at time period t (FINEXPAC). According to Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent (2006a), the existence and effective operation of corporate governance 
variables increases audit fees as firms endeavor to use both corporate governance and 
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external audit activities in a complementary manner to improve the management of the firm 
and the firm’s financial reporting practices. In relation to the variable FINEXPAC, the 
following definition is used in this study: audit committee members who are either a CPA 
member of CPA Australia or a CA member of the ICAA are deemed to have accounting 
expertise. Additionally, a description (in the director’s report of an annual report) of any 
audit committee member who has substantial experience in finance positions will satisfy the 
definition of finance expertise. 
4.5.1.4 Other characteristics 
A significant number of researchers have attempted to determine if the relationship 
between the determinants of audit fees are influenced by the industry in which the firm is 
operating (Anderson and Zeghal 1994; Firth 1985; Gerrard et al. 1994; Low et al. 1990; 
Palmrose 1986a; Simunic 1980). Depending on the industry in which the auditee is 
operating, that industry may impact the audit fee paid by the auditee, either positively or 
negatively, relative to other industries. As an example, firms in the mining industry have 
lower audit fees since the extent of the transactional testing undertaken by the auditor is 
limited due to the relatively unimportant role which the Profit and Loss Statement plays 
(Butterworth and Houghton 1995; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006a). This is primarily due 
to the exploratory nature of the industry where: first, there is a less diverse asset base; 
second, fewer inventory and receivables balances; and, third, a small number of customers. 
Different industries have different risk profiles and this is clearly the case given such 
different inherent risks (as evidenced by, for example, the market betas). Industries may vary 
systematically for some of the ratios discussed earlier. This study will examine nine 
industries in Australia within which the sample firms operate and determine if any 
industry/ries impact on the relationship between the selected auditor attributes and audit 
fees.35
4.6 STATISTICAL TESTS AND MODELS 
 
This study uses OLS multiple regression to analyze the relationship between the 
selected auditor attributes and audit fees. The hypotheses of this study will be tested formally 
through this multivariate technique; specifically, by using a number of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal OLS regression models. 
  
                                                     
35  Consistent with prior literature, firms in the financial industry are excluded from this study (Simunic 1980; Singh and 
Newby 2010). 
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4.6.1 Basic test model 
The basic statistical model to be used in this study is defined as:36
AF
 
it = β0 + β1AAit + β2SRSUBSIDit + β3LNNBSit + β4ROAit + β5CURRENTit 
+ β6PERNEXBDit + β7BODMEETit + β8FINEXPACit + β9INDUSTRYit + εit 
Where: 
[1] 
AF = it The amount of audit fees deflated for total assets of size of firm i at time period t; 
AA = it ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit , CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit
BIG4
); 
= it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period 
t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t  is scored zero (0). 
SPECIALIST = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period 
t is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored 
zero (0).  
CNON-AUDIT = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i 
in time period t  is scored zero (0). 
CTENURE = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor 
j till time period t has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; 
otherwise auditee i in time period t  is scored zero (0). 
SRSUBSID = it Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t. 
LNNBS = it Natural log of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t. 
ROA = it Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t. 
CURRENT = it Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t. 
PERNEXBD = it The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at 
time period t. 
BODMEET = it The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time 
period t. 
FINEXPAC = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least 
one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t. 
INDUSTRY = it ENERGYit + MATERIALSit  + INDUSTRIALSit  + CONSUMERDISCit  + 
CONSUMERSTAPit + HEALTHCAREit + INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit + 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit + UTILITIES
ENERGY
it 
= it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the energy industry and 
0 if otherwise in 2001. 
MATERIALS = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the materials industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
INDUSTRIALS = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the industrials industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
CONSUMERDISC = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the consumer 
discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
CONSUMERSTAP = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the consumer staples 
industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
HEALTHCARE = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the health-care industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY
= 
it 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the information 
technology industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS
= 
it 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the telecommunications 
industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
UTILITIES = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
β = Coefficients on variable 0 through 9. 
ε = it The error term. 
The model in Equation 1 has been specified to examine the relationship (cross-
sectionally) between a composite score capturing the four key auditor attributes and audit 
fees. The regression model will be run four times (one for each of the calendar years-ending 
2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005). Details of the specific OLS regression models to test 
the variables of interest of this study individually are specified in Equations 2 to 4. 
                                                     
36  To address the cross-sectional focus of this study, the basic test model (specified in Section 4.6.1) and the comprehensive 
cross-sectional model (specified in Section 4.6.2) will be used to examine GH1, H1a, H2a, H3a and H4a. 
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4.6.2 Comprehensive cross-sectional model 
Twelve (12) cross-sectional OLS regression models will be run to provide results of 
the association between the selected auditor attributes (independent variable) and audit fees 
(dependent variable). Specifically, in order to analyze all four auditor attributes individually, 
four individual regression models will need to be run within each year; resulting in a total of 
12 regressions (given that there are three calendar years to be investigated). The overall 
model to be used, therefore, is defined in Equation 2: 
AFit = β0 + β1BIG4it + β2SPECIALISTit + β3CNONAUDITit + β4CTENUREit 
+ β5SRSUBSIDit + β6LNNBSit + β7ROAit + β8CURRENTit + β9PERNEXBDit 
+ β10BODMEETit + β11FINEXPACit + β12INDUSTRYit + ε it 
Where: 
[2] 
AF = it Amount of audit fees paid by auditee i at time period t deflated by ASSETS;  
BIG4 = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period 
t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t  is scored zero (0).  
SPECIALIST = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period 
t is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored 
zero (0).  
CNON-AUDIT = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i 
in time period t  is scored zero (0);  
CTENURE = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor 
j till time period t has been engaged 
SRSUBSID = it Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t. 
LNNBS = it Natural log of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t. 
ROA = it Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t. 
CURRENT = it Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t. 
PERNEXBD = it The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at 
time period t. 
BODMEET = it The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time 
period t. 
FINEXPAC = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least 
one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t. 
INDUSTRY = it ENERGYit + MATERIALSit  + INDUSTRIALSit  + CONSUMERDISCit  + 
CONSUMERSTAPit + HEALTHCAREit + INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit + 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit + UTILITIES
ENERGY
it 
= it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the energy industry and 
0 if otherwise in 2001. 
MATERIALS = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the materials industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
INDUSTRIALS = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the industrials industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
CONSUMERDISC = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the consumer 
discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
CONSUMERSTAP = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the consumer staples 
industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
HEALTHCARE = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the health-care industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY
= 
it 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the information 
technology industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS
= 
it 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the telecommunications 
industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
UTILITIES = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
β = Coefficients on variables 0 through 12. 
ε = it The error term.  
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4.6.3 Longitudinal model 
Given that this study is also longitudinal in nature, changes in audit fees over this 
study period will also be investigated. The overall model to be used, therefore, is defined in 
Equations 3 and 4:37
∆AFit = β0 + β1AAit + β2SRSUBSIDit + β3LNNBSit + β4ROAit + β5CURRENTit 
+ β6PERNEXBDit + β7BODMEETit + β8FINEXPACit + β9INDUSTRYit + εit 
 
[3] 
∆AFit = β0 + β1BIG4it + β2SPECIALISTit + β3CNON-AUDITit + β4CTENUREit 
+ β5SRSUBSIDit + β6LNNBSit + β7ROAit + β8CURRENTit + β9PERNEXBDit 
+ β10BODMEETit + β11FINEXPACit + β12INDUSTRYit + εit 
Where: 
[4] 
∆AF = it Change in amount of audit fees paid by firm i at time period t deflated by opening 
total assets of auditee i; and 
BIG4 = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period 
t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t  is scored zero (0).  
SPECIALIST = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period 
t is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored 
zero (0).  
CNON-AUDIT = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i 
in time period t  is scored zero (0);  
CTENURE = it Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor 
j till time period t has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; 
otherwise auditee i in time period t  is scored zero (0).  
SRSUBSID = it Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t. 
LNNBS = it Natural log of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t. 
ROA = it Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t. 
CURRENT = it Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t. 
PERNEXBD = it The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at 
time period t. 
BODMEET = it The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time 
period t. 
FINEXPAC = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least 
one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t. 
INDUSTRY = it ENERGYit + MATERIALSit  + INDUSTRIALSit  + CONSUMERDISCit  + 
CONSUMERSTAPit + HEALTHCAREit + INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit + 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit + UTILITIES
ENERGY
it 
= it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the energy industry and 
0 if otherwise in 2001. 
MATERIALS = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the materials industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
INDUSTRIALS = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the industrials industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
CONSUMERDISC = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the consumer 
discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
CONSUMERSTAP = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the consumer staples 
industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
HEALTHCARE = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the health-care industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
INFORMATION  
TECHNOLOGY
= 
it 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the information 
technology industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS
= 
it 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the telecommunications 
industry and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
UTILITIES = it A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the company is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise in 2001. 
β = Coefficients on variables 0 through 12. 
ε = it The error term. 
                                                     
37  To address the longitudinal focus of this study, the models in Equations 3 and 4 are tested to examined GH2, H1b, H2b, H3b 
and H4b respectively. For brevity, year indicator variables have not been included in Equation 3 (Lim and Tan 2008). 
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4.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity tests will be undertaken to validate the robustness of the findings. 
Initially, the sample is partitioned by the following four audit characteristics of: firm size, 
firm complexity, firm risk and industry. Partitioning the sample by the four auditee 
characteristics (individually) is undertaken to determine if the main regression results in 
Chapter Six are influenced by firm size, firm complexity, firm risk and industry. 
Subsequently, the sample is partitioned by the following three corporate governance features: 
non-executive board of directors’ members, number of board of directors meetings annually 
and the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee. Once again, partitioning the 
sample by the following three corporate governance features (individually) is undertaken to 
determine if the main regression results are influenced by the three corporate governance 
features. 
The main regression model as defined in Equation 1 is amended to include an 
alternative measure of audit fees. Specifically, a new variable, the natural logarithm of the 
audit fees paid to the external auditor for the provision of external audit services for firm i at 
time period t (AFit) is utilized as the dependent variable (and, therefore, the natural logarithm 
of total assets for firm i at time period t (ASSETSit) is introduced into the regression models 
as an additional control variable). The alternative measure of audit fees is derived to 
determine if the main regression results in Chapter Six are influenced by the choice of the 
measure of audit fees used (that is, AFit/ASSETSit). 
The main regression model as defined in Equation 2 is also amended to include 
alternative measures of auditor attributes. Specifically, the regression models are amended to 
replace the two dichotomous variables of CNON-AUDITit and CTENUREit with continuous 
proxies of RNON-AUDITit (ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor j by 
auditee i during time period t) and NTENUREit (length of time (in years up to a maximum of 
10) during which the auditor has remained unchanged for auditee i at time period t).38
Finally, the results of multiple regression using a dichotomous composite score of 
auditor attributes (that is, AAit) as an explanatory variable were re-run to analyze the 
variation of audit fees for the years – ended 2001 and 2005 and also the change in audit fees 
 The 
alternative measures of auditor attributes are derived to determine if the main regression 
results in Chapter Six are influenced by the measures used to proxy for auditor attributes. 
                                                     
38  It is not possible to replace the two remaining dichotomous variables of BIG4it (Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) 
if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0)) and 
SPECIALISTit (Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is an industry specialist 
in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0)) as there are no continuous measures in the prior 
literature to operationalize the two dichotomous variables. 
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for 2001 to 2003 and 2003 to 2005. The objective in undertaking this partitioning is to 
determine if the introduction of CLERP 9 in 2003 improved the relationship between AAit 
and audit fees before and after the introduction of CLERP 9 (that is, between 2001 and 2005) 
in Australia. 
4.8 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Four detailed the research method used to test the hypotheses of this study. 
Initially, there was a justification of the sample selected, source documentation chosen and 
time period analyzed. Subsequently, measures for the dependent (audit fees) and independent 
variables (auditor attributes) used in this study were outlined before the main empirical tests 
to be undertaken in this study identified. 
Chapter Five will provide the descriptive statistics and univariate analyses of the 
sample. Initially, details pertaining to cleaning and excluding the data are provided. Sample 
descriptive statistics such as the mean, standard deviation, 0.25 percentile, median and 0.75 
percentile will also be provided. Details of t-tests from key descriptive sample characteristics 
for both cross-sectional and longitudinal factors along with correlation analyses are also 
provided in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Four outlined the sample collection and selection process. Measures for 
audit fees, auditor attributes and use of control variables were also discussed. The statistical 
tests and models adopted for this study were also detailed. 
Chapter Five reviews the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. 
After discussing data cleaning, the chapter continues with a description of the sample 
selection process and identifies the industry breakdowns in the final usable sample. 
Subsequently, a comprehensive discussion is undertaken of the descriptive statistics for the 
dependent variable, independent variables, firm characteristic variables, corporate 
governance and industry variables. The second part of the chapter provides t-tests for the key 
descriptive characteristics of the sample. Specifically, independent samples t-tests and two-
way ANOVA results are reported. Correlation analysis is subsequently provided before a 
summary is outlined at the end of Chapter Five. 
5.2 CLEANING OF THE DATA 
Prior to data analysis, data screening checks are undertaken for each of the variables 
used in this study. Such checks include accuracy of data entry, missing values and normality 
assessments. In relation to accuracy of data entry and missing values, a data authentication 
check is undertaken, on a sample basis, by re-visiting data already entered. In total, 
approximately ten (10) percent of the completed dataset is examined in this manner. There 
were a very small number of errors noted (three in total all of which were transpositional) 
and the errors were correctly easily. 
Additionally, each continuous variable in this study is tested for normality by 
examining the variable’s skewness, kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-value. After 
examining normality, a number of variables in this study are subject to logarithmic or square 
root transformation to provide a better linear fit with the dependent variable (that is, audit 
fees).39
                                                     
39  The variables subject to transformation have a p-value below the Kolmogorov-Smirnov threshold normality test of 0.05. 
 While some of the subsequent transformations did not result in normal distributions, 
the continued inclusion of the variables is justified by the prior research (Carcello and Nagy 
2004; Chaney et al. 2004; Gerrard et al. 1994; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2003). In 
addition, Central Limit Theorem principle suggests that large samples (of at least 30) can be 
used with confidence for subsequent multivariate testing, depending on the number of 
degrees of freedom and independent variables employed (Hair et al. 1995). 
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Univariate outliers in the dataset were identified by using box plots and an 
examination of standardized scores in excess of 3.29 (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Once 
outliers were identified, the data entered (for that variable) is checked for accuracy. 
Following this, an examination is conducted for all cases of outliers to determine whether the 
outliers are properly part of the population intended for the sample. For the purposes of this 
study, identified outliers are retained in the sample for the subsequent analysis. However the 
analysis is also re-run without the outliers to discern whether the outlier impacts the results. 
5.3 BASIC SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.3.1 Sample selection process and industry breakdown 
Table 5.1 Panel A outlines the sample selection process. The final usable sample for 
this study consists of 200 firms per calendar year for 2001, 2003 and 2005. Initially, 100 of 
the 200 firms selected in 2001 were chosen because the firms are listed at the top of the ASX 
based on market capitalization. The remaining 100 firms for 2001 are selected from the rest 
of the ASX randomly by industry stratification. After obtaining the final sample of 200 firms 
for 2001, the same firms are also selected for 2003 and 2005 resulting in a total final usable 
sample of 600 firms. When finalizing the initial sample of 200 firms for 2001, a number of 
exclusions are necessary in keeping with the established prior literature. Specifically, the 
initial sample of 2 128 firms comprises all publicly listed firms trading on the ASX as at 1 
January 2001. Consistent with the prior literature, financial institutions (338), trusts and 
investments (23), foreign incorporated firms (67) and firms not continuously listed during 
the observation period of 2001 to 2005 (994) are excluded (Hay et al. 2006; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Schleifer 1999; O'Regan, O'Donnell, Kennedy, Bontis, and Cleary 2005; 
Simunic 1980; Stearns and Mizruchi 1993; Taylor and Baker 1981; Vafeas 2005). From the 
resulting pool of 706 firms, 100 firms are selected based on market capitalization and the 
remaining 100 firms randomly selected on the basis of industry. For purposes of brevity and 
convenience of reference, the 100 firms selected based on market capitalization are referred 
to as the ASX T100 sub-sample and the remaining 100 firms randomly selected based on 
industry are referred to as ASX RI 100 sub-sample. 
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Table 5.1: 
  Sample Selection and Industry Breakdown 
Panel A: Sample Selection   
Number of Firms Listed on the ASX as at 1 January, 2001  2 128  
Exclusions:   
Financial Institutions 338  
Trusts and Investments  23  
Foreign Incorporated Firms 67  
Firms not Continuously Listed 994 (1 422) 
Sample Pool for Random Selection  706  
Firms by Market Capitalization 100  
Random Selection of Remaining Firms by Industry 100  
Final Useable Sample (2001)  200  
   
Panel B: Sample Firm Breakdown by Industry in 2001 
No. of 
Firms 
% of 
Sample 
ASX Industry   
Energy 23 11.50 
Materials 34 17.00 
Industrials 33 16.50 
Consumer Discretionary 33 16.50 
Consumer Staples 20 10.00 
Health Care 24 12.00 
Information Technology 13 6.50 
Telecommunications 12 6.00 
Utilities 8 4.00 
Total 200 100 
   
Table 5.1 Panel B presents the industry breakdown of the sample firms. Materials, 
industrials and consumer discretionary sectors collectively represent the highest proportion 
(that is, 50%) of the final sample of 200 firms in 2001. This spread is also proportionally 
representative of the ASX market as a whole. Therefore, each industry contains sufficient 
observations to control for industry effects in the subsequent multivariate analysis. 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics (dependent variable) 
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable in the sample, 
audit fees. The discussion of the descriptive statistics in this chapter is organized within 
tables in order of market capitalization (for example, n=100 in Table 5.2 Panel A), random-
selection by industry (for example, n=100 in Table 5.2 Panel B) and by total (for example, 
n=200 in Table 5.2 Panel C). 
Table 5.2 Panel A reports that audit fees paid by firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample 
have a mean of $1 026 721 and a standard deviation of $1 468 396 in 2001. Table 5.2 Panel 
A also reports that audit fees paid by firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample range from $247 525 
(at 0.25 percentile) to $1 196 051 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. The values increase steadily in 
2003 and 2005. Table 5.2 Panel A reports that total assets of firms in the ASX T100 sub-
sample have a mean of $2 246 252 876 and a standard deviation of $4 297 496 199 in 2001. 
The total assets of the 100 firms on the ASX by market capitalization in Table 5.2 Panel A 
range from $378 942 750 (at 0.25 percentile) to $2 443 462 250 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. 
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This is unsurprising given that Table 5.2 contains 100 of the top public firms on the ASX by 
market capitalization. As is the case with audit fees, the total asset values generally steadily 
in 2003 before reducing slightly in 2005. 
Table 5.2: 
  Descriptive Statistics – Audit Fees (Dependent Variable) 
Panel A: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 
(n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th percentile 
Median (50th 
percentile) 75th percentile 
AF/ASSETS_01 0.0011 0.0016 0.0003 0.0006 0.0012 
AF/ASSETS_03 0.0012 0.0017 0.0003 0.0007 0.0013 
AF/ASSETS_05 0.0017 0.0032 0.0003 0.0009 0.0015 
AF_01   ($) 1 026 721 1 468 396 247 525 560 952 1 196 051 
AF_03   ($) 1 116 002 1 596 083 269 049 609 731 1 300 055 
AF_05   ($) 1 200 272 1 690 471 293 372 648 650 1 383 038 
ASSETS_01   ($) 2 246 252 876 4 297 496 199 378 942 750 784 166 500 2 443 462 250 
ASSETS_03   ($) 2 255 358 006 4 295 567 223 380 442 350 797 206 750 2 563 474 250 
ASSETS_05   ($) 2 088 770 231 4 253 220 873 289 617 500 841 327 500 2 233 180 500 
LNAF_01 13.1333 1.2897 12.4193 13.2372 13.9936 
LNAF_03 13.2167 1.2897 12.5026 13.3206 14.0769 
LNAF_05 13.3750 1.1404 12.5891 13.3825 14.1388 
Panel B: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 
(n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
AF/ASSETS_01 
 percentile 
0.0078 0.0127 0.0013 0.0029 0.0089 
AF/ASSETS_03 0.0082 0.0136 0.0014 0.0033 0.0082 
AF/ASSETS_05 0.0056 0.0124 0.0014 0.0031 0.0061 
AF_01   ($) 56 961 69 429 17 372 38 060 67 558 
AF_03   ($) 61 914 75 466 18 882 41 370 73 433 
AF_05   ($) 52 853 44 144 19 700 40 285 72 659 
ASSETS_01   ($) 32 546 656 58 428 801 4 271 093 11 387 460 26 184 514 
ASSETS_03   ($) 28 872 812 46 889 462 4 551 192 11 048 460 25 864 750 
ASSETS_05   ($) 32 095 305 64 850 728 6 037 535 10 586 921 26 840 972 
LNAF_01 10.4829 0.9803 9.7626 10.5469 11.1207 
LNAF_03 10.5663 0.9802 9.8459 10.6303 11.2041 
LNAF_05 10.5324 0.8880 9.8883 10.6035 11.1933 
Panel C: 
Pooled Sample (n = 200) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
AF/ASSETS_01 
 percentile 
0.0044 0.0096 0.0005 0.0012 0.003 
AF/ASSETS_03 0.0047 0.0103 0.0005 0.0014 0.0039 
AF/ASSETS_05 0.0036 0.0092 0.0007 0.0014 0.0037 
AF_01   ($) 541 842 1 145 148 32 256 115 518 566 379 
AF_03   ($) 588 958 1 244 726 35 063 125 563 615 630 
AF_05   ($) 626 563 1 324 172 38 000 133 578 654 925 
ASSETS_01   ($) 1 139 399 766 3 228 128 278 11 338 190 114 187 961 789 859 250 
ASSETS_03   ($) 1 142 115 409 3 228 965 516 10 928 230 111 294 961 789 859 250 
ASSETS_05   ($) 1 060 432 768 3 172 440 079 10 282 790 92 782 602 847 283 750 
LNAF_01 11.8100 1.7500 10.3800 11.6600 13.2500 
LNAF_03 11.8900 1.7500 10.4600 11.7400 13.3300 
LNAF_05 11.9500 1.7500 10.5500 11.8000 13.3900 
Where: 
AF/ASSETS_01 = The amount of audit fees paid by the firm in 2001 deflated by total assets; AF/ASSETS_03 = The amount of audit 
fees paid by the firm in 2003 deflated by total assets; AF/ASSETS_05 = The amount of audit fees paid by the firm in 2005 deflated 
by total assets; AF_01 = The amount of audit fees paid to the external auditor in 2001 for the provision of external audit services 
for the firm; AF_03 = The amount of audit fees paid to the external auditor in 2003 for the provision of external audit services for 
the firm; AF_05 = The amount of audit fees paid to the external auditor in 2005 for the provision of external audit services for the 
firm; ASSETS_01 = Total assets of the firm in 2001; ASSETS_03 = Total assets of the firm in 2003; ASSETS_05 = Total assets of 
the firm in 2005; LNAF_01 = Natural logarithmic transformation of audit fees for the firm in 2001; LNAF_03 = Natural 
logarithmic transformation of audit fees for the firm in 2003; LNAF_05 = Natural logarithmic transformation of audit fees for the 
firm in 2005 
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Table 5.2 Panel B reports that audit fees paid by firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample 
have a mean of $56 961 and a standard deviation of $69 429 in 2001. Table 5.2 Panel B also 
reports that audit fees paid by firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample range from $17 372 (at 
0.25 percentile) to $67 558 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. As is the case for the top 100 firms 
by market capitalization on the ASX, the values for firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample on 
the ASX increase in 2003 before declining slightly in 2005. Table 5.2 Panel B reports that 
total assets of firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample have a mean of $32 546 656 and a 
standard deviation of $58 428 801 in 2001. The total assets of the firms randomly selected by 
industry in Table 5.2 Panel B range from $4 271 093 (at 0.25 percentile) to $26 184 514 (at 
0.75 percentile) in 2001. As is the case with audit fees, the increase in mean suggests that 
total asset values increase steadily in 2003 and 2005. 
Table 5.2 Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for audit fees across the pooled 
sample. The descriptive statistics for the pooled sample follow a similar pattern to the ASX 
T100 and ASX RI 100 sub-samples. 
5.3.3 Descriptive statistics (independent variable) 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous independent 
variables and continuous independent variables respectively in the sample (that is, four 
selected auditor attributes). 
5.3.3.1 Descriptive statistics (dichotomous independent variables) 
Table 5.3 Panel A shows that 92% of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample employ a 
Big4 auditor for 2001, 2003 and 2005. In respect to auditor specialization, 50% of the firms 
in Table 5.3 Panel A employ an industry specialist auditor with the number of firms 
increasing to 54 in 2003 and 57 in 2005 suggesting a greater desire by firms for higher levels 
of auditor quality. Fifty-one percent (51%) of firms have incumbent auditors who provide 
non-audit services equaling less than 25% of total fees charged for 2001, 2003 and 2005. In 
relation to auditor tenure, 87% of firms in Table 5.3 Panel A have an incumbent auditor who 
has been engaged as the principal auditor for three years or more in 2001. Over time, this 
value has increased to 90% in 2003 and 99% in 2005 suggesting that the biggest firms in 
Australia tend to stay with the same auditor over time. Most importantly, the composite 
dichotomous score (reported in Table 5.3 Panel A) based on the four auditor attributes (that 
is, Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and auditor tenure) indicates 
that in 2001, a total of 63 firms of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample obtain a cumulative 
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composite score of either three or greater (specifically, 43 firms scoring three and 20 firms 
scoring four). The result remains fairly constant during 2003 and 2005 also.40
Table 5.3: 
  Descriptive Statistics – Auditor Attributes (Dichotomous Independent Variables) 
 
Panel A: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 2001 2003 2005 
BIG4  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t 
is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0). 92 92 92 
Auditee i in time period t is not audited by a Big4 auditor. 8 8 8 
Total 100 100 100 
SPECIALIST  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t 
is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored 
zero (0). 
50 54 57 
Auditee i in time period t is not audited by an industry specialist in industry k 50 46 43 
Total 100 100 100 
CNON-AUDIT  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i in 
time period t is scored zero (0). 
51 51 51 
Auditee i in time period t pays more than 0.25 of the ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees to the incumbent auditor. 49 49 49 
Total 100 100 100 
CTENURE  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor j 
till time period t has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; 
otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0). 
87 90 99 
Auditee i in time period t has engaged the incumbent auditor for less than three years. 13 10 1 
Total 100 100 100 
∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit , CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A composite dichotomous 
score based on the four proxy measures for auditor attributes: Big4, industry 
specialization, provision of non-audit services and length of tenure is developed that 
is, AA
 
it 
  
Number of firms scoring 0 0 0 0 
Number of firms scoring 1 3 1 2 
Number of firms scoring 2 34 33 38 
Number of firms scoring 3 43 44 19 
Number of firms scoring 4 20 22 41 
Total 100 100 100 
    
Panel B: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 2001 2003 2005 
BIG4  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t 
is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0). 47 47 45 
Auditee i in time period t is not audited by a Big4 auditor. 53 53 55 
Total 100 100 100 
SPECIALIST  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t 
is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored 
zero (0). 
46 49 54 
Auditee i in time period t is not audited by an industry specialist in industry k 54 51 46 
Total 100 100 100 
    
                                                     
40  It is noteworthy to mention that in 2005, there were only 19 firms with a score of three but a significant 41 firms with an 
auditor attributes dichotomous score of four. 
87 
 
Table 5.3: 
Descriptive Statistics – Auditor Attributes (Dichotomous Independent Variables) (continued) 
Panel B continued: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 2001 2003 2005 
CNON-AUDIT  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i in 
time period t is scored zero (0). 
45 43 39 
Auditee i in time period t pays more than 0.25 of the ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees to the incumbent auditor. 55 57 61 
Total 100 100 100 
CTENURE  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor j 
till time period t has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; 
otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0). 
86 90 95 
Auditee i in time period t has engaged the incumbent auditor for less than three years. 14 10 5 
Total 100 100 100 
∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit , CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A composite dichotomous 
score based on the four proxy measures for auditor attributes: Big4, industry 
specialization, provision of non-audit services and length of tenure is developed that 
is, AA
 
it 
  
Number of firms scoring 0 2 2 1 
Number of firms scoring 1 20 16 19 
Number of firms scoring 2 38 42 41 
Number of firms scoring 3 32 31 24 
Number of firms scoring 4 8 9 15 
Total 100 100 100 
    
Panel C: 
Pooled Sample 2001 2003 2005 
BIG4  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t 
is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0). 139 139 137 
Auditee i in time period t is not audited by a Big4 auditor. 61 61 63 
Total 200 200 200 
SPECIALIST  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t 
is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored 
zero (0). 
96 103 111 
Auditee i in time period t is not audited by an industry specialist in industry k 104 97 89 
Total 200 200 200 
CNON-AUDIT  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i in 
time period t is scored zero (0). 
96 94 90 
Auditee i in time period t pays more than 0.25 of the ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees to the incumbent auditor. 104 106 110 
Total 200 200 200 
CTENURE  it   
Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor j 
till time period t has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; 
otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0). 
173 180 194 
Auditee i in time period t has engaged the incumbent auditor for less than three years. 27 20 6 
Total 200 200 200 
∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit , CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A composite dichotomous 
score based on the four proxy measures for auditor attributes: Big4, industry 
specialization, provision of non-audit services and length of tenure is developed that 
is, AA
 
it 
  
Number of firms scoring 0 2 2 1 
Number of firms scoring 1 23 17 21 
Number of firms scoring 2 72 75 79 
Number of firms scoring 3 75 75 43 
Number of firms scoring 4 28 31 56 
Total 200 200 200 
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Table 5.3 Panel B shows that only 47% of firms randomly selected by industry 
employ a Big4 auditor in 2001 and 2003 with a slight reduction in the value in 2005.41 This 
contrasts sharply with 92 % of the firms on the ASX with the largest market capitalization in 
Table 5.3 Panel A across a similar time span. In respect of auditor specialization, Table 5.3 
Panel B indicates that 46% of the firms randomly selected by industry employ an industry 
specialist auditor in 2001 with the number increasing to 49 in 2003 and 54 in 2005 
suggesting a greater desire by smaller firms for higher levels of auditor quality. Overall, 
across the ASX RI 100 sample, the upward change in auditor specialization suggests an 
overall intention by the entire market to align with auditors of greater quality. Forty-five 
percent (45%) of firms have incumbent auditors who provide non-audit services equaling 
less than 25% of total fees charged for 2001. This value decreases in 2003 to 43% and 2005 
to 39%. The decline suggests that over time auditors of smaller firms in the ASX are 
undertaking a greater amount of non-audit services in addition to the statutory audit.42
Table 5.3 Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for audit fees across the pooled 
sample. The descriptive statistics for the pooled sample follow a similar pattern to the ASX 
T100 and ASX RI 100 sub-samples. 
 In 
relation to auditor tenure, 86% of firms in Table 5.3 Panel B have an incumbent auditor who 
has been engaged as the principal auditor for three years or more in 2001. Over time, this 
value increased to 90% in 2003 and 95% in 2005. This trend is similar to firms in the ASX 
T100 sub-sample (that is, Table 5.3 Panel A) suggesting that most firms tend to stay with the 
same auditor over time. Importantly, the composite dichotomous score (reported in Table 5.3 
Panel B) based on the four auditor attributes (that is, Big4, industry specialization, provision 
of non-audit services and auditor tenure) indicates that for firms randomly selected by 
industry in 2001, a total of 40 firms obtain a cumulative score of either three or more 
(specifically, 32 firms scoring three and eight firms scoring four). The result remains fairly 
constant during 2003 and 2005. In terms of comparing the results for the composite 
dichotomous score for auditor attributes between the two types of sample drawn for this 
study, it is evident that the largest firms on the ASX have 20 firms with a dichotomous score 
of four for auditor attributes compared to only eight firms (within the firms sampled in 2001) 
with a similar score of four. Furthermore, the variance in the score of four between the two 
groups of samples increases in 2003 and especially in 2005. 
                                                     
41  This is consistent with prior research suggesting that smaller public firms do not necessarily gravitate towards Big4 auditors 
(Francis and Simon 1987; Thinggaard and Kiertzner 2008). 
42  However, firms randomly selected by industry have a smaller percentage of firms paying incumbent auditors for non-audit 
services compared to firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample who have an average of 51%. 
89 
 
5.3.3.2 Descriptive statistics (continuous independent variables) 
Table 5.4 Panel A reports that non-audit fees paid by firms in the ASX T100 sub-
sample have a mean of $376 618 and a standard deviation of $509 931 in 2001. Table 5.4 
Panel A shows that non-audit fees paid by firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample range from 
$57 045 (at 0.25 percentile) to $535 326 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. The values increase 
steadily in 2003 and 2005. Table 5.4 Panel A reports that the ratio of non-audit fees to total 
audit fees paid to the auditor of the 100 firms on the ASX by market capitalization has a mean 
of 0.2853 with a standard deviation of 0.2128 in 2001. Table 5.4 Panel A shows that the ratio 
of non-audit fees to total audit fees paid to the auditor of the 100 firms on the ASX by market 
capitalization range from 0.1100 (at 0.25 percentile) to 0.4278 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. 
The values stay generally unchanged in 2003 and 2005. Table 5.4 Panel A reports that in 
terms of the length of time in years (up to a maximum of 10 years) during which the auditor 
remains unchanged, firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample have a mean of 8 years with a 
standard deviation of 3 years. Table 5.4 Panel A also shows that in terms of the length of 
time in years (up to a maximum of 10 years) during which the auditor remains unchanged, 
most of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample range from 7 years (at 0.25 percentile) to 10 years 
(at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. The values increase steadily in 2003 and 2005 suggesting that 
over time, firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample choose to stay longer with the incumbent 
auditor. This is also evident with the standard deviation of auditor tenure decreasing from 3 
years in 2001 and 2003 to 2 years in 2005. 
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Table 5.4: 
  Descriptive Statistics (Continuous Independent Variables) 
Panel A: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 
(n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
NON-AUDIT_01   ($) 
 percentile 
376 618 509 931 57 045 168 245 535 326 
NON-AUDIT_03   ($) 396 440 536 770 60 048 177 100 563 501 
NON-AUDIT_05   ($) 434 111 581 483 73 050 192 500 612 501 
RNON-AUDIT_01 0.2853 0.2128 0.1100 0.2596 0.4278 
RNON-AUDIT_03 0.2785 0.2107 0.1069 0.2534 0.4200 
RNON-AUDIT_05 0.2827 0.2122 0.1090 0.2575 0.4252 
NTENURE_01 8 3 7 9 10 
NTENURE_03 8 3 8 10 10 
NTENURE_05 9 2 9 10 10 
Panel B: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 
(n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
NON-AUDIT_01   ($) 
 percentile 
23 173 35 279 219 9 002 27 915 
NON-AUDIT_03   ($) 23 818 37415 0 8818 29 384 
NON-AUDIT_05   ($) 20 867 35489 0 6968 27 648 
RNON-AUDIT_01 0.2383 0.2142 0.0051 0.1999 0.4071 
RNON-AUDIT_03 0.2229 0.2141 0.0000 0.1708 0.3884 
RNON-AUDIT_05 0.2022 0.2093 0.0000 0.1404 0.3496 
NTENURE_01 6 3 3 5 9 
NTENURE_03 6 3 4 6 10 
NTENURE_05 7 2 5 7 9 
Panel C: 
Pooled Sample (n = 200) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
NON-AUDIT_01   ($) 
 percentile 
199 896 401 707 5 574 31 932 168 464 
NON-AUDIT_03   ($) 210 129 422 989 5 158 33 613 177 330 
NON-AUDIT_05   ($) 227 489 460 159 3 320 33 593 192 750 
RNON-AUDIT_01 0.2609 0.2142 0.0782 0.2308 0.4199 
RNON-AUDIT_03 0.2507 0.2137 0.0640 0.2204 0.4085 
RNON-AUDIT_05 0.2424 0.2140 0.0328 0.2148 0.4066 
NTENURE_01 7 3 4 8 9 
NTENURE_03 7 3 5 9 10 
NTENURE_05 8 2 6 9 10 
Where:  
NON-AUDIT_01 = Non-audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor in 2001; NON-AUDIT_03= Non-audit fees paid to the incumbent 
auditor in 2003; NON-AUDIT_05 = Non-audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor in 2005; RNON-AUDIT_01 = Ratio of non-audit 
fees to total fees paid to the auditor in 2001; RNON-AUDIT_03 = Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor in 2003; 
RNON-AUDIT_05 = Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor in 2005; NTENURE_01 = Length of time (in years up 
to a maximum of 10) during which the auditor has remained unchanged from 2001; NTENURE_03 = Length of time (in years up to 
a maximum of 10) during which the auditor has remained unchanged from 2003; NTENURE_05 = Length of time (in years up to a 
maximum of 10) during which the auditor has remained unchanged from 2005. 
Table 5.4 Panel B reports that non-audit fees paid by firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-
sample have a mean of $23 173 with a standard deviation of $35 279 in 2001. Table 5.4 
Panel B also shows that non-audit fees paid by firms randomly selected by industry to 
auditors range from $219 (at 0.25 percentile) to $27 915 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. Given 
the reduction in such non-audit fees paid to auditors in 2003 and 2005 to $0 (at 0.25 
percentile) and the marginal change over 2003 and 2005 (at 0.75 percentile and the mean), 
the data suggests that non-audit fees represent a declining proportion of total audit fees paid 
by smaller firms on the ASX. Table 5.4 Panel B reports that non-audit to total audit fees paid 
to the auditor of firms randomly selected by industry have a mean of 0.2383 with a standard 
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deviation of 0.2142 in 2001. Table 5.4  Panel B also shows that non-audit fees to total audit 
fees paid to the auditor of firms randomly selected by industry range from 0.0051 (at 0.25 
percentile) to 0.4071 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. As is the case for non-audit fees, the 
reduction in the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees paid to auditors in 2003 and 2005 to 
$0 (at 0.25 percentile) and the marginal change over 2003 and 2005 (at 0.75 percentile and 
the mean), the data confirms that non-audit fees do not represent a significant proportion of 
total audit fees paid by smaller firms on the ASX over time. Table 5.4 Panel B reports that in 
terms of the length of time in years (up to a maximum of 10 years) during which the auditor 
remains unchanged, the firms randomly selected by industry have a mean of 6 years with a 
standard deviation of 3 years in 2001. Table 5.4 Panel B also shows that in terms of the 
length of time in years (up to a maximum of 10 years) during which the auditor remains 
unchanged, the firms randomly selected by industry range from 3 years (at 0.25 percentile) to 
9 years (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. The values increase steadily in 2003 and 2005 
suggesting that over time, firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample choose to stay with the 
incumbent auditor. However, in terms of comparisons with firms in the ASX T100 sub-
sample, the firms randomly selected by industry have a much shorter tenure (at 0.25 and 0.75 
percentiles) with the incumbent auditors suggesting that smaller firms do not stay as long 
with auditors compared to larger firms. This is particularly evident with the standard 
deviation of auditor tenure decreasing from 3 years in 2001 and 2003 to 2 years in 2005 in 
Table 5.4 Panel B. 
Table 5.4 Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for audit fees across the pooled 
sample. The descriptive statistics for the pooled sample follow a similar pattern to the ASX 
T100 and ASX RI 100 sub-samples. 
5.3.4 Descriptive statistics (firm characteristics variables) 
Table 5.5 Panel A reports that sales by firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample have a 
mean of $1 783 346 925 and a standard deviation of $3 484 452 840 in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel 
A also reports that the quantum of sales by firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample range from 
$224 337 750 (at 0.25 percentile) to $1 646 690 000 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001.43
                                                     
43  This is unsurprising given that the sample consists of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample. 
 In relation 
to number of employees, Table 5.5 Panel A reports that firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample 
have a mean of 5 036 employees and a standard deviation of 8 929 employees in 2001. Table 
5.5 Panel A also reports that the top 100 firms on the ASX range from having 461 employees 
(at 0.25 percentile) to 5 522 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel A reveals that the 
number of subsidiaries in the sample of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample have a mean of 54 
and a standard deviation of 83 in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel A also reports that the number of 
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subsidiaries in the sample of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample range from 14 (at 0.25 
percentile) to 63 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. As is the case for sales and numbers of 
employees, the numbers of subsidiaries in the sample of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample 
increase steadily in 2003 and 2005. In terms of number of business segments, Table 5.5 
Panel A reports that firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample have a mean of 3 business segments 
and a standard deviation of 2 business segments in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel A also reports that 
the number of business segments in the sample of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample range 
from 1 (at the 0.25 percentile) to 4 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. The values remain relatively 
constant in 2003 and 2005. 
Descriptive statistics for profitability and liquidity ratios reported in Table 5.5 Panel 
A (that is, earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets and current assets divided 
by current liabilities) show firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample at various stages of firm 
profitability and risk. Specifically, in terms of profitability, the ROA reveals a mean of 
0.0463 and a standard deviation 0.1356. Results range from 0.0344 (at 0.25 percentile) to 
0.0804 (at 0.75 percentile) for 2001. The values increase steadily in 2003 and 2005 
suggesting higher levels of profitability across all of the larger firms in the sample. The 
current ratio reports firms with a mean of 2.8003 and a standard deviation of 13.2465 in 
2001. The current ratio ranges from 0.9650 (at 0.25 percentile) to 1.6600 (at 0.75 percentile) 
in 2001. Values decrease in 2003 and 2005 suggesting greater levels of liquidity for 
Australia’s largest firms. 
Table 5.5: 
  Descriptive Statistics (Firm Characteristics Variables) 
Panel A: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 
 (n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th percentile 
 Firm Size     
LNASSETS_01 20.6027 1.4571 19.7529 20.4800 21.6166 
LNASSETS_03 20.6098 1.4588 19.7529 20.4800 21.6166 
LNASSETS_05 20.4602 1.5460 19.4840 20.5504 21.5262 
LNSALES_01 19.9501 2.3129 19.2284 20.2643 21.2220 
LNSALES_03 20.2735 1.7659 19.3302 20.3913 21.3800 
LNSALES_05 20.4503 1.8488 19.5486 20.5749 21.6702 
SALES_01   ($) 1 783 346 925 3 484 452 840 224 337 750 631 956 500 1 646 690 000 
SALES_03   ($) 2 046 061 137 3 958 721 197 248 304 000 717 602 500 1 928 538 000 
SALES_05   ($) 2 441 476 754 4 624 237 359 309 072 250 862 229 000 2 577 883 500 
SREMPLOYEES_01 53.4706 46.8904 21.4278 39.2804 74.3041 
SREMPLOYEES_03 55.6925 48.9468 22.3432 40.9567 77.4634 
SREMPLOYEES_05 58.8599 51.4407 23.5470 43.1676 81.6519 
EMPLOYEES_01 5036 8929 461 1543 5522 
EMPLOYEES_03 5473 9706 502 1678 6001 
EMPLOYEES_05 6084 10783 557 1864 6668 
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Table 5.5: 
  Descriptive Statistics (Firm Characteristics Variables) (continued) 
Panel A continued: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 
 (n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th percentile 
 Firm Complexity     
SRSUBSID_01 6.2000 3.9221 3.7745 5.8310 7.9039 
SRSUBSID_03 6.3845 4.0538 3.9047 6.0000 8.1532 
SRSUBSID_05 6.6095 4.0843 4.0607 6.0828 8.4557 
SUBSID_01 54 83 14 34 63 
SUBSID_03 57 88 15 36 67 
SUBSID_05 60 91 17 37 72 
LNNBS_01 0.7901 0.6489 0.0000 0.6931 1.3863 
LNNBS_03 0.7939 0.6561 0.0000 0.6931 1.3863 
LNNBS_05 0.8181 0.6688 0.0000 0.6931 1.3863 
NBS_01 3 2 1 2 4 
NBS_03 3 2 1 2 4 
NBS_05 3 2 1 2 4 
 Firm Risk     
ROA_01 0.0463 0.1356 0.0344 0.0554 0.0804 
ROA_03 0.0652 0.1171 0.0476 0.0617 0.0982 
ROA_05 0.0697 0.1013 0.0477 0.0777 0.0956 
CURRENT_01 2.8003 13.2465 0.9650 1.2650 1.6600 
CURRENT_03 1.9923 03.0108 1.0525 1.3750 1.8150 
CURRENT_05 8.5353 68.6507 1.0000 1.2900 1.7900 
Panel B: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 
 (n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th percentile 
 Firm Size     
LNASSETS_01 16.2426 1.4916 15.2672 16.2480 17.0807 
LNASSETS_03 16.2204 1.4289 15.3298 16.2176 17.0682 
LNASSETS_05 16.3715 1.2878 15.6135 16.1751 17.1053 
LNSALES_01 14.4198 3.9210 13.2304 15.0026 16.8817 
LNSALES_03 14.6615 3.6416 12.6119 15.4821 17.0073 
LNSALES_05 15.5342 2.5461 13.8316 15.8125 17.3621 
SALES_01   ($) 38 363 133 104 521 552 560 369 3 279 049 21 480 332 
SALES_03   ($) 35 284 189 79 375 065 300 100 5 307 009 24 354 668 
SALES_05   ($) 42 594 737 96 462 251 1 021 855 7 368 701 34 702 575 
SREMPLOYEES_01 6.4512 6.1826 2.2361 4.4721 7.4325 
SREMPLOYEES_03 6.7120 6.4549 2.4495 4.5826 7.7616 
SREMPLOYEES_05 6.8487 6.7797 2.4495 4.7958 8.0000 
EMPLOYEES_01 79 172 5 20 55 
EMPLOYEES_03 86 187 6 21 60 
EMPLOYEES_05 92 207 6 23 64 
 Firm Complexity     
SRSUBSID_01 2.4621 1.5596 1.7321 2.2361 2.9571 
SRSUBSID_03 2.4971 1.6189 1.7321 2.2361 2.9571 
SRSUBSID_05 2.3725 1.4568 1.4142 2.2361 2.8284 
SUBSID_01 8 15 3 5 9 
SUBSID_03 9 15 3 5 9 
SUBSID_05 8 13 2 5 8 
LNNBS_01 0.6190 0.5329 0.0000 0.6931 1.0986 
LNNBS_03 0.6300 0.5404 0.0000 0.6931 1.0986 
LNNBS_05 0.6278 0.5277 0.0000 0.6931 1.0986 
NBS_01 2 1 1 2 3 
NBS_03 2 1 1 2 3 
NBS_05 2 1 1 2 3 
 Firm Risk     
ROA_01 -0.3276 0.9336 -0.3338 -0.0476 0.0654 
ROA_03 -0.2335 0.5340 -0.3380 -0.0895 0.0501 
ROA_05 -0.1655 0.5513 -0.2557 -0.0266 0.0705 
CURRENT_01 9.3400 23.7353 1.1250 1.8500 4.9500 
CURRENT_03 3.9222 7.4418 1.0500 1.7200 3.1050 
CURRENT_05 4.8371 7.0646 1.1975 1.8600 5.0900 
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Table 5.5: 
  Descriptive Statistics (Firm Characteristics Variables) (continued) 
Panel C: 
Pooled Sample (n = 200) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th percentile 
 Firm Size     
LNASSETS_01 18.4226 2.6344 16.2437 18.5534 20.4873 
LNASSETS_03 18.4151 2.6297 16.2067 18.5274 20.4873 
LNASSETS_05 18.4159 2.4929 16.1459 18.3458 20.5575 
LNSALES_01 17.1849 4.2420 14.7930 18.0491 20.3006 
LNSALES_03 17.4675 4.0077 15.3355 18.2778 20.4002 
LNSALES_05 17.9923 3.3163 15.7396 18.6528 20.5816 
SALES_01   ($) 910 855 029 2 609 732 192 2 660 833 68 976 571 655 423 000 
SALES_03   ($) 1 040 672 663 2 969 070 726 4 572 111 86 696 500 724 029 250 
SALES_05   ($) 1 242 035 746 3 476 862 852 6 849 274 126 129 975 867 926 000 
SREMPLOYEES_01 29.9609 40.8452 3.6396 11.5325 39.3886 
SREMPLOYEES_03 31.2023 42.6074 3.7745 12.0208 41.0696 
SREMPLOYEES_05 32.8543 44.9331 3.9047 12.6490 43.2863 
EMPLOYEES_01 2 558 6 771 13 133 1 552 
EMPLOYEES_03 2 780 7 360 14 145 1 687 
EMPLOYEES_05 3 089 8 178 15 160 1 874 
 Firm Complexity     
SRSUBSID_01 4.3311 3.5176 2.0000 3.1623 5.8948 
SRSUBSID_03 4.4408 3.6436 2.0000 3.3166 6.0621 
SRSUBSID_05 4.4910 3.7236 2.0000 3.3166 6.1440 
SUBSID_01 31 63 4 10 35 
SUBSID_03 33 67 4 11 37 
SUBSID_05 34 70 4 11 38 
LNNBS_01 0.7046 0.5984 0.0000 0.6931 1.0986 
LNNBS_03 0.7120 0.6052 0.0000 0.6931 1.0986 
LNNBS_05 0.7229 0.6084 0.0000 0.6931 1.0986 
NBS_01 2 12 1 2 3 
NBS_03 2 2 1 2 3 
NBS_05 2 2 1 2 3 
 Firm Risk     
ROA_01 -0.1406 0.6913 -0.0830 0.0384 0.0743 
ROA_03 -0.0841 0.4136 -0.1114 0.0489 0.0814 
ROA_05 -0.0479 0.4125 -0.0429 0.0520 0.0916 
CURRENT_01 6.0702 19.4501 1.0325 1.4450 2.3800 
CURRENT_03 2.9573 5.7442 1.0525 1.4950 2.3775 
CURRENT_05 6.6862 48.7123 1.0600 1.4650 2.6350 
Where: 
LNASSETS_01 = Natural logarithmic of total assets for firm in 2001; LNASSETS_03 = Natural logarithmic of total assets for firm 
in 2003; LNASSETS_05 = Natural logarithmic of total assets for firm in 2005; LNSALES_01 = Natural logarithmic of sales/revenue 
for firm in 2001; LNSALES_03 = Natural logarithmic of sales/revenue for firm in 2003; LNSALES_05 = Natural logarithmic of 
sales/revenue for firm in 2005; SALES_01 = Sales/revenue for firm in 2001; SALES_03 = Sales/revenue for firm in 2003; 
SALES_05 = Sales/revenue for firm in 2005; SREMPLOYEES_01 = Square root of number of employees for firm in 2001; 
SREMPLOYEES_03 = Square root of number of employees for firm in 2003; SREMPLOYEES_03 = Square root of number of 
employees for firm in 2003; EMPLOYEES_01 = Number of employees for firm in 2001; EMPLOYEES_03 = Number of 
employees for firm in 2003; EMPLOYEES_05 = Number of employees for firm in 2005; SRSUBSID_01 = Square root of number 
of subsidiaries for firm in 2001; SRSUBSID_03 = Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm in 2003; SRSUBSID_05 = Square 
root of number of subsidiaries for firm in 2005; SUBSID_01 = Total number of subsidiaries for firm in 2001; SUBSID_03 = Total 
number of subsidiaries for firm in 2003; SUBSID_05 = Total number of subsidiaries for firm in 2005; LNNBS_01 = Natural 
logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm in 2001; LNNBS_03 = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm in 2003; LNNBS_05 = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm in 2005; 
NBS_01 = Number of business segments for firm in 2001; NBS_03 = Number of business segments for firm in 2003; NBS_05 = 
Number of business segments for firm in 2005; ROA_01 = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm in 2001; 
ROA_03 = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm in 2003; ROA_05 = Earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets for firm in 2005; CURRENT_01 = Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm in 2001; 
CURRENT_03 = Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm in 2003; and CURRENT_05 = Current assets divided by 
current liabilities for firm in 2005;  
Table 5.5 Panel B reports that sales of firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample have a 
mean of $38  363  133 with a standard deviation of $104 521 552 in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel B 
also shows that the sales range from $560 369 (at 0.25 percentile) to $21 480 332 (at 0.75 
95 
 
percentile) in 2001. As evidenced by the increase in mean, values increase steadily in 2003 
and 2005. Table 5.5 Panel B reports that the number of employees of firms in the ASX RI 
100 sub-sample has a mean of 79 employees with a standard deviation of 172 employees in 
2001. Table 5.5 Panel B also shows that the number of employees range from 5 employees 
(at 0.25 percentile) to 55 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel B reports that the 
number of subsidiaries of firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample has a mean of 8 subsidiaries 
with a standard deviation of 15 subsidiaries in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel B also shows that the 
number of subsidiaries range from 3 subsidiaries (at 0.25 percentile) to 9 subsidiaries (at 
0.75 percentile) in 2001. As is the case for employees, the number of subsidiaries in the 
sample of firms randomly selected by industry generally increased steadily in 2003 and 
2005. In terms of number of business segments, Table 5.5 Panel B reports that firms in the 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample have a mean of 2 business segments with a standard deviation of 1 
business segments in 2001. Table 5.5 Panel B also shows that the firms in the ASX RI 100 
sub-sample have business segments ranging from 1 business segments (at 0.25 percentile) to 
3 business segments (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. The profitability ratio in Table 5.5 Panel B 
(that is, earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets) shows the firms randomly 
selected by industry performing poorly in terms of profitability. Specifically, the ROA 
measure reveals mean results of -0.3276 and a standard deviation of 0.9336 and values 
ranging from -0.3338 (at 0.25 percentile) to 0.0654 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. The ROA 
values move in no discernable pattern in 2003 and 2005 suggesting differing levels of 
profitability across the smaller firms in the sample. The current ratio of firms in the ASX RI 
100 sub-sample not suggest firms with significant liquidity problems within the observation 
window with a mean ratio of 9.3400 and a standard deviations of 23.7353 in 2001. The 
current ratio ranges from 1.1250 (at 0.25 percentile) to 4.9500 (at 0.75 percentile) in 2001. 
The current ratio values decrease initially in 2003 before increasing in 2005 suggesting an 
overall reduction in liquidity levels amongst Australia’s smaller firms. 
Table 5.5 Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for audit fees across the pooled 
sample. The descriptive statistics for the pooled sample follow a similar pattern to the ASX 
T100 and ASX RI 100 sub-samples. 
5.3.5 Descriptive statistics (corporate governance variable) 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous and 
continuous corporate governance variables respectively in the sample. 
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5.3.5.1 Descriptive statistics (dichotomous corporate governance variable) 
Table 5.6 Panel A shows that 72% of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample have audit 
committees consisting of at least one financial expert during 2001. The percentage increases 
to 82% in 2003 and 89% in 2005. 
Table 5.6: 
  Descriptive Statistics (Dichotomous Corporate Governance Variable) 
Panel A: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 
 2001 2003 2005 
FINEXPAC  it   
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one 
financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t. otherwise auditee i in time 
period t is scored zero (0). 
72 82 89 
The audit committee does not consist of at least one financial expert during the year 
for firm i at time period t. 28 18 11 
Total 100 100 100 
    
Panel B: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 
 2001 2003 2005 
FINEXPAC  it   
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one 
financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t. otherwise auditee i in time 
period t is scored zero (0). 
53 62 64 
The audit committee does not consist of at least one financial expert during the year 
for firm i at time period t. 47 38 36 
Total 100 100 100 
    
Panel C: 
Pooled Sample 2001 2003 2005 
FINEXPAC  it   
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one 
financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t. otherwise auditee i in time 
period t is scored zero (0). 
125 144 153 
The audit committee does not consist of at least one financial expert during the year 
for firm i at time period t. 75 56 47 
Total 200 200 200 
    
Table 5.6 Panel B shows that 53% of the firms randomly selected by industry have 
audit committees consisting of at least one financial expert during 2001 with the percentage 
increasing to 62% in 2003 and 64% in 2005. It is clearly suggested by Table 5.6 Panels A 
and B that the larger firms on the ASX have a greater percentage of financial experts on audit 
committees than the remaining firms on the ASX. Table 5.6 Panel C shows the representation 
of at least one financial expert on the audit committee for the pooled sample. 
5.3.5.2 Descriptive statistics (continuous corporate governance variables) 
Table 5.7 Panel A reports the mean percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors for firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample is 41% with a standard deviation of 
18% in 2001. Also, Table 5.7 Panel A also reports that the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board of directors for firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample ranges from 26% 
(at 0.25 percentile) to 60% (at the 0.75 percentile) in 2001. Values increase in 2003 and 2005 
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suggesting an improvement in the independence of board members. Table 5.7 Panel A 
reports that number of board of directors meetings of firms in the ASX T100 sub-sample has 
a mean of 11 and a standard deviation of 4 in 2001. The number of board of directors 
meetings in 2001 ranges from 8 (at 0.25 percentile) to 15 (at the 0.75 percentile in 2001. The 
number of board meetings increased in 2003 and 2005. 
Table 5.7: 
  Descriptive Statistics (Continuous Corporate Governance Variables) 
Panel A: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 
(n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
PERNEXBD_01 
 percentile 
0.41 0.18 0.26 0.38 0.60 
PERNEXBD_03 0.48 0.22 0.30 0.45 0.70 
PERNEXBD_05 0.54 0.24 0.33 0.50 0.78 
BODMEET_01 11 4 8 10 15 
BODMEET_03 13 5 9 11 17 
BODMEET_05 14 5 9 12 18 
PERINDAC_01 0.76 0.21 0.67 0.75 1.00 
PERINDAC_03 0.81 0.20 0.67 0.75 1.00 
PERINDAC_05 0.83 0.19 0.69 0.78 1.00 
Panel B: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 
(n = 100) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
PERNEXBD_01 
 percentile 
0.49 0.19 0.38 0.51 0.61 
PERNEXBD_03 0.57 0.22 0.45 0.60 0.72 
PERNEXBD_05 0.64 0.24 0.50 0.68 0.80 
BODMEET_01 9 4 6 9 11 
BODMEET_03 10 4 7 9 12 
BODMEET_05 10 4 7 10 13 
PERINDAC_01 0.65 0.29 0.43 0.67 1.00 
PERINDAC_03 0.68 0.30 0.50 0.67 1.00 
PERINDAC_05 0.71 0.31 0.50 0.75 1.00 
Panel C: 
Pooled Sample (n = 200) Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25th
Median (50
 percentile 
th
75
 
percentile) th
PERNEXBD_01 
 percentile 
0.45 0.19 0.26 0.46 0.61 
PERNEXBD_03 0.53 0.22 0.30 0.54 0.72 
PERNEXBD_05 0.59 0.25 0.33 0.60 0.80 
BODMEET_01 10 4 7 10 12 
BODMEET_03 11 5 8 11 13 
BODMEET_05 12 5 8 12 14 
PERINDAC_01 0.70 0.26 0.60 0.75 1.00 
PERINDAC_03 0.75 0.26 0.67 0.75 1.00 
PERINDAC_05 0.77 0.26 0.67 0.75 1.00 
Where: 
PERNEXBD_01 = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm in 2001; PERNEXBD_03 = The 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm in 2003; PERNEXBD_05 = The percentage of non-
executive directors on the board of directors for firm in 2005; BODMEET_01 = The number of board of directors meetings held 
during the year for firm in 2001; BODMEET_03 = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm in 
2003; BODMEET_05 = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm in 2005; PERINDAC_01 = The 
percentage of independent directors on the audit committee for firm in 2001; PERINDAC_03 = The percentage of independent 
directors on the audit committee for firm in 2003; and PERINDAC_05 = The percentage of independent directors on the audit 
committee for firm in 2005. 
Table 5.7 Panel B reports that the percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
of directors for firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample has a mean of 49% with a standard 
deviation of 19% in 2001. The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
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directors for the firms randomly selected by industry range from 38% (at 0.25 percentile) to 
61% (at the 0.75 percentile) in 2001. Values for the representation of non-executive directors 
on the board of directors’ increase in 2003 and 2005 suggesting an improvement in the 
independence of board members.44
Table 5.7 Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for audit fees across the pooled 
sample. The descriptive statistics for the pooled sample follow a similar pattern to the ASX 
T100 and ASX RI 100 sub-samples. 
 Table 5.7 Panel B reports that number of board of 
directors meetings of firms in the ASX RI 100 sub-sample has a mean of 9 and a standard 
deviation of 4 in 2001. The number of board of directors meetings in 2001 ranges from 6 (at 
0.25 percentile) to 11 (at the 0.75 percentile) in 2001. In 2003 and 2005, the number of board 
meetings increased. 
5.3.6 Descriptive statistics (industry variables) 
Table 5.8 Panel A shows a breakdown of the various industries within which firms 
in the ASX T100 sub-sample operate. Firms with the greatest representation within the 
sample are in the industrials, materials and consumer discretionary industries with utilities 
and information technology sectors the most poorly represented (within firms in the ASX 
T100 sub-sample).45
  
 
                                                     
44  In fact, the result relating to the percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors within the firms randomly 
selected by industry is better the similar results of the top firms on the ASX by market capitalization. 
45  It is unsurprising that there is no change of industries by firms for the years 2003 and 2005 as ordinarily changes in 
principal activities by firms (and, therefore, industries) do not occur frequently. 
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Table 5.8: 
  Descriptive Statistics (Dichotomous Industry Variables) 
Panel A: 
ASX T100 sub-sample 
 2001 2003 2005 
ENERGYit 10  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise. 10 10 
MATERIALSit 20  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise. 20 20 
INDUSTRIALSit 22  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise. 22 22 
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARYit 20  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise. 20 20 
CONSUMER STAPLESit 8 - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise. 8 8 
HEALTH CAREit 13  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise. 13 13 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit 2  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise. 2 2 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit 4  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise. 4 4 
UTILITIESit 1  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 1 1 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
    
Panel B: 
ASX RI 100 sub-sample 
 2001 2003 2005 
ENERGYit 13  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise. 13 13 
MATERIALSit 14  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise. 14 14 
INDUSTRIALSit 11  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise. 11 11 
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARYit 13  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise. 13 13 
CONSUMER STAPLESit 12  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise. 12 12 
HEALTH CAREit 11 - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise. 11 11 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit 11  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise. 11 11 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit 8  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise. 8 8 
UTILITIESit 7  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 7 7 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
    
Panel C: 
Pooled Sample 2001 2003 2005 
ENERGYit 23  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise. 23 23 
MATERIALSit 34  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise. 34 34 
INDUSTRIALSit 33  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise. 33 33 
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARYit 33  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise. 33 33 
CONSUMER STAPLESit 20  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise. 20 20 
HEALTH CAREit 24  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise. 24 24 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit 13  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise. 13 13 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit 12  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise. 12 12 
UTILITIESit 8  - A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 8 8 
TOTAL 200 200 200 
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Table 5.8 Panel B shows a breakdown of the various industries within which firms 
randomly selected by industry operate. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, 100 firms in the final 
sample for 2005 were chosen randomly by industry. However, as part of the necessary 
exclusions (in an effort to be consistent with the prior literature), the financial sector was 
excluded leaving only nine Global Industries Classification (GIC) Sectors to select the 
sample of 100 firms from. Furthermore, not all of the remaining nine sectors have enough 
observations within to allow for each of the sectors to have equal numbers of observations 
for the total sample of 100 firms.46
5.4 T-TESTS OF KEY DESCRIPTIVE SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 Table 5.8 Panel C shows the breakdown of the various 
industries for the pooled sample. 
Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 present univariate results comparing means and changes in 
means of the variables used in this study. Specifically, independent samples t-tests and two 
way ANOVA tests are completed and results discussed. 
5.4.1 T-tests 
T-tests are completed for the dichotomous variables collected in this study. 
Specifically, the objective in undertaking the independent samples t-tests is to examine the 
relationship between audit fees deflated by total assets and the dichotomous variables (on a 
univariate basis) to determine if the quantum of audit fees paid by firms significantly differ 
depending on whether the dichotomous variable/s existed or not. 
An overall review of Table 5.9 shows a number of significant relationships in 2001. 
In relation to the independent variables examined in this study, audit fees deflated by total 
assets have a statistically significant association with a Big4 auditor (in this case, BIG4it with 
a p-value<0.05). The association suggests that firms employing a Big4 auditor pay a 
significantly different quantum of audit fees compared to firms which do not utilize a Big4 
auditor in 2001. This can be explained on the basis of the Big4 auditor’s greater expertise, 
experience and resources (Choi et al. 2008; Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Iyer and Iyer 1996; 
Willenborg 2002). 
Table 5.9 also reports that industry variables also have a significant association with 
the dependent variable, audit fees deflated by total assets. Specifically, firms in the consumer 
staples (in this case, CONSUMERSTAPit with a p-value<0.01), industrials (in this case, 
INDUSTRIALSit with a p-value<0.01), information technology (in this case, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit with a p-value<0.05) and telecommunications (in this case, 
                                                     
46  Nevertheless, the resulting 100 observations are representative of the ASX market as a whole. 
101 
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit with a p-value<0.05) industries all pay a statistically different 
quantum of audit fees to firms in other industries in 2001. 
It is also noteworthy from Table 5.9 that the presence of a financial expert on a 
firm’s audit committee (in this case, FINEXPACit) does not, on a univariate basis, have any 
statistically significant association with the amount of audit fees paid by a firm in 2001.47
. 
 
With respect to the t-tests results for the financial years 2003 and 2005, two main 
observations can be made. First, in relation to both BIG4it and SPECIALISTit in 2003, the p-
value for both variables diminishes in terms of statistical significance compared to 2001 but 
increases in terms of significance in 2005 (compared to 2003). Second, the statistical 
significance of both CNON-AUDITit and CTENUREit with audit fees deflated by total assets 
diminishes in terms of strength of the association in 2003 and 2005 (compared to 2001) 
                                                     
47  However, the results of multivariate testing (discussed in Chapter Six) will have the greatest bearing on the significance of 
audit fees deflated by total assets and the remaining variables in this study. This is because multivariate testing not only 
examines the significance of the relationship between the experimental variable (in this case, a range of auditor attributes) 
and the dependent variable (in this case, audit fees deflated by assets), but, more importantly, controls for the effects of a 
number of other independent variables in the relationship.  
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Table 5.9: 
  Independent Samples T-test - Changes to Mean of Audit Fees Deflated by Assets to Dichotomous Variables 
 2001  2003  2005 
 Yes (?̅?𝑥) No (?̅?𝑥) t-statistic p-value  Yes (?̅?𝑥) No (?̅?𝑥) t-statistic p-value  Yes (?̅?𝑥) No (?̅?𝑥) t-statistic p-value 
Independent Variables 
BIG4 0.0033 it 0.0071 2.3115 0.0231  0.0036 0.0073 -2.1694 0.0326  0.0026 0.0060 -2.4286 0.0161 
SPECIALIST 0.0036 it 0.0052 1.1947 0.2336  0.0045 0.0049 -0.2719 0.7860  0.0043 0.0028 1.1372 0.2568 
CNON-AUDIT 0.0039 it 0.0049 0.7821 0.4351  0.0043 0.0051 -0.5640 0.5734  0.0033 0.0039 -0.4455 0.6565 
CTENURE 0.0042 it 0.0061 0.7533 0.4572  0.0048 0.0042 0.2504 0.8025  0.0037 0.0031 0.1468 0.8835 
Corporate Governance Variables 
FINEXPAC 0.0041 it 0.0050 0.6098 0.5427  0.0107 0.0057 -0.8618 0.3898  0.0027 0.0068 -1.6076 0.1146 
Industry Variables 
ENERGYit  48 0.0064  0.0042 -1.0459 0.2969  0.0070 0.0044 1.1848 0.2375  0.0088 0.0030 1.1149 0.2768 
MATERIALS 0.0033 it 0.0047 0.7363 0.4624  0.0036 0.0049 -0.6757 0.5000  0.0018 0.0040 -1.2622 0.2084 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0016 it 0.0050 3.8446 0.0002  0.0018 0.0053 -3.7609 0.0002  0.0024 0.0039 -0.8273 0.4091 
CONSUMERDISC 0.0025 it 0.0048 1.2896 0.1987  0.0027 0.0051 -1.2448 0.2147  0.0022 0.0039 -1.0083 0.3145 
CONSUMERSTAP 0.0015 it 0.0048 3.9674 0.0001  0.0016 0.0050 -3.8866 0.0001  0.0022 0.0038 -0.7130 0.4767 
HEALTH CARE 0.0058 it 0.0042 -0.7718 0.4412  0.0064 0.0045 0.8411 0.4013  0.0033 0.0037 -0.2015 0.8405 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 0.0125 it 0.0039 -2.1780 0.0489  0.0136 0.0041 2.2066 0.0464  0.0067 0.0034 1.2353 0.2182 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 0.0099 it 0.0041 -2.0406 0.0426  0.0087 0.0044 1.3837 0.1680  0.0064 0.0035 1.0871 0.2873 
UTILITIES 0.0049 it 0.0044 -0.1515 0.8797  0.0048 0.0047 0.0236 0.9812  0.0031 0.0037 -0.1640 0.8699 
Where: 
BIG4it = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); SPECIALISTit  = Auditee i in time 
period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); CNON-AUDITit  = Auditee i in time period t 
is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i in time period t  is scored zero (0); CTENUREit = Auditee i in 
time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor j till time period t has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); 
FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit = A dummy variable given the 
value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the 
value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 
if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 
1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
                                                     
48  For purposes of brevity, all industry variables in this study relate to firm i at time period t although not expressly stated in the legend to each table. 
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5.4.2 Two-way ANOVA 
Two-way ANOVA tests are completed for the continuous variables collected in this 
study. Specifically, the objective in undertaking the two-way ANOVA tests is to determine if 
the means of the continuous variables differed significantly over the observation window of 
2001, 2003 and 2005 given that the firms are identical across the observation window. In 
other words, the intention is to examine the significant effects of two factors simultaneously 
(in this case, the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 2005 and firm identity) on the 
means of the continuous variables collected in this study. 
A review of Table 5.10 indicates that, on a univariate basis, a number of variables 
examined in this study vary significantly across the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 
2005. For instance, the length of time (in years up to a maximum of 10 years) during which 
the auditor has remained unchanged varies significantly (in this instance, NTENUREit with a 
p-value<0.01) between 2001, 2003 and 2005. Similarly, both corporate governance variables 
(namely, PERNEXBDit and BODMEETit) vary significantly across the observation period (all 
with p-values<0.01).49
  
 
                                                     
49  As an additional statistical check, one-way ANOVA tests were also completed for the continuous variables collected in this 
study. Specifically, the objective in undertaking the one-way ANOVA tests is to determine if the means of the continuous 
variables significantly differed over the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 2005. In other words, the intention is to 
examine the significant effects of one factor only (in this case, the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 2005) on the 
means of the continuous variables collected in this study. The duplication of firms across the observation window is, 
therefore, not taken into account when undertaking the one-way ANOVA tests. The results from the one-way ANOVA 
tests fully support the results from the two-way ANOVA tests. Specifically, on a univariate basis, a number of variables 
examined in this study vary significantly across the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 2005. For instance, the length 
of time (in years up to a maximum of 10 years) during which the auditor has remained unchanged varies significantly (in 
this instance, NTENUREit with a p-value of 0.0002) between 2001, 2003 and 2005. Similarly both corporate governance 
variables (namely, PERNEXBDit and BODMEETit) vary significantly across the observation period (all with p-values less 
than 0.0000). After confirming that population differences existed as identified above, Tukey post hoc tests are completed 
to identify where the significant differences in means were within the 2001, 2003 and 2005 observation window. The 
Tukey post hoc tests confirm that all of the three significant differences in means were for the financial years-ending 2001 
and 2005 (namely, NTENUREit, PERNEXBDit, BODMEETit). 
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Table 5.10: 
  Results – Two-way ANOVA 
 F-stat p-value 
Dependent Variable   
AFitASSETS 1.2273 it 0.2942 
Independent Variables   
RNONAUDIT 2.8415 it 0.0595 
NTENURE 165.8474 it 0.0000 
 Firm Characteristics  
SRSUBSID 1.5276 it 0.2183 
LNNBS 0.5839 it 0.5582 
ROA 2.1567 it 0.1171 
CURRENT 0.8831 it 0.4143 
 Corporate Governance Variables  
PERNEXBD 584.2750 it 0.0000 
BODMEET 112.2423 it 0.0000 
Where: 
AFit/ASSETSit = The amount of audit fees paid by firm i at time 
period t deflated by total assets for firm i at time period t.; 
RNONAUDITit  = Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the 
auditor j by auditee i during time period t; NTENUREit = Length of 
time (in years up to a maximum of 10) during which the auditor has 
remained unchanged for auditee i at time period t; SRSUBSIDit  = 
Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; 
LNNBSit  = Natural log of 1 plus number of business segments for 
firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = 
Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period 
t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors for firm i at time period t; and BODMEETit
5.5 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
 = 
The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for 
firm i at time period t. 
Tables 5.11 to 5.13 present a correlation matrix reporting Pearson listwise 
correlation coefficients for both the continuous and dichotomous variables used in this study 
for the years-ending 2001, 2003 and 2005. A review of the correlation coefficients in Table 
5.11 highlights a number of observations. First, it is clear that the independent variable of 
this study, audit fees deflated by total assets is significantly correlated with one of the four 
auditor attributes examined in this study (namely, the existence of a Big4 auditor (in this 
case, BIG4_01)). Second, audit fees deflated by total assets are significantly correlated with 
proxies that measure firm complexity (in this case, square root of the number of subsidiaries 
(SRSUBSID_01) and firm risk (in this case, ROA_01). This is unsurprising given that the 
published prior literature into audit fee determinants (detailed in Chapter Three) 
demonstrated the significant link between firm complexity, firm risk and audit fees.50
                                                     
50  Given that the independent variable in this study, audit fees, is deflated by total assets (a firm size proxy), it is not 
necessary to include any firm size proxies in Tables 5.10 to 5.13 and in the subsequent main regressions. 
 
Finally, Table 5.11 also confirms that the quantum of audit fees paid by a firm is sensitive to 
one of the three corporate governance variables in this study (namely the number of board of 
directors meetings held during 2001 (BODMEET_01)). A review of the subsequent tables 
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(that is, Tables 5.12 and 5.13 (reporting correlation coefficients for 2003 and 2005 
respectively)) indicates largely similar correlations to that observed in 2001. However, the 
strength and extent of the correlations in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 appear to diminish somewhat 
in the latter years of 2003 and 2005 (from 2001). 
A review of Table 5.11 also suggests that the correlation on the quantum of non-
audit fees paid to the external auditor (that is, RNONAUDIT_01 and CNONAUDIT_01) is 
above the critical multicollinearity limit of 0.8 (Hair et al. 1995). Given that 
RNONAUDIT_01 and CNONAUDIT_01 are continuous and dichotomous variables 
(respectively) measuring the same proxy (that is, the quantum of non-audit fees paid to the 
external auditor) and will not be used in the same multivariate analysis in Chapter Six, the 
high correlation between RNONAUDIT_01 and CNONAUDIT_01 is not of concern. The 
above issue (and the associated resolution) is also observed in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 (that is, 
for years-ended 2003 and 2005 respectively). As such, at this stage, based on the Pearson 
listwise correlations, standard interpretations of the univariate coefficients in Tables 5.11 to 
5.13 can be made.51
 
 
                                                     
51  Non-parametric Spearman’s rank coefficient correlations are also completed as additional tests but not reported herein. The 
Spearman correlation coefficient is often thought of as being the Pearson correlation coefficient between the ranked 
variables given the Spearman correlation coefficient converts continuous variables into ranked variables before undertaking 
the associated correlation analysis (Hair et al. 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Given the subsequent decrease in the 
stringency of the statistical power when using the Spearman’s rank coefficient correlations, it is unsurprising that the 
results from the Spearman’s rank coefficient correlations fully support the correlation results using the Pearson correlation 
tests for this study. 
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Table 5.11: 
  Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Transformed Variables) – 2001 
 AF/ASSETS 
01 
BIG4 
01 
SPECIALIST 
01 
CNONAUDIT 
01 
RNONAUDIT 
_01 
CTENURE 
01 
NTENURE 
01 
SRSUBSID 
01 
LNNBS 
01 
ROA 
01 
CURRENT 
01 
PERNEXBD 
01 
BODMEET 
01 
FINEXPAC 
_01 
AF/ASSETS_01   1.0000              
BIG4_01 -0.1820** 1.0000             
SPECIALISTt_01 -0.0846 -0.0591 1.0000            
CNONAUDIT_01 -0.0555 -0.1026 0.0785 1.0000           
RNONAUDITt_01 -0.0880 -0.0124 0.0074 0.8400** 1.0000          
CTENURE_01 -0.0693 0.0561 -0.0305 0.0574 0.0286 1.0000         
NTENURE_01 -0.1306 0.2370** -0.0952 0.0065 -0.0423 0.6840** 1.0000        
SRSUBSID_01 -0.1940** 0.3060** 0.2190** -0.0957 -0.0520 0.0273 0.2370** 1.0000       
LNNBS_01 -0.1169 0.1009 0.2170** -0.1317 -0.1010 -0.0364 0.0255 0.4050** 1.0000      
ROA_01 -0.3300** 0.2330** 0.1450* 0.0867 0.1197 0.2600** 0.1920** 0.2100** 0.1680* 1.0000     
CURRENT_01 -0.0408 -0.0733 0.2000** 0.0326 -0.0431 0.0456 0.0083 -0.1305 -0.1830** 0.0001 1.0000    
PERNEXBD_01 0.1300 -0.1277 -0.1440* -0.0778 -0.0149 -0.1118 -0.0890 -0.2320** -0.1610* -0.0869 0.1351 1.0000   
BODMEET_01 -0.1560* 0.2020** 0.0186 -0.0122 0.0112 0.0032 0.1400* 0.1910** 0.0161 0.1540* -0.0226 -0.2030** 1.0000  
FINEXPAC_01 -0.0433 0.0925 -0.0207 0.0000 0.0137 0.1780* 0.1960** 0.1480* -0.0553 0.1326 0.0390 -0.0977 0.3110** 1.0000 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)         **   Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Where: 
AF/ASSETS_01 = the amount of audit fees paid to the auditor deflated by total assets of auditee in 2001; BIG4_01 = auditee is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor in 2001 is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee is scored zero 
(0); SPECIALIST_01 = auditee is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor in 2001 is an industry specialist; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); CNONAUDIT_01 = auditee is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor in 2001 is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); RNONAUDIT_01 = ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor by auditee in 2001; CTENURE_01 = auditee is scored one (1) 
if, as at 2001, the number of years the incumbent auditor has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); NTENURE_01 = length of time (in years up to a maximum of 10), as at 
2001, during which the auditor has remained unchanged for auditee; SRSUBSID_01 = square root of the number of subsidiaries of a firm in 2001; LNNBS_01 = natural log of 1 plus the number of business segments of firm in 
2001; ROA_01 = earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets of firm in 2001; CURRENT_01 = current assets divided by current liabilities of firm in 2001; PERNEXBD_01=the percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board of directors of firm in 2001; BODMEET_01 = the number of board of directors meetings held during the year of firm in 2001; and FINEXPAC_01 = a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee of firm 
in 2001 consists of at least one financial expert during the year. 
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Table 5.12: 
  Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Transformed Variables) – 2003 
 AF/ASSETS 
03 
BIG4 
03 
SPECIALIST 
03 
CNONAUDIT 
03 
RNONAUDIT 
03 
CTENURE 
03 
NTENURE 
03 
SRSUBSID 
03 
LNNBS 
03 
ROA 
03 
CURRENT 
03 
PERNEXBD 
03 
BODMEET 
03 
FINEXPAC 
03 
AF/ASSETS_03   1.0000              
BIG4_03 -0.1690* 1.0000             
SPECIALIST_03 -0.0193 -0.0344 1.0000            
CNONAUDIT_03 -0.0401 -0.0725 0.0785 1.0000           
RNONAUDIT_03 -0.0814 0.0129 0.0074 0.8400** 1.0000          
CTENURE_03 0.0178 0.0326 -0.0305 0.0574 0.0286 1.0000         
NTENURE_03 -0.1066 0.2570** -0.0952 0.0065 -0.0423 0.6840** 1.0000        
SRSUBSID_03 -0.1890** 0.3080** 0.2190** -0.0957 -0.0520 0.0273 0.2370** 1.0000       
LNNBS_03 -0.1239 0.0845 0.2170** -0.1317 -0.1010 -0.0364 0.0255 0.4050** 1.0000      
ROA_03 -0.4010** 0.1840** 0.1450* 0.0867 0.1197 0.2600** 0.1920** 0.2100** 0.1680* 1.0000     
CURRENT_03 0.0032 -0.0816 -0.2000** 0.0326 -0.0431 0.0456 0.0083 -0.1305 -0.1830** 0.0001 1.0000    
PERNEXBD_03 0.1161 -0.1277 -0.1440* -0.0778 -0.0149 -0.1118 -0.0890 -0.2320** 00.1610* -0.0869 0.1351 1.0000   
BODMEET_03 -0.1430* 0.1950** 0.0186 -0.0122 0.0112 0.0032 0.1400* 0.1910** 0.0161 0.1540* -0.0226 -0.2030** 1.0000  
FINEXPAC_03 -0.0611 0.0706 -0.0207 0.0000 0.0137 0.1780* 0.1960** 0.1480* -0.0553 0.1326 0.0390 -0.0977 0.3110** 1.0000 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)         **   Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Where: 
AF/ASSETS_03 = the amount of audit fees paid to the auditor deflated by total assets of auditee in 2003; BIG4_03 = auditee is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor in 2003 is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee is scored zero 
(0); SPECIALIST_03 = auditee is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor in 2003 is an industry specialist; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); CNONAUDIT_03 = auditee is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor in 2003 is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); RNONAUDIT_03 = ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor by auditee in 2003; CTENURE_03 = auditee is scored one (1) 
if, as at 2003, the number of years the incumbent auditor has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); NTENURE_03 = length of time (in years up to a maximum of 10), as at 
2003, during which the auditor has remained unchanged for auditee; SRSUBSID_03 = square root of the number of subsidiaries of a firm in 2003; LNNBS_03 = natural logarithmic of 1 plus the number of business segments of 
firm in 2003; ROA_03 = earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets of firm in 2003; CURRENT_03 = current assets divided by current liabilities of firm in 2003; PERNEXBD_03=the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board of directors of firm in 2003; BODMEET_03 = the number of board of directors meetings held during the year of firm in 2003; and FINEXPAC_03 = a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit 
committee of firm in 2003 consists of at least one financial expert during the year. 
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Table 5.13: 
  Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Transformed Variables) – 2005 
 AF/ASSETS 
05 
BIG4 
05 
SPECIALIST 
05 
CNONAUDIT 
05 
RNONAUDIT 
05 
CTENURE 
05 
NTENURE 
05 
SRSUBSID 
05 
LNNBS 
05 
ROA 
_05 
CURRENT 
05 
PERNEXBD 
05 
BODMEET 
05 
FINEXPAC 
05 
AF/ASSETS_05   1.0000              
BIG4_05 -0.1700* 1.0000             
SPECIALIST_05 0.0806 -0.1091 1.0000            
CNONAUDIT_05 -0.0316 -0.0141 0.7090** 1.0000           
RNONAUDIT_05 -0.0488 0.0751 0.5670** 0.8450** 1.0000          
CTENURE_05 0.0104 0.1960** -0.0985 -0.1355 -0.0970 1.0000         
NTENURE_05 -0.1610* 0.2540** -0.0765 0.0232 -0.0152 0.4160** 1.0000        
SRSUBSID_05 -0.1720* 0.3300** -0.0339 -0.0607 -0.0019 0.0431 0.2080** 1.0000       
LNNBS_05 -0.1345 0.1086 -0.0593 -0.0892 -0.0571 0.0118 0.0025 0.4030** 1.0000      
ROA_05 -0.0026 0.1990** 0.1066 0.0837 0.0954 0.2340** 0.1620* 0.2000** 0.0294 1.0000     
CURRENT_05 -0.0106 0.0333 0.0669 -0.0729 -0.0611 0.0178 -0.1362 0.0815 -0.1038 -0.0065 1.0000    
PERNEXBD_05 -0.0051 -0.1299 -0.1090 -0.0857 -0.0130 -0.0778 -0.0840 -0.2320** -0.1480* -0.1710* 0.0399 1.0000   
BODMEET_05 -0.1460* 0.2100** -0.0125 0.0331 0.0519 -0.0357 0.1670* 0.1940** 0.0235 -0.0162 -0.0702 -0.2100** 1.0000  
FINEXPAC_05 -0.1211 0.1319 0.0495 0.0984 0.1083 0.0408 0.1400* 0.2230** 0.0193 0.1790* 0.0224 -0.1470* 0.3010** 1.0000 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)         **   Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Where: 
AF/ASSETS_05 = the amount of audit fees paid to the auditor deflated by total assets of auditee in 2005; BIG4_05=auditee is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor in 2005 is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee is scored zero 
(0); SPECIALIST_05 = auditee is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor in 2005 is an industry specialist; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); CNONAUDIT_05 = auditee is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor in 2005 is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); RNONAUDIT_05 = ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor by auditee in 2005; CTENURE_05 = auditee is scored one (1) 
if, as at 2005, the number of years the incumbent auditor has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; otherwise auditee is scored zero (0); NTENURE_05 = length of time (in years up to a maximum of 10), as at 
2005, during which the auditor has remained unchanged for auditee; SRSUBSID_05 = square root of the number of subsidiaries of a firm in 2005; LNNBS_05 = natural logarithmic of 1 plus the number of business segments of 
firm in 2005; ROA_05 = earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets of firm in 2005; CURRENT_05 = current assets divided by current liabilities of firm in 2005; PERNEXBD_05=the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board of directors of firm in 2005; BODMEET_05 = the number of board of directors meetings held during the year of firm in 2005; and FINEXPAC_05 = a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit 
committee of firm in 2005 consists of at least one financial expert during the year. 
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5.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Five provided the descriptive statistics for the data examined in this study. 
The sample selection process was detailed. An industry breakdown of the final usable 
sample is provided before a comprehensive review undertaken of the descriptive statistics of 
variables. Subsequently, results from t-tests and correlations were reported and discussed. 
Chapter Six discusses the main empirical results obtained in this study. Initially, 
regression results using a dichotomous composite score for auditor attributes is reported 
against audit fees. Subsequently, the composite score is decomposed into the four key 
auditor attributes of brand, specialization, independence and tenure with regressions re-run 
against the dependent variable (that is, audit fees deflated for total assets). The analysis is 
completed both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS – MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS 
6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Five reported the descriptive statistics and univariate results of this study. 
Steps taken to ensure the normality of data and the validity of assumptions for multiple 
regression were outlined. T-tests of key descriptive characteristics, along with Spearman and 
Pearson correlation analyses, were also provided. 
Chapter Six reports and discusses the main empirical results of this study. Initial 
regression is completed using a dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor 
attributes and regressing the score against the dependent variable of this study (that is, audit 
fees deflated by total assets). The resulting regression results are analyzed on both a cross-
sectional and longitudinal time-scale. Subsequently, the composite score of auditor attributes 
is dis-aggregated into the four main components of auditor brand, auditor specialization, 
auditor independence and auditor tenure. All of the four individual attributes are then 
(independently) regressed against audit fees deflated by total assets in isolation. Once again, 
the regression results are analyzed both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Finally, a 
summary of Chapter Six is provided. 
6.2 COMPOSITE AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES AND AUDIT FEES 
This section will discuss the multivariate results arising from examining the 
association between a dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor attributes and 
audit fees deflated by total assets. Initially, the association is examined cross-sectionally and 
subsequently, on a longitudinally time-frame. 
6.2.1 Composite score and cross-sectional variations 
Table 6.1 documents the results of OLS regression using a dichotomous composite 
score of auditor attributes (that is, AAit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing the variation 
of audit fees for the years – ended 2001 (n=200), 2003 (n=200) and 2005 (n=200) and 2001 
to 2005 (n=600) inclusive. The results from Table 6.1 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the 
coefficient on AAit (the independent variable) is negative and statistically insignificant for 
2001. A review of Table 6.1 Columns 3 and 5 also shows that the coefficient on AAit 
becomes positive in 2003 before reverting to being negative again in 2005. The p-value 
remains insignificant and moves in no discernable pattern across the observation window 
(see Table 6.1 Columns 2, 4 and 6 respectively). 
A further review of Table 6.1 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative but significant (p-value<0.01) for 2001. The strength of 
the relationship increases in 2003 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.01) before becoming 
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statistically insignificant in 2005 (see Column 6). The coefficient on ROAit remains negative 
in 2003 (see Column 3) but in 2005 (see Column 5), the coefficient on ROAit becomes 
positive. In relation to the corporate governance variables examined in this study, only the 
presence of a financial expert on a firm’s audit committee (FINEXPACit) has a significant 
relationship (p-value<0.05) with AFit/ASSETSit in 2005 (see Column 6) with the coefficient 
being negative (see Column 5). Only three industry variables (that is, ENERGYit, 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit, and TELECOMMUNICATIONSit) have statistically 
significant relationships with AFit/ASSETSit (namely firms in the information technology and 
telecommunications industries (p-value<0.01 and p-value<0.05 respectively) in 2001 (see 
Column 2) and the energy industry (p-value<0.05) in 2005 (see Column 6)). The coefficients 
for all the significant industry variables (that is, ENERGYit, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit, and TELECOMMUNICATIONSit) are positive across the observation 
window of 2001, 2003 and 2005 (see Table 6.1 Columns 1, 3 and 5 respectively). 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables across the observation window have an adjusted R2 
ranging from 0.1445 (in 2001 (see Column 1/2)), 0.0584 (in 2003 (see Column 3/4)) and 
0.0585 (in 2005 (see Column 5/6)). Specifically, for 2001, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain 14.45% of the variation in the dependent variable, AFit/ASSETSit 
however the goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) falls markedly in 2003 and 2005. Table 6.1 
Columns 7 and 8 report regression results for identical variables but with all firm-year 
observations from 2001, 2003 and 2005 included in one regression model (that is, n=600). 
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Table 6.1: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Audit Fees for 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 
(n=200) 
2003 
(n=200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
2001 – 2005 
(n=600) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0048 0.2540 0.0106 0.3066 0.0122 0.0013 0.0125 0.1841 
Independent Variable         
AA -0.0002 it 0.8373 0.0000 0.9948 -0.0004 0.5362 -0.0001 0.7544 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.4067 -0.0001 0.5762 -0.0002 0.3081 -0.0002 0.1779 
LNNBS -0.0007 it 0.5575 -0.0011 0.3721 -0.0010 0.4137 -0.0011 0.1335 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0036 it 0.0006 -0.0080 0.0000 0.0017 0.3229 -0.0032 0.0000 
CURRENT -4.2754 it 0.2105 -0.0001 0.2508 0.0000 0.4861 0.0000 0.2811 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0031 it 0.3860 0.0010 0.7601 -0.0039 0.1584 -0.0007 0.6844 
BODMEET -0.0003 it 0.1123 -0.0002 0.1658 -0.0002 0.2890 -0.0002 0.0079 
FINEXPAC 0.0012 it 0.3895 0.0008 0.6296 -0.0036 0.0304 -0.0002 0.8195 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0009 it 0.7426 -0.0024 0.8057 0.0062 0.0207 -0.0016 0.8595 
MATERIALS 0.0004 it 0.8403 -0.0041 0.6897 -0.0006 0.7719 -0.0047 0.6137 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0006 it 0.7520 -0.0050 0.7089 -0.0008 0.6970 -0.0047 0.5976 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0001 it 0.9605 -0.0044 0.6627 0.0001 0.9653 -0.0048 0.6095 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0003 it 0.9027 -0.0055 0.5956 -0.0004 0.8668 -0.0054 0.5640 
HEALTH CARE 0.0029 it 0.2546 -0.0029 0.7636 0.0010 0.6906 -0.0030 0.7444 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0084 it 
0.0068 0.0026 0.8021 0.0044 0.1526 0.0018 0.8464 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0071 it 
0.0253 0.0012 0.9059 0.0038 0.2200 0.0005 0.9579 
UTILITIES 0.0010 it 0.7858 -0.0046 0.6633 -0.0008 0.8171 -0.0044 0.6396 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.1004 0.0000 1.9502 0.0272 1.7721 0.0378 5.7315 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1445 2 0.0584 0.0585 0.1184 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit , CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy 
measures for auditor attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = 
Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business 
segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; 
CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-
executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings 
held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value 
of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer 
discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is 
in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 
if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.2.2 Composite score and longitudinal variations 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
Table 6.2 documents the results of OLS regression using a composite score of 
auditor attributes (that is, AAit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing changes in audit fees 
(that is, AFit/ASSETSit) at three points in time: the change from 2001 from 2003; the change 
from 2003 from 2005; and the overall change from 2001 from 2005. The results from Table 
6.2 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on AAit (the independent variable) is 
positive and statistically insignificant for the period 2001 to 2003. A review of Table 6.2 also 
shows that the coefficient on AAit remains positive throughout 2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) 
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and 2001 to 2005 (see Column 5). The statistical significance of the relationship between 
AAit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit becomes stronger over the observation window (the p-
value changes from 0.6061 for the period 2001 to 2003 (see Column 2) to 0.5135 for the 
period 2003 to 2005 (Columns 4) and 0.4585 for the period 2001 to 2005 (Columns 6)). 
Nevertheless, the relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.2 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative but significant (p-value<0.05) for the period 2001 to 
2003. The significance of the relationship between ROAit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit, 
however, reduces for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.05) and for the 
period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value<0.05). The coefficient on ROAit also becomes 
positive for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) and for the period 2001 to 2005 (see 
Column 5). None of the corporate governance and industry variables suggest any significant 
statistical association with the change in AFit/ASSETSit. 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables have an adjusted R2 ranging from 0.0182 (change in 
AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2003 (see Columns 1/2), 0.0026 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 
2003 to 2005 (see Columns 3/4) to 0.0002 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2005 (see 
Columns 5/6)). Specifically, for the period 2001 to 2003, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain only 1.82% of the change in the variation in the dependent 
variable, AFit/ASSETSit with the goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) falling even further in 
the subsequent periods of 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005. 
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Table 6.2: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Change in Audit Fees over 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005 
Change from 2001 to 
2003 
(n=200) 
Change from 2003 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
Change from 2001 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0011 0.6035 0.0036 0.4795 0.0041 0.4230 
Independent Variable       
AA 0.0001 it 0.6061 0.0006 0.5135 0.0007 0.4585 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.0000 it 0.8913 0.0001 0.7050 0.0001 0.7623 
LNNBS -0.0001 it 0.5750 0.0000 0.9863 -0.0001 0.9720 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0009 it 0.0167 0.0052 0.0281 0.0047 0.0448 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.9028 0.0000 0.8724 0.0000 0.8139 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0006 it 0.3946 -0.0051 0.1721 -0.0056 0.1383 
BODMEET 0.0000 it 0.6391 -0.0001 0.4462 -0.0001 0.4361 
FINEXPAC 0.0001 it  0.7542 -0.0012 0.5866 -0.0013 0.5585 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY -0.0001 it 0.9665 0.0022 0.5490 0.0029 0.4211 
MATERIALS -0.0006 it 0.7841 -0.0015 0.6260 -0.0013 0.6569 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0007 it 0.7298 -0.0016 0.7050 -0.0014 0.6999 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0006 it 0.7630 -0.0013 0.6708 -0.0012 0.6935 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0007 it 0.7409 0.0005 0.8825 0.0005 0.8775 
HEALTH CARE -0.0006 it 0.7696 -0.0024 0.4817 -0.0021 0.5291 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY -0.0001 it 
0.9799 -0.0043 0.3005 -0.0036 0.3868 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS -0.0020 it 
0.3350 -0.0004 0.9164 -0.0019 0.6453 
UTILITIES -0.0010 it 0.6413 -0.0002 0.9642 -0.0006 0.9013 
F-statistic (p-value) 1.2174 0.2545 1.0329 0.4241 1.0025 0.4561 
Adjusted R 0.0182 2 0.0026 0.0002 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A composite dichotomous score based 
on the four proxy measures for auditor attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit 
services and length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit = Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time 
period t; LNNBSit = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period 
t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; 
CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = 
The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at time period t; 
BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period 
t; FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one 
financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the 
value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer 
discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 
if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology 
industry and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if 
the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.3 KEY AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES AND AUDIT FEES 
 = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
This section will discuss the multivariate results arising from examining the 
association between four key individual auditor attributes and audit fees deflated by total 
assets. Initially, the association is examined cross-sectionally and subsequently, on a 
longitudinally time-frame. 
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6.3.1 Key auditor attributes – cross-sectional variations 
This sub-section will outline results from examining the multivariate relationship 
between the four key (individual) auditor attributes of auditor brand, auditor specialization, 
auditor independence and auditor tenure and audit fees deflated by total assets for the years-
ended 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive. 
6.3.1.1 Brand 
Table 6.3 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, BIG4it) as an explanatory variable in analyzing the variation of audit fees 
for the years – ended 2001, 2003 and 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive. The results from 
Table 6.3 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on BIG4it (the independent variable) 
is negative and statistically insignificant for 2001. A review of Table 6.3 Columns 3 and 5 
also shows that the coefficient on BIG4it remains negative throughout 2003 and 2005 and the 
p-value remains insignificant and moves in no discernable pattern across the observation 
window (see Table 6.3 Columns 2, 4 and 6 respectively). 
A further review of Table 6.3 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative and significant (p-value<0.01) for 2001. The strength of 
the relationship increases in 2003 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.01) before becoming 
statistically insignificant in 2005 (see Column 6). The coefficient on ROAit remains negative 
in 2003 (see Column 3) but reverts to being positive in 2005 (see Column 5). In relation to 
the corporate governance variables examined in this study, only the presence of a financial 
expert on a firm’s audit committee (FINEXPACit) has a significant relationship (p-
value<0.05) in 2005 (see Column 6) with AFit/ASSETSit with the coefficient of the 
relationship being negative (see Column 5). Three industry variables (that is, ENERGYit, 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit, and TELECOMMUNICATIONSit) have statistically 
significant relationships with AFit/ASSETSit, (namely, firms in the information technology 
and telecommunications industries (p-value<0.01 and p-value<0.05 respectively) in 2001 
(see Column 2) and the energy industry (p-value<0.05) in 2005 (see Column 6)). The 
coefficients for all the significant industry variables are positive across the observation 
window of 2001, 2003 and 2005 (see Table 6.3 Columns 1, 3 and 5 respectively). 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables across the observation window have an adjusted R2 
ranging from 0.1497 in 2001 (see Columns 1/2), 0.1552 in 2003 (see Columns 3/4) and 
0.0669 in 2005 (see Column 5/6). Specifically, for 2001, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain 14.97% of the variation in the dependent variable, (that is, 
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AFit/ASSETSit). The goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) improves marginally in 2003 before 
falling markedly in 2005.  
Table 6.3 Columns 7 and 8 report regression results for identical variables but with 
all firm-year observations from 2001, 2003 and 2005 included in one regression model (that 
is, n=600). Table 6.3 Column 8 suggests that the variables BIG4it, ROAit and BODMEETit are 
significant predictors of audit fees variation. Additionally, the adjusted R2 suggests that the 
variables in the regression model account for 12.28% of the change in audit fees for the 
period 2001 to 2005 (see Columns 7/8). 
Table 6.3: 
  BIG4it  
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Audit Fees for 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 
(n=200) 
2003 
(n=200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
2001 – 2005 
(n=600) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0051 0.1266 0.0112 0.2743 0.0122 0.0003 0.0129 0.1687 
Independent Variable         
BIG4 -0.0013 it 0.3783 -0.0013 0.4064 -0.0022 0.1542 -0.0016 0.0821 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0001 it 0.5186 -0.0001 0.7197 -0.0001 0.4872 -0.0001 0.3454 
LNNBS -0.0007 it 0.5439 -0.0012 0.3499 -0.0010 0.4115 -0.0011 0.1210 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0035 it 0.0005 -0.0078 0.0000 0.0019 0.2715 -0.0031 0.0001 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.1966 -0.0001 0.2382 0.0000 0.5152 0.0000 0.2838 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0032 it 0.3676 0.0010 0.7647 -0.0037 0.1746 -0.0007 0.6754 
BODMEET -0.0002 it 0.1420 -0.0002 0.2046 -0.0001 0.3813 -0.0002 0.0149 
FINEXPAC 0.0012 it 0.3943 0.0008 0.6516 -0.0036 0.0278 -0.0002 0.7861 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0008 it 0.7580 -0.0025 0.7999 0.0057 0.0326 -0.0017 0.8541 
MATERIALS 0.0004 it 0.8608 -0.0040 0.6935 -0.0007 0.7388 -0.0047 0.6178 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0003 it 0.7020 -0.0048 0.6394 -0.0006 0.6205 -0.0048 0.6084 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0003 it 0.8973 -0.0045 0.6553 -0.0006 0.7896 -0.0049 0.5996 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0005 it 0.8482 -0.0055 0.5896 -0.0007 0.7874 -0.0055 0.5569 
HEALTH CARE 0.0031 it 0.2141 -0.0027 0.7842 0.0009 0.7138 -0.0028 0.7637 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0081 it 
0.0074 0.0024 0.8128 0.0039 0.2048 0.0016 0.8606 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0070 it 
0.0223 0.0012 0.9064 0.0036 0.2429 0.0005 0.9541 
UTILITIES 0.0009 it 0.8139 -0.0047 0.6555 -0.0014 0.7074 -0.0046 0.6284 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.1590 0.0000 3.1505 0.0000 1.8920 0.0235 5.9330 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1479 2 0.1552 0.0669 0.1228 
Where: 
BIG4it = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise 
auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; 
LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest 
and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at 
time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at time period t; 
BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at 
time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; 
MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit 
= A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit 
= A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if 
otherwise; UTILITIESit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
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6.3.1.2 Specialization 
Table 6.4 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, SPECIALISTit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing the variation of audit 
fees for the years – ended 2001, 2003 and 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive. The results from 
Table 6.4 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on SPECIALISTit (the independent 
variable) is positive and statistically insignificant for 2001. A review of Table 6.4 Columns 3 
and 5 also shows that the coefficient on SPECIALISTit remains positive throughout 2003 and 
2005. However, the p-value becomes marginally significant (p-value=0.1024) in 2003 (see 
Column 4) before becoming insignificant again in 2005 (see Column 6). Nevertheless, the 
relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.4 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative and significant (p-value<0.01) for 2001. The strength of 
the relationship increases in 2003 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.01). In 2005 (see Column 5), 
the coefficient on ROAit becomes positive and the relationship between ROAit and audit fees 
deflated by assets (AFit/ASSETSit) becomes statistically insignificant (see Column 6). In 
relation to the corporate governance variables examined in this study, only the presence of a 
financial expert on a firm’s audit committee (FINEXPACit) has a significant relationship (p-
value<0.05) in 2005 (see Column 6) with AFit/ASSETSit, with the coefficient of the 
relationship being negative (see Column 5). Three industry variables (that is, ENERGYit, 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit and TELECOMMUNICATIONSit) have statistically 
significant relationships with AFit/ASSETSit, (namely firms in the information technology (p-
value<0.01) and telecommunications (p-value<0.01) industries in 2001 (see Column 2) and 
the energy (p-value<0.05) industry in 2005 (see Column 6)). The coefficients for all the 
significant industry variables are positive across the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 
2005 (see Table 6.4 Columns 1, 3 and 5 respectively). 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables across the observation window have an adjusted R2 of 
0.1506 in 2001 (see Columns 1/2), 0.1644 in 2003 (see Column 3/4) and 0.0612 in 2005 (see 
Column 5/6). Specifically, for 2001, the variables entered into the regression model explain 
15.06% of the variation in the dependent variable, AFit/ASSETSit. However, the goodness-of-
fit (that is, adjusted R2) improves marginally in 2003 before falling markedly in 2005. 
Table 6.4 Columns 7 and 8 report regression results for identical variables but with 
all firm-year observations from 2001, 2003 and 2005 included in one regression model (that 
is, n=600). Table 6.4 Column 8 suggests that the variables SPECIALISTit, ROAit and 
BODMEETit are significant predictors of audit fees variation. Additionally, the adjusted R2 
118 
 
suggests that the variables in the regression model account for 12.57% of the change in audit 
fees for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Columns 7/8). 
Table 6.4: 
  SPECIALISTit
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Audit Fees for 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 
(n=200) 
2003 
(n = 200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
2001 – 2005 
(n=600) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0025 0.4820 0.0119 0.2427 0.0101 0.0028 0.0127 0.1723 
Independent Variable         
SPECIALIST 0.0019 it 0.2432 0.0027 0.1024 0.0013 0.3387 0.0018 0.0261 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.3420 -0.0002 0.4800 -0.0002 0.3223 -0.0002 0.1489 
LNNBS -0.0008 it 0.5292 -0.0012 0.3322 -0.0009 0.4555 -0.0011 0.1252 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0036 it 0.0003 -0.0077 0.0000 0.0014 0.4231 -0.0033 0.0000 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.2852 -0.0001 0.2733 0.0000 0.4387 0.0000 0.2603 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0035 it 0.3241 0.0011 0.7287 -0.0035 0.2123 -0.0005 0.7788 
BODMEET -0.0003 it 0.1245 -0.0002 0.2087 -0.0002 0.2903 -0.0002 0.0090 
FINEXPAC 0.0012 it 0.3781 0.0005 0.7725 -0.0037 0.0258 -0.0003 0.7474 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0023 it 0.4112 -0.0041 0.6763 0.0062 0.0192 -0.0028 0.7621 
MATERIALS 0.0010 it 0.6606 -0.0069 0.5000 -0.0005 0.8302 -0.0064 0.4951 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0009 it 0.6786 -0.0086 0.4082 -0.0080 0.4004 -0.0075 0.4085 
CONSUMERDISC 0.0008 it 0.7246 -0.0068 0.5032 -0.0003 0.9054 -0.0003 0.9054 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0002 it 0.9376 -0.0089 0.3911 -0.0002 0.9480 -0.0002 0.9480 
HEALTH CARE 0.0044 it 0.1068 -0.0049 0.6145 0.0008 0.7595 0.0008 0.7595 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0094 it 
0.0025 0.0004 0.9691 0.0043 0.1572 0.0043 0.1572 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0087 it 
0.0090 -0.0003 0.9743 0.0038 0.2193 0.0038 0.2193 
UTILITIES 0.0023 it 0.5389 -0.0066 0.5323 -0.0006 0.8647 -0.0006 0.8647 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.2059 0.0000 3.3024 0.0000 1.8108 0.0325 6.0665 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1506 2 0.1644 0.0612 0.1257 
Where: 
SPECIALISTit  = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is an industry specialist in 
industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at 
time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings 
before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current liabilities 
for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at time 
period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at 
time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; 
MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit 
= A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit 
= A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if 
otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.3.1.3 Independence 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
Table 6.5 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, CNON-AUDITit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing the variation of 
audit fees for the years – ended 2001, 2003 and 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive. The results 
from Table 6.5 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on CNON-AUDITit (the 
independent variable) is negative and statistically insignificant for 2001. A review of Table 
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6.5 Columns 3 and 5 also shows that the coefficient on CNON-AUDITit remains negative 
throughout 2003 and 2005. The p-value, however, becomes more significant (p-
value=0.4516) in 2003 (see Column 4) and 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value=0.3895) compared 
to 2001 (see Column 2) (p-value=0.5603). Nevertheless, the relationship is not significant at 
conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.5 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative and significant (p-value<0.01) for 2001. The strength of 
the relationship increases in 2003 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.01). In 2005 (see Columns 5 
and 6), though, the coefficient on ROAit becomes positive whilst the relationship between 
ROAit and audit fees deflated by assets (AFit/ASSETSit) becomes statistically insignificant. 
None of the corporate governance measures prove significant explanatory variables in 
determining the variation of audit fees. Only three industry variables (that is, ENERGYit, 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit and TELECOMMUNICATIONSit) have statistically 
significant relationships with AFit/ASSETSit, that is firms in the information technology (p-
value<0.01) and telecommunications (p-value<0.05) industries in 2001 (see Column 2) and 
the energy (p-value<0.05) industry in 2005 (see Column 6) are significant. The coefficients 
for all the significant industry variables are positive across the observation window of 2001, 
2003 and 2005 (see Table 6.5 Columns 1, 3 and 5 respectively). 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables across the observation window have an adjusted R2 
changing from 0.1459 in 2001 (see Columns 1/2) to 0.1546 in 2003 (see Columns 3/4) and 
finally 0.0603 in 2005 (see Columns 5/6). Specifically, for 2001, the variables entered into 
the regression model explain 14.59% of the variation in the dependent variable, 
AFit/ASSETSit. The goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) improves marginally in 2003 before 
falling markedly in 2005. 
Table 6.5 Columns 7 and 8 report regression results for identical variables but with 
all firm-year observations from 2001, 2003 and 2005 included in one regression model (that 
is, n=600). Table 6.5 Column 8 suggests that the variables ROAit and BODMEETit are 
significant predictors of audit fees variation. Additionally, the adjusted R2 suggests that the 
variables in the regression model account for 9.45% of the change in audit fees for the period 
2001 to 2005 (see Columns 7/8). 
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Table 6.5: 
  CNON-AUDITit
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Audit Fees for 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 
(n=200) 
2003 
(n=200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
2001 – 2005 
(n=600) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0049 0.1465 0.0117 0.2597 0.0118 0.0005 0.0133 0.1555 
Independent Variable         
CNON-AUDIT -0.0008 it 0.5603 -0.0010 0.4516 -0.0011 0.3895 -0.0010 0.1782 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.3678 -0.0001 0.5371 -0.0002 0.2697 -0.0002 0.1389 
LNNBS -0.0008 it 0.5271 -0.0012 0.3393 -0.0010 0.4009 -0.0011 0.1089 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0036 it 0.0004 -0.0079 0.0000 0.0016 0.3447 -0.0032 0.0000 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.2199 -0.0001 0.2803 0.0000 0.4401 0.0000 0.2618 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0030 it 0.4002 0.0008 0.8121 -0.0039 0.1555 -0.0009 0.6120 
BODMEET -0.0003 it 0.1087 -0.0002 0.1580 -0.0002 0.2765 -0.0002 0.0069 
FINEXPAC 0.0012 it 0.3988 0.0009 0.5780 -0.0035 0.3320 -0.0002 0.8564 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0010 it 0.6984 -0.0028 0.7764 0.0062 0.0188 -0.0020 0.8250 
MATERIALS 0.0005 it 0.8334 -0.0045 0.6588 -0.0007 0.7645 -0.0052 0.5751 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0006 it 0.6623 -0.0053 0.6055 -0.0009 0.5844 -0.0054 0.5623 
CONSUMERDISC 0.0000 it 0.9982 -0.0048 0.6390 0.0000 0.9849 -0.0052 0.5794 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0004 it 0.8825 -0.0060 0.5616 -0.0004 0.8702 -0.0060 0.5225 
HEALTH CARE 0.0029 it 0.2348 -0.0034 0.7293 0.0008 0.7333 -0.0035 0.7029 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0085 it 
0.0050 0.0022 0.8332 0.0044 0.1485 0.0014 0.8821 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0072 it 
0.0191 0.0009 0.9314 0.0039 0.2120 0.0001 0.9900 
UTILITIES 0.0010 it 0.7746 -0.0052 0.6233 -0.0009 0.8061 -0.0050 0.5948 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.1241 0.0000 3.1412 0.0000 1.7981 0.0341 5.8495 0.1210 
Adjusted R 0.1459 2 0.1546 0.0603 0.0945 
Where: 
CNON-AUDITit  = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the incumbent 
auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i in time period t  is scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit = Square root of 
number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i 
at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = Current 
assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for 
firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one 
financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry 
and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if 
otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 
if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry 
and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications 
industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.3.1.4 Tenure 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if 
otherwise. 
Table 6.6 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, CTENUREit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing the variation of audit 
fees for the years – ended 2001, 2003 and 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive. The results from 
Table 6.6 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on CTENUREit (the independent 
variable) is positive and statistically insignificant for 2001. A review of Table 6.6 Columns 3 
and 5 also shows that the coefficient on CTENUREit remains positive throughout 2003 and 
2005 though the p-value reduces marginally in significance (p-value=0.9055) in 2003 (see 
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Column 4) before becoming more significant in 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value=0.7753). 
Nevertheless, the relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.6 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative and significant (p-value<0.01) for 2001. The strength of 
the relationship increases in 2003 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.01). In 2005 (see Columns 5 
and 6), the coefficient on ROAit becomes positive whilst the relationship between ROAit and 
audit fees deflated by assets (AFit/ASSETSit) becomes statistically insignificant. None of the 
corporate governance measures prove significant explanatory variables in determining the 
variation of audit fees. Only three industry variables (that is, ENERGYit, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit and TELECOMMUNICATIONSit) have statistically significant 
relationships with AFit/ASSETSit, that is firms in the information technology (p-value<0.01) 
and telecommunications (p-value<0.05) industries in 2001 (see Column 2) and the energy (p-
value<0.05) industry in 2005 (see Column 6) are significant. The coefficients for all the 
significant industry variables are positive across the observation window of 2001, 2003 and 
2005 (see Table 6.6 Columns 1, 3 and 5 respectively). 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables across the observation window have an adjusted R2 
changing from 0.1443 in 2001 (see Columns 1/2), 0.1521 in 2003 (see Column 3/4) and 
finally 0.0549 in 2005 (see Column 5/6). Specifically, for 2001, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain 14.43% of the variation in the dependent variable, AFit/ASSETSit. 
The goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) improves marginally in 2003 before falling 
markedly in 2005.  
Table 6.6 Columns 7 and 8 report regression results for identical variables but with 
all firm-year observations from 2001, 2003 and 2005 included in one regression model (that 
is, n=600). Table 6.6 Column 8 suggests that the variables ROAit and BODMEETit are 
significant predictors of audit fees variation. Additionally, the adjusted R2 suggests that the 
variables in the regression model account for 11.83% of the change in audit fees for the 
period 2001 to 2005 (see Columns 7/8). 
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Table 6.6: 
  CTENUREit
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Audit Fees for 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 
(n=200) 
2003 
(n=200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
2001 – 2005 
(n=600) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0040 0.2836 0.0104 0.3233 0.0122 0.0167 0.0118 0.2100 
Independent Variable         
CTENURE 0.0002 it 0.9026 0.0003 0.9055 -0.0011 0.7753 0.0004 0.7850 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.3948 -0.0001 0.5767 -0.0002 0.2981 -0.0002 0.1715 
LNNBS -0.0007 it 0.5726 -0.0011 0.3725 -0.0009 0.4388 -0.0011 0.1385 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0037 it 0.0004 -0.0079 0.0000 0.0016 0.3516 -0.0033 0.0000 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.2140 -0.0001 0.2516 0.0000 0.4812 0.0000 0.2806 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0033 it 0.3582 0.0011 0.7486 -0.0038 0.1716 -0.0006 0.7173 
BODMEET -0.0003 it 0.1170 -0.0002 0.1647 -0.0002 0.2737 -0.0002 0.0077 
FINEXPAC 0.0012 it 0.4093 0.0008 0.6281 -0.0037 0.0277 -0.0002 0.7885 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0010 it 0.7065 -0.0025 0.8030 0.0063 0.0185 -0.0017 0.8557 
MATERIALS 0.0005 it 0.8262 -0.0041 0.6881 -0.0006 0.8037 -0.0048 0.6093 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0007 it 0.8270 -0.0050 0.6260 -0.0012 0.8807 -0.0050 0.5899 
CONSUMERDISC 0.0000 it 0.9989 -0.0045 0.6617 -0.0001 0.9731 -0.0048 0.6069 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0002 it 0.9287 -0.0055 0.5934 -0.0003 0.9151 -0.0054 0.5614 
HEALTH CARE 0.0030 it 0.2304 -0.0030 0.7611 0.0010 0.6855 -0.0031 0.7377 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0085 it 
0.0048 0.0026 0.8019 0.0045 0.1436 0.0018 0.8485 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0072 it 
0.0194 0.0012 0.9057 0.0038 0.2193 0.0005 0.9587 
UTILITIES 0.0011 it 0.7517 -0.0046 0.6604 -0.0006 0.8773 -0.0045 0.6379 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.0982 0.0000 3.0991 0.0000 1.7504 0.0411 5.7299 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1443 2 0.1521 0.0549 0.1183 
Where: 
CTENUREit  = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor j till time period t has been 
engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit = Square 
root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for 
firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = 
Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year 
for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one 
financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry 
and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if 
otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 
if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry 
and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications 
industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.3.2 Key auditor attributes – longitudinal variations 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if 
otherwise. 
This sub-section will outline results from examining the multivariate relationship 
between the four key (individual) auditor attributes of auditor brand, auditor specialization, 
auditor independence and auditor tenure and audit fees deflated by total assets for the 
financial periods 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005. 
123 
 
6.3.2.1 Brand 
Table 6.7 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, BIG4it) as an explanatory variable in analyzing changes in audit fees (that 
is, AFit/ASSETSit) at three points in time: the change from 2001 from 2003; the change from 
2003 from 2005; and the change from 2001 from 2005. Results from Table 6.7 Columns 1 
and 2 suggest that the coefficient on BIG4it (the independent variable) is positive and 
statistically insignificant for the period 2001 to 2003. A review of Table 6.7 also shows that 
the coefficient on BIG4it remains positive throughout 2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) and 2001 
to 2005 (see Column 5) and the statistical significance of the relationship between BIG4it and 
the change in AFit/ASSETSit becomes weaker over the observation window (the p-value 
changes from 0.4583 for the period 2001 to 2003 (see Column 2) to 0.8100 for the period 
2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) and 0.7828 (see Column 6) for the period 2001 to 2005). 
Nevertheless, the relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.7 indicates that the coefficient on return on assets 
(ROAit) is negative but significant (p-value<0.05) for the period 2001 to 2003. The 
significance of the relationship between ROAit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit, however, 
reduces marginally for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.05) and for the 
period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value<0.05). The coefficient on ROAit also becomes 
positive for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) and for the period 2001 to 2005 (see 
Column 5). None of the corporate governance and industry variables suggest any significant 
statistical association with the change in AFit/ASSETSit over the observation period. 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables have an adjusted R2 ranging from 0.0198 (change in 
AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2003 (see Columns 1/2)), -0.0105 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 
2003 to 2005 (see Column 3/4)) to -0.0145 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2005 (see 
Column 5/6)). Specifically, for the period 2001 to 2003, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain only 1.98% of the change in the variation in the dependent 
variable, AFit/ASSETSit with the goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) falling even further in 
the subsequent periods of 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005. 
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Table 6.7: 
  BIG4it
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Change in Audit Fees over 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005 
Change from 2001 to 
2003 
(n=200) 
Change from 2003 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
Change from 2001 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0011 0.5808 0.0007 0.8616 0.0005 0.9142 
Independent Variable       
BIG4 0.0002 it 0.4583 0.0005 0.8100 0.0006 0.7828 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.0000 it 0.9844 0.0001 0.6377 0.0001 0.6982 
LNNBS -0.0001 it 0.5776 0.0001 0.9410 0.0001 0.9680 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0009 it 0.0139 0.0057 0.0158 0.0052 0.0272 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.9278 0.0000 0.8690 0.0000 0.8236 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0006 it 0.3621 0.0007 0.8423 0.0018 0.6343 
BODMEET 0.0000 it 0.5800 -0.0001 0.5867 -0.0001 0.5856 
FINEXPAC 0.0001 it 0.6923 -0.0012 0.6235 -0.0015 0.5386 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0000 it 0.9835 0.0017 0.6416 0.0024 0.5071 
MATERIALS -0.0005 it 0.8039 -0.0018 0.5468 -0.0018 0.5608 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0006 it 0.7559 -0.0020 0.5052 -0.0025 0.5066 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0005 it 0.7866 -0.0012 0.6920 -0.0011 0.7255 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0006 it 0.7713 0.0001 0.9674 0.0001 0.9783 
HEALTH CARE -0.0006 it 0.7714 -0.0024 0.4706 -0.0022 0.5122 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0000 it 
0.9997 -0.0045 0.2893 -0.0038 0.3691 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS -0.0020 it 
0.3400 -0.0008 0.8573 -0.0023 0.5903 
UTILITIES -0.0009 it 0.6551 -0.0008 0.8691 -0.0013 0.7962 
F-statistic (p-value) 1.2361 0.2404 0.8707 0.6037 0.8220 0.6596 
Adjusted R 0.0198 2 -0.0105 -0.0145 
Where: 
BIG4it = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is a Big4 
audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number 
of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business 
segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for 
firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time 
period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i 
at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm 
i at time period t; FINEXPACit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists 
of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 
if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the 
value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.3.2.2 Specialization 
 = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
Table 6.8 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, SPECIALISTit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing changes in audit fees 
(that is, AFit/ASSETSit) at three points in time: the change from 2001 from 2003; the change 
from 2003 from 2005; and the change from 2001 from 2005. The results from Table 6.8 
Column 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on SPECIALISTit (the independent variable) is 
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positive and statistically insignificant for the period 2001 to 2003. A review of Table 6.8 also 
shows that the coefficient on SPECIALISTit remains positive throughout 2003 to 2005 (see 
Column 3) and 2001 to 2005 (see Column 5) and the statistical significance of the 
relationship between SPECIALISTit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit becomes stronger over 
the observation window (the p-value changes from 0.7602 for the period 2001 to 2003 (see 
Column 2) to 0.1882 for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) and 0.1574 for the period 
2001 to 2005 (see Column 6)). Nevertheless, the relationship is not significant at 
conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.8 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative but significant (p-value<0.05) for the period 2001 to 
2003. The significance of the relationship between ROAit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit, 
however, reduces marginally for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.05) and 
for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value<0.05). The coefficient on ROAit also 
becomes positive for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) and for the period 2001 to 
2005 (see Column 5). None of the corporate governance and industry variables suggest any 
significant statistical association with the change in AFit/ASSETSit over the observation 
period. 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables have an adjusted R2 ranging from 0.0173 (change in 
AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2003 (see Columns 1/2)), 0.0097 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 
2003 to 2005 (see Columns 3/4)) to 0.0081 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2005 (see 
Columns 5/6)). Specifically, for the period 2001 to 2003, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain only 1.73% of the change in the variation in the dependent 
variable, AFit/ASSETSit with the goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) falling even further in 
the subsequent periods of 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005. 
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Table 6.8: 
  SPECIALISTit
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Change in Audit Fees over 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005 
Change from 2001 to 
2003 
(n=200) 
Change from 2003 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
Change from 2001 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0013 0.5293 0.0036 0.4311 0.0041 0.3601 
Independent Variable       
SPECIALIST 0.0001 it 0.7602 0.0024 0.1882 0.0025 0.1574 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.0000 it 0.8671 0.0001 0.6317 0.0001 0.6803 
LNNBS -0.0002 it 0.5448 0.0000 0.9804 0.0000 0.9762 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0008 it 0.0184 0.0052 0.0253 0.0047 0.0401 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.9158 0.0000 0.8051 0.0000 0.7432 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0006 it 0.3619 -0.0049 0.1947 -0.0053 0.1575 
BODMEET 0.0000 it 0.6654 -0.0001 0.4869 -0.0001 0.4804 
FINEXPAC 0.0001 it 0.7436 -0.0012 0.5882 -0.0013 0.5616 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY -0.0001 it 0.9535 0.0020 0.5710 0.0027 0.4421 
MATERIALS -0.0006 it 0.7719 -0.0015 0.6105 -0.0014 0.6378 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0007 it 0.7249 -0.0017 0.6020 -0.0015 0.6150 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0007 it 0.7498 -0.0017 0.5745 -0.0016 0.5880 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0007 it 0.7254 0.0004 0.9030 0.0004 0.9031 
HEALTH CARE -0.0006 it 0.7635 -0.0027 0.4272 -0.0024 0.4680 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY -0.0001 it 
0.9588 -0.0045 0.2756 -0.0038 0.3550 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS -0.0020 it 
0.3283 -0.0005 0.8996 -0.0020 0.6276 
UTILITIES -0.0010 it 0.6263 -0.0005 0.9164 -0.0009 0.8469 
F-statistic (p-value) 1.2061 0.2634 1.1224 0.3372 1.1017 0.3563 
Adjusted R 0.0173 2 0.0097 0.0081 
Where: 
SPECIALISTit  = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is 
an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit  = 
Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; LNNBSit = Natural logarithmic of 1 
plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current 
liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors meetings 
held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if 
the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; 
ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if 
otherwise; MATERIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials 
industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 
1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; 
HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 
0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm 
is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; 
UTILITIESit
6.2.2.3 Independence 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if 
otherwise. 
Table 6.9 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, CNON-AUDITit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing changes in audit 
fees (that is, AFit/ASSETSit) at three points in time: the change from 2001 from 2003; the 
change from 2003 from 2005; and the change from 2001 from 2005. The results from Table 
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6.9 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on CNON-AUDITit (the independent 
variable) is positive and statistically insignificant for the period 2001 to 2003. A review of 
Table 6.9 also shows that the coefficient on CNON-AUDITit remains positive throughout 
2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) and 2001 to 2005 (see Column 5) and the statistical 
significance of the relationship between CNON-AUDITit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit 
becomes weaker for the period 2003 to 2005 (the p-value changes from 0.7815 for the period 
2001 to 2003 (see Column 2) to 0.9103 for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) before 
becoming stronger for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value=0.8885). 
Nevertheless, the relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.9 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative but significant (p-value<0.05) for the period 2001 to 
2003. The significance of the relationship between ROAit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit, 
however, reduces for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.05) and for the 
period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value<0.05). The coefficient on ROAit also becomes 
positive for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) and for the period 2001 to 2005 (see 
Column 5). None of the corporate governance and industry variables suggest any significant 
statistical association with the change in AFit/ASSETSit over the observation period. 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables have an adjusted R2 ranging from 0.0172 (change in 
AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2003 (see columns 1/2)), 0.0004 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 
2003 to 2005 (see Columns 3/4)) to -0.0027 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2005 (see 
Columns 5/6)). Specifically, for the period 2001 to 2003, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain only 1.72% of the change in the variation in the dependent 
variable, AFit/ASSETSit with the goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) falling even further in 
the subsequent periods of 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005. 
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Table 6.9: 
  CNON-AUDITit
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Change in Audit Fees over 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005 
Change from 2001 to 
2003 
(n=200) 
Change from 2003 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
Change from 2001 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0012 0.5729 0.0052 0.2524 0.0058 0.1958 
Independent Variable       
CNON-AUDIT 0.0001 it 0.7815 0.0002 0.9103 0.0002 0.8885 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.0000 it 0.8304 0.0001 0.6814 0.0001 0.7339 
LNNBS -0.0001 it 0.5705 0.0000 0.9877 -0.0001 0.9433 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0009 it 0.0166 0.0054 0.0193 0.0050 0.0306 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.8877 0.0000 0.8876 0.0000 0.8319 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0006 it 0.3739 -0.0054 0.1543 -0.0058 0.1217 
BODMEET 0.0000 it 0.6527 -0.0001 0.4627 -0.0001 0.4548 
FINEXPAC 0.0001 it 0.7361 -0.0012 0.6072 -0.0012 0.5808 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.000 it 0.9898 0.0020 0.5691 0.0028 0.4412 
MATERIALS -0.0005 it 0.8210 -0.0016 0.5940 -0.0015 0.6205 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0006 it 0.7774 -0.0019 0.5990 -0.0020 0.6200 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0005 it 0.7902 -0.0013 0.6597 -0.0012 0.6807 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0006 it 0.7817 0.0003 0.9338 0.0003 0.9350 
HEALTH CARE -0.0005 it 0.8038 -0.0023 0.4958 -0.0020 0.5462 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0000 it 
0.9981 -0.0044 0.2954 -0.0036 0.3800 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS -0.0019 it 
0.3468 -0.0005 0.9082 -0.0020 0.6371 
UTILITIES -0.0009 it 0.6651 -0.0005 0.9220 -0.0009 0.8547 
F-statistic (p-value) 1.2050 0.2642 1.0046 0.4539 0.9664 0.4953 
Adjusted R 0.0172 2 0.0004 -0.0027 
Where: 
CNON-AUDITit  = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
paid to the incumbent auditor j in time period t is less than 0.25; otherwise auditee i in time period t  is 
scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit = Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; 
LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit 
= Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = 
Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage 
of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The 
number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert 
during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 
1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if 
otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer 
staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.3.2.4 Tenure 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 
if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
Table 6.10 documents the results of OLS regression using an auditor attribute 
measure (that is, CTENUREit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing changes in audit fees 
(that is, AFit/ASSETSit) at three points in time: the change from 2001 from 2003; the change 
from 2003 from 2005; and the change from 2001 from 2005. The results from Table 6.10 
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Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on CTENUREit (the independent variable) is 
negative and statistically insignificant for the period 2001 to 2003. A review of Table 6.10 
also shows that the coefficient on CTENUREit remains negative throughout 2003 to 2005 
(see Column 3) and 2001 to 2005 (see Column 5) and the statistical significance of the 
relationship between CTENUREit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit becomes stronger (the p-
value changes from 0.5850 for the period 2001 to 2003 (see Column 2) to 0.2892 for the 
period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) and 0.2856 for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 6). 
Nevertheless, the relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
A further review of Table 6.10 Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coefficient on 
return on assets (ROAit) is negative but significant (p-value<0.05) for the period 2001 to 
2003. The significance of the relationship between ROAit and the change in AFit/ASSETSit, 
however, increases for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 4) (p-value<0.05) before 
becoming weaker for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 6) (p-value<0.05). The 
coefficient on ROAit also becomes positive for the period 2003 to 2005 (see Column 3) and 
for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Column 5). None of the corporate governance and industry 
variables suggest any significant statistical association with the change in AFit/ASSETSit over 
the observation period. 
The regression models run to examine the association between the independent 
variables and dependent variables have an adjusted R2 ranging from 0.0184 (change in 
AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2003 (see Columns 1/2)), 0.0064 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 
2003 to 2005 (see Columns 3/4)) to 0.0034 (change in AFit/ASSETSit from 2001 to 2005 (see 
Columns 5/6)). Specifically, for the period 2001 to 2003, the variables entered into the 
regression model explain only 1.84% of the change in the variation in the dependent 
variable, AFit/ASSETSit with the goodness-of-fit (that is, adjusted R2) falling even further in 
the subsequent periods of 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005. 
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Table 6.10: 
  CTENUREit
 
 (Individual Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Change in Audit Fees over 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005 
Change from 2001 to 
2003 
(n=200) 
Change from 2003 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
Change from 2001 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0015 0.4801 0.0109 0.1122 0.0116 0.0898 
Independent Variable       
CTENURE -0.0002 it 0.5850 -0.0056 0.2892 -0.0056 0.2856 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.0000 it 0.8620 0.0001 0.6795 0.0001 0.7337 
LNNBS -0.0002 it 0.5471 0.0000 0.9978 -0.0001 0.9517 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0009 it 0.0156 0.0061 0.0110 0.0056 0.0177 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.8996 0.0000 0.8826 0.0000 0.8249 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0006 it 0.3276 -0.0056 0.1340 -0.0061 0.1042 
BODMEET 0.0000 it 0.6578 -0.0001 0.4416 -0.0002 0.4337 
FINEXPAC 0.0001 it 0.7156 -0.0011 0.6121 -0.0012 0.5869 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0000 it 0.9907 0.0023 0.5228 0.0030 0.4005 
MATERIALS -0.0005 it 0.8125 -0.0017 0.5638 -0.0016 0.5884 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0006 it 0.7714 -0.0019 0.5602 -0.0015 0.0013 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0006 it 0.7833 -0.0014 0.6498 -0.0013 0.6709 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0006 it 0.7726 0.0002 0.9631 0.0001 0.9661 
HEALTH CARE -0.0005 it 0.7997 -0.0020 0.5474 -0.0017 0.5999 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0000 it 
0.9887 -0.0039 0.3520 -0.0032 0.4462 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS -0.0020 it 
0.3389 -0.0006 0.8925 -0.0021 0.6225 
UTILITIES -0.0009 it 0.6628 -0.0002 0.9666 -0.0006 0.8971 
F-statistic (p-value) 1.2195 0.2529 1.0806 0.3764 1.0428 0.4140 
Adjusted R 0.0184 2 0.0064 0.0034 
Where: 
CTENUREit  = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if number of years the incumbent auditor j till 
time period t has been engaged as the principal auditor is 3 years or more; otherwise auditee i in time 
period t is scored zero (0); SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period 
t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t; 
ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage 
of non-executive directors on the board of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The 
number of board of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert 
during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 
1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if 
otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer 
staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
6.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 
if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
Chapter Six reported the empirical results of this study. Initially, regression results 
examining the relationship between a composite score (capturing four key auditor attributes) 
against audit fees deflated by total assets is examined on both a cross-sectional and 
longitudinal time-scale. Subsequently, the regression results are re-run but with the four 
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auditor attributes regressed (individually) against audit fees deflated by total assets; once 
again, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. 
Chapter Seven will discuss the results of the robustness tests and sensitivity analysis 
completed. Specifically, the sample in this study will be partitioned by key auditee 
characteristics and corporate governance features and multivariate analyses re-run. 
Subsequently, alternative measures of both audit fees and auditor attributes will be utilized to 
assess the robustness of this study’s main results. Finally, pre-CLERP 9 and post-CLERP 9 
analyses will also be completed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
ROBUSTNESS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
7.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Six presented the results of the OLS regressions (both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal variations) on the relationship between audit fees and the composite auditor 
attributes examined in this study. Subsequently, individual key auditor attributes and the 
extent of the association with audit fees were also examined. 
Chapter Seven discusses the robustness and sensitivity of the main results in Chapter 
Six. Initially, the sample is partitioned by four key auditee characteristics and the regression 
models in Chapter Six individually re-run (that is, using a dichotomous composite score 
capturing four key auditor attributes. Subsequently, the sample is partitioned by three key 
corporate governance features and the main results in Chapter Six re-run. Alternative 
measures of audit fees and auditor attributes are then utilized before a pre- versus post- 
CLERP 9 analyses undertaken of the main results. Finally, a summary is of Chapter Seven 
provided. 
7.2 PARTITIONING OF THE SAMPLE BY AUDITEE CHARACTERISTICS 
The following section will discuss the robustness and sensitivity of the main results 
in Chapter Six. Initially, the sample is partitioned by the following four auditee 
characteristics: firm size, firm complexity, firm risk and industry. The following approach is 
utilized when partitioning the sample in the following manner: (1) for each individual year 
(that is, 2001, 2003 and 2005), the relevant split point for the auditee characteristics is 
identified;52
7.2.1 Composite score and firm size 
 (2) the sample is then partitioned per individual year based on the identified split 
point; (3) the individual year-based split points are re-combined into a pooled sample of 600 
observations; and (4) the robustness and sensitivity tests are then run using the pooled 
sample. Sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.4 will discuss the results of examining the association between 
a dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor attributes and audit fees deflated 
by total assets after the sample is partitioned by the four auditee characteristics. 
Table 7.1 shows the regression results when the sample is partitioned by firm size 
and the main multivariate regression results in Chapter Six re-run. Partitioning by firm size is 
undertaken to determine if the main regression results in Chapter Six are influenced by firm 
size effects. Specifically, the Table 7.1 regressions test whether larger or smaller firms in the 
sample (as measured by market capitalization (MARCAPit)) are driving the main regression 
results. 
                                                     
52  The split point for each of the four auditee characteristics is the median. 
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Table 7.1: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Partitioning by Firm Size 
Audit Fees for 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 – 2005 
(n=300) 
Large Firms 
2001 – 2005 
(n=300) 
Small Firms 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0068 0.0140 0.0159 0.1326 
Independent Variable     
AA -0.0001 it 0.9258 -0.0002 0.8219 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.0000 it 0.7424 -0.0003 0.1349 
LNNBS -0.0012 it 0.1703 -0.0010 0.3757 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0030 it 0.0008 -0.0034 0.0136 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.3677 -0.0001 0.1298 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0021 it 0.3479 -0.0034 0.2173 
BODMEET -0.0004 it 0.0003 -0.0001 0.5530 
FINEXPAC 0.0017 it 0.1593 -0.0018 0.1944 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0008 it 0.6348 0.0004 0.9707 
MATERIALS -0.0050 it 0.4058 -0.0060 0.5712 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0001 it 0.9557 -0.0071 0.5010 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0004 it 0.8262 -0.0065 0.5312 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0002 it 0.8894 -0.0074 0.4879 
HEALTH CARE 0.0020 it 0.2450 -0.0047 0.6467 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0048 it 
0.0343 0.0008 0.9378 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0080 it 
0.0010 -0.0034 0.7493 
UTILITIES 0.0007 it 0.7858 -0.0067 0.5331 
F-statistic (p-value) 4.1246 0.0000 3.0865 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1433 2 0.1061 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A 
composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy measures for auditor 
attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for 
firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; 
PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of 
directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; 
FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time 
period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise. 
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The regression results in Table 7.1 support the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.1 Columns 1 to 4 suggest that the coefficient on AAit
7.2.2 Composite score and firm complexity 
 
(the independent variable) is negative and statistically insignificant for 2001 to 2005 for both 
large firms (p-value = 0.9258 (see Column 2)) and small firms (p-value = 0.8219 (see 
Column 4)) in the sample. Table 7.1 results clearly support the main results shown in 
Chapter Six, that is, the dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor attributes is 
not significantly associated with audit fees even after partitioning the sample by firm size. 
Table 7.2 shows the regression results when the sample is partitioned by firm 
complexity and the main multivariate regression results in Chapter Six re-run. Partitioning 
by firm complexity is undertaken to determine if the main regression results are influenced 
by firm complexity effects. Specifically, the Table 7.2 regressions test whether more or less 
complex firms in the sample (as measured by the square root of the number of subsidiaries 
for each firm (SRSUBSIDit)) are driving the main regression results. 
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Table 7.2: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Partitioning by Firm Complexity 
Audit Fees for 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 – 2005 
(n=300) 
Complex Firms 
2001 – 2005 
(n=300) 
Less Complex Firms 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0095 0.0038 0.0123 0.1714 
Independent Variable     
AA 0.0000 it 0.9753 -0.0004 0.5364 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0001 it 0.5364 -0.0002 0.2104 
LNNBS -0.0018 it 0.0928 -0.0005 0.5775 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0038 it 0.0002 -0.0018 0.1512 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.4503 0.0000 0.1738 
Control Variables -  Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0005 it 0.8652 -0.0023 0.3116 
BODMEET -0.0006 it 0.0000 0.0001 0.6336 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY -0.0001 it 0.9653 0.0016 0.8563 
MATERIALS -0.0004 it 0.7090 -0.0056 0.5325 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0009 it 0.6590 -0.0054 0.5484 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0002 it 0.9365 -0.0044 0.6181 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0006 it 0.7678 -0.0053 0.5531 
HEALTH CARE 0.0039 it 0.0616 -0.0045 0.6039 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0048 it 
0.0737 0.0031 0.7297 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0087 it 
0.0006 -0.0028 0.7551 
UTILITIES 0.0007 it 0.8036 -0.0047 0.6156 
F-statistic (p-value) 4.6511 0.0000 3.3953 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1634 2 0.1199 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A 
composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy measures for auditor 
attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for 
firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; 
PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of 
directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; 
FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time 
period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise. 
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The regression results in Table 7.2 support the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.2 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on AAit 
(the independent variable) is positive and statistically insignificant for 2001 to 2005 for the 
more complex firms (p-value = 0.9753). In contrast, the coefficient on AAit
7.2.3 Composite score and firm risk 
 is negative 
(though still statistically insignificant) for the less complex firms (p-value = 0.5364) in the 
sample (see Columns 3 and 4). Table 7.2 results clearly support the main results in Chapter 
Six that the dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor attributes is not 
significantly associated with audit fees even after partitioning the sample by firm 
complexity. 
Table 7.3 shows the regression results when the sample is partitioned by firm risk 
and the main multivariate regression results in Chapter Six re-run. Partitioning by firm risk is 
undertaken to determine if the main regression results are influenced by firm risk effects. 
Specifically, the Table 7.3 regressions test whether more or less risky firms in the sample (as 
measured by the return on assets for each firm (ROAit)) are driving the main regression 
results. 
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Table 7.3: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Partitioning by Firm Risk 
Audit Fees for 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 – 2005 
(n=300) 
Less Risky Firms 
2001 – 2005 
(n=300) 
More Risky Firms 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0113 0.0014 0.0101 0.2279 
Independent Variable     
AA -0.0005 it 0.4488 0.0002 0.7605 
Control Variables  - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.3119 -0.0003 0.1241 
LNNBS -0.0012 it 0.3258 -0.0009 0.2631 
Control Variables  - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0026 it 0.0100 -0.0040 0.0054 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.3774 -0.0002 0.1043 
Control Variables  - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0015 it 0.6183 -0.0007 0.7349 
BODMEET -0.0002 it 0.1500 -0.0003 0.0045 
FINEXPAC -0.0019 it 0.1915 0.0012 0.2895 
Control Variables  - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0040 it 0.0532 -0.0035 0.6615 
MATERIALS -0.0007 it 0.5320 -0.0041 0.6236 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0010 it 0.6255 -0.0030 0.7206 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0009 it 0.6882 -0.0028 0.7323 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0016 it 0.4358 -0.0039 0.6468 
HEALTH CARE -0.0016 it 0.4750 0.0008 0.9176 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0052 it 
0.0511 0.0035 0.6752 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0082 it 
0.0173 0.0015 0.8576 
UTILITIES -0.0010 it 0.7137 -0.0034 0.6999 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.3502 0.0000 3.8392 0.000 
Adjusted R 0.1117 2 0.1390 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A 
composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy measures for auditor 
attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for 
firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; 
PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of 
directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; 
FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time 
period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise. 
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The regression results in Table 7.3 support the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.3 Columns 1and 2 suggest that the coefficient on AAit 
(the independent variable) is negative and statistically insignificant for 2001 to 2005 for the 
more risky firms (p-value = 0.4488). The coefficient on AAit
7.2.4 Composite score and firm industry 
 is positive (though still 
statistically insignificant) for the less risky firms (p-value = 0.7605) in the sample (see 
Columns 3 and 4). Table 7.3 results clearly supports the main results in Chapter Six that the 
dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor attributes is not significantly 
associated with audit fees even after partitioning the sample by firm risk. 
Table 7.4 shows the regression results when the sample is partitioned by industry 
and the main multivariate regression results in Chapter Six re-run. Partitioning by industry is 
undertaken to determine if the main regression results are influenced by firm industry. 
Specifically, the Table 7.4 regressions test whether the industry that the firm is in (as split by 
Materialsit, Industrialsit, Energyit and others) is driving the main regression results. 
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Table 7.4: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Partitioning by Firm Industry 
Audit Fees for 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 – 2005 
(n=270) 
Materials, Industrials 
and Energy 
Industries 
2001 – 2005 
(n=330) 
All Other Industries 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0200 0.0771 0.0058 0.0132 
Independent Variable     
AA -0.0005 it 0.4858 0.0002 0.7443 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.4386 -0.0002 0.0882 
LNNBS -0.0022 it 0.0824 0.0000 0.9827 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0004 it 0.7316 -0.0060 0.0000 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.3005 0.0000 0.6495 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0026 it 0.3982 -0.0008 0.6978 
BODMEET -0.0003 it 0.0672 -0.0002 0.0420 
FINEXPAC -0.0017 it 0.2570 0.0009 0.3738 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGYit -0.0011 0.9172 0.0007 0.6716 
MATERIALSit -0.0083 0.4523 -0.0008 0.7712 
INDUSTRIALSit -0.0077 0.4860 -0.0006 0.6896 
CONSUMERDISCit -0.0074 0.5064 -0.0008 0.5955 
CONSUMERSTAPit -0.0089 0.4244 -0.0008 0.6193 
HEALTH CAREit -0.0057 0.5950 0.0009 0.5871 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit -0.0019 0.8626 0.0051 0.0145 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONSit 0.0019 0.8667 0.0005 0.8110 
UTILITIESit -0.0069 0.5515 -0.0010 0.6529 
F-statistic (p-value) 2.7992 0.0000 5.5870 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1021 2 0.1824 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A 
composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy measures for auditor 
attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for 
firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; 
PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of 
directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; 
FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time 
period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise. 
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The regression results in Table 7.4 support the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.4 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on AAit 
(the independent variable) is negative and statistically insignificant for 2001 to 2005 for 
firms in the materials, industrials and energy Industries (p-value = 0.4858). In contrast, the 
coefficient on AAit
7.3 PARTITIONING SAMPLE BY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FEATURES 
 is positive (though still statistically insignificant) for firms in the other 
industries (p-value = 0.7443) in the sample (see Columns 3 and 4). Table 7.4 results clearly 
supports the main results in Chapter Six that the dichotomous composite score capturing four 
key auditor attributes is not significantly associated with audit fees even after partitioning the 
sample by firm industry. 
This section discusses the robustness and sensitivity of the main results in Chapter 
Six when the sample is partitioned by the following three corporate governance features: 
non-executive board of director members, number of board of directors meetings annually 
and the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee. The following approach is 
utilized when partitioning the sample: first, for each individual year (that is, 2001, 2003 and 
2005), the relevant split point for the corporate governance features are identified;53
7.3.1 Composite score and non-executive board of directors members 
 second, 
the sample is then partitioned per individual year based on the identified split point; third, the 
individual year-based split points are re-combined into a pooled sample of 600 observations; 
and last, the robustness and sensitivity tests are then run using the pooled sample. Sections 
7.3.1 to 7.3.3 discuss the results of examining the association between a dichotomous 
composite score capturing four key auditor attributes and audit fees deflated by total assets 
after the sample is partitioned by the three aforementioned corporate governance features. 
Table 7.5 shows the regression results when the sample is partitioned by non-
executive members (at the 50th percentile) and the main multivariate regression results in 
Chapter Six re-run. Partitioning by non-executive board members is undertaken to determine 
if the main regression results are influenced by the percentage of non-executive board 
members. Specifically, the Table 7.5 regressions test whether the degree of independence of 
board members within the firms in the sample (as measured PERNEXBDit) are driving the 
main regression results. 
                                                     
53  The split point differs depending on the corporate governance feature being partitioned. Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.3 document 
the individual split points. 
141 
 
Table 7.5: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Partitioning by Non-Executive Board of Directors Members 
Audit Fees for 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 – 2005 
(n=356) 
Boards with more 
than 50% non-
executive members 
2001 – 2005 
(n=244) 
Boards with less than 
50% non-executive 
members 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0088 0.2034 0.0112 0.0100 
Independent Variable     
AA -0.0004 it 0.3503 0.0002 0.8544 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.0001 it 0.5443 -0.0005 0.0681 
LNNBS -0.0009 it 0.1707 -0.0011 0.4866 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0059 it 0.0000 -0.0015 0.2225 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.2748 -0.0001 0.2276 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0005 it 0.7460 -0.0024 0.4817 
BODMEET -0.0001 it 0.2338 -0.0005 0.0125 
FINEXPAC -0.0001 it 0.9318 0.0004 0.8225 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY -0.0005 it 0.9376 0.0040 0.1238 
MATERIALS -0.0037 it 0.5943 -0.0008 0.8092 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0043 it 0.5309 0.0006 0.8183 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0042 it 0.5367 0.0018 0.5428 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0044 it 0.5222 -0.0004 0.8955 
HEALTH CARE -0.0045 it 0.5032 0.0057 0.0463 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0026 it 
0.7023 0.0039 0.2955 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0037 it 
0.5891 0.0019 0.6094 
UTILITIES -0.0035 it 0.6192 0.0003 0.9430 
F-statistic (p-value) 8.2275 0.0000 2.1438 0.0076 
Adjusted R 0.2571 2 0.0700 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A 
composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy measures for auditor 
attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for 
firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; 
PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of 
directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; 
FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time 
period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise. 
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The regression results in Table 7.5 support the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.5 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on AAit 
(the independent variable) is negative and statistically insignificant for 2001 to 2005 for 
firms with board of directors comprising more than 50% non-executive members (p-value = 
0.3503). In contrast, the coefficient on AAit
7.3.2 Composite score and number of board of directors meetings annually 
 positive (though still statistically insignificant) 
for firms with board of directors comprising less than 50% non-executive members (p-value 
= 0.8544) in the sample (see Columns 3 and 4). Table 7.5 results clearly support the main 
results in Chapter Six that the dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor 
attributes is not significantly associated with audit fees even after partitioning the sample by 
firms with board of directors comprising more and less than 50% non-executive members. 
Table 7.6 shows the regression results when the sample is partitioned by board of 
directors which meet at least 10 meetings per year and the main multivariate regression 
results in Chapter Six re-run. Partitioning by board of directors with at least 10 meetings 
annually is undertaken to determine if the main regression results are influenced by the 
number of annual board of directors meetings. Specifically, the Table 7.6 regressions test 
whether the number of annual board of directors meetings of firms in the sample (as 
measured by the number of board of directors meetings annually for each firm 
(BODMEETit)) are driving the main regression results. 
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Table 7.6: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Frequency of Annual Board of Directors Meetings 
Audit Fees for 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 – 2005 
(n=346) 
Boards with at least 
10 meetings annually 
2001 – 2005 
(n=254) 
Boards with less than 
10 meetings annually 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0058 0.0799 0.0070 0.4621 
Independent Variable     
AA 0.0007 it 0.3295 -0.0007 0.1731 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.1785 0.0000 0.8004 
LNNBS -0.0006 it 0.6052 -0.0010 0.2022 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0015 it 0.1149 -0.0139 0.0000 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.3700 -0.0001 0.0716 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0008 it 0.7643 -0.0017 0.4070 
BODMEET -0.0002 it 0.1528 -0.0002 0.0384 
FINEXPAC -0.0024 it 0.0838 0.0025 0.0106 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0050 it 0.0083 -0.0003 0.9632 
MATERIALS 0.0065 it 0.0074 -0.0015 0.8717 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0005 it 0.8402 -0.0002 0.9847 
CONSUMERDISC 0.0004 it 0.8626 -0.0002 0.9799 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0001 it 0.9724 0.0000 0.9963 
HEALTH CARE 0.0048 it 0.0178 -0.0009 0.9215 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0108 it 
0.0000 0.0024 0.7988 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0030 it 
0.4135 0.0071 0.4556 
UTILITIES 0.0004 it 0.8901 -0.0019 0.8481 
F-statistic (p-value) 4.1147 0.0000 6.9050 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1262 2 0.2841 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A 
composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy measures for auditor 
attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for 
firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; 
PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of 
directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; 
FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time 
period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary 
industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit = 
A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry 
and 0 if otherwise. 
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The regression results in Table 7.6 support the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.6 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on AAit 
(the independent variable) is positive and statistically insignificant for 2001 to 2005 for firms 
with board of directors meeting at least 10 times annually (p-value = 0.3295). In contrast, 
coefficient on AAit
7.3.3 Composite score and presence of a financial expert on audit committee 
 is negative (though still statistically insignificant) for firms with board of 
directors meeting less than 10 times annually (p-value = 0.1731 (see Columns 3 and 4)). 
Table 7.6 results clearly support the main results in Chapter Six that the dichotomous 
composite score capturing four key auditor attributes is not significantly associated with 
audit fees even after partitioning the sample by firms with board of directors meeting more 
and less than 10 times annually. 
Table 7.7 shows the regression results when the sample is partitioned by the 
presence of a financial expert on a firm’s audit committee and the main multivariate 
regression results in Chapter Six re-run. Partitioning by the presence of a financial expert on 
a firm’s audit committee is undertaken to determine if the main regression results are 
influenced by the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee. Specifically, the 
Table 7.7 regressions test whether the presence of a financial expert on a firm’s audit 
committee (as measured FINEXPACit) are driving the main regression results. 
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Table 7.7: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Partitioning by Presence of a Financial Expert on Audit Committee 
Audit Fees for 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 – 2005 
(n=422) 
Financial Expert on 
Audit Committee 
2001 – 2005 
(n=178) 
No Financial Expert 
on Audit Committee 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0097 0.0008 0.0048 0.0575 
Independent Variable     
AA 0.0000 it 0.9977 -0.0002 0.7066 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0001 it 0.3376 -0.0002 0.2719 
LNNBS -0.0013 it 0.1726 -0.0006 0.4455 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0022 it 0.0248 -0.0053 0.0000 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.2969 -0.0001 0.2394 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD -0.0013 it 0.5775 -0.0001 0.9656 
BODMEET -0.0004 it 0.0019 0.0000 0.8701 
FINEXPAC -0.0004 it 0.7290 0.0002 0.8396 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0030 it 0.0690 0.0008 0.8910 
MATERIALS -0.0007 it 0.7545 0.0009 0.8875 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0009 it 0.6942 0.0007 0.7507 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0004 it 0.8334 0.0000 0.9814 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0008 it 0.6452 0.0006 0.8989 
HEALTH CARE 0.0038 it 0.0533 -0.0005 0.6847 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0071 it 
0.0173 0.0054 0.0021 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0057 it 
0.0061 0.0005 0.5645 
UTILITIES 0.0004 it 0.8815 0.0000 0.9897 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.7068 0.0000 7.9487 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.0933 2 0.3202 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A 
composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy measures for auditor 
attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for 
firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of 
business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit 
= Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; 
PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number 
of board of directors of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at 
time period t; FINEXPACit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
audit committee consists of at least one financial expert during the year for 
firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if 
the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry 
and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 
1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is 
in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; 
CONSUMERSTAPit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is 
in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry 
and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable 
given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry and 
0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the 
value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if 
otherwise; UTILITIESit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm 
is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
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The regression results in Table 7.7 support the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.7 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the coefficient on AAit 
(the independent variable) is positive and statistically insignificant for 2001 to 2005 for firms 
with a financial expert on the audit committee (p-value = 0.9977). In contrast, the coefficient 
on AAit
7.4 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF AUDIT FEES 
 is negative (though still statistically insignificant) for firms without a financial expert 
on the audit committee (p-value = 0.7066 (see Columns 3 and 4)). Table 7.7 results clearly 
support the main results in Chapter Six that the dichotomous composite score capturing four 
key auditor attributes is not significantly associated with audit fees even after partitioning the 
sample by firms with and without a financial expert on the audit committee. 
Table 7.8 shows the regression results when an alternative measure for audit fees 
(that is, the amount of audit fees paid by firm i at time period t deflated by total assets for 
firm i at time period t (AFit/ASSETSit)) is utilized and main multivariate regression results in 
Chapter Six re-run. Specifically, the regression models utilized to date in this study are 
amended to include the natural logarithm of the audit fees paid to the external auditor for the 
provision of external audit services for firm i at time period t (AFit) as the dependent variable 
and, therefore, the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i at time period t (AFit/ASSETSit) 
is introduced into the multiple regression model as an additional control variable. The 
alternative measure of audit fees (as tabulated in Table 7.8) is derived to determine if the 
main regression results in Chapter Six are influenced by the choice of the measure of audit 
fees used (that is, the amount of audit fees paid by firm i at time period t deflated by total 
assets for firm i at time period t (AFit/ASSETSit).54
  
 
                                                     
54  In order to re-run the main results in Chapter Six, it is necessary to undertake the sensitivity tests (after utilizing an 
alternative measure of audit fees) for the individual years of 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005. 
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Table 7.8: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Natural Logarithmic of Audit Fees for 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 
(n=200) 
2003 
(n=200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
2001 – 2005 
(n=600) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 2.6716 0.0001 2.1075 0.0698 1.7628 0.0040 1.7416 0.0635 
Independent Variable         
AA 0.1286 it 0.1267 0.1527 0.0731 0.0406 0.5066 0.1019 0.0142 
Control Variables – Firm Size Variable 
LNASSETS 0.4082 it 0.0000 0.4141 0.0000 0.5136 0.0000 0.4398 0.0000 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID 0.1308 it 0.0000 0.1266 0.0000 0.0905 0.0001 0.1203 0.0000 
LNNBS 0.2570 it 0.0393 0.2493 0.0456 0.1413 0.2058 0.2272 0.0008 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0042 it 0.9679 -0.1158 0.5464 0.1057 0.5053 -0.0096 0.8979 
CURRENT -0.0087 it 0.0134 -0.0141 0.2382 -0.0003 0.7798 -0.0016 0.1771 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables  
PERNEXBD 0.4205 it 0.2548 0.1523 0.6326 0.0347 0.8901 0.1775 0.2822 
BODMEET 0.0148 it 0.3936 0.0181 0.2717 0.0083 0.5375 0.0133 0.1257 
FINEXPAC 0.3056 it 0.0356 0.0866 0.5951 0.0551 0.7151 0.1787 0.0372 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.1390 it 0.6098 0.8255 0.3879 -0.0063 0.9792 0.7950 0.3654 
MATERIALS -0.0697 it 0.7584 0.6117 0.5367 -0.1998 0.3240 0.6092 0.4934 
INDUSTRIALS -0.0762 it 0.7020 0.6347 0.5243 -0.1550 0.4380 0.7136 0.4232 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0992 it 0.6685 0.5884 0.5522 -0.1106 0.5866 0.6071 0.4950 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0843 it 0.7471 0.4921 0.6227 -0.1376 0.5554 0.5660 0.5259 
HEALTH CARE 0.2415 it 0.3470 0.7796 0.4132 -0.0447 0.8420 0.7732 0.3785 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.4243 it 
0.1838 1.0741 0.2852 0.4150 0.1424 1.1064 0.2163 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.6178 it 
0.0560 1.1996 0.2357 0.2760 0.3313 1.1695 0.1920 
UTILITIES -0.1033 it 0.7832 0.5550 0.5884 -0.2379 0.4725 0.5947 0.5093 
F-statistic (p-value) 33.2101 0.0000 30.0645 0.0000 43.5351 0.0000 103.1857 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.7334 2 0.7244 0.7842 0.7543 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit , CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy 
measures for auditor attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and length of tenure; LNASSETSit  = 
Natural logarithmic of total assets for firm i at time period t; SRSUBSIDit  = Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time 
period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current liabilities for 
firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors of directors for firm i at 
time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period 
t; FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert during the 
year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if 
otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; 
CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if 
otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if 
otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the information technology industry 
and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the telecommunications 
industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
The regression results in Table 7.8 provide mixed support to the main results of this 
study. Specifically, the results from Table 7.8 suggest that the coefficient on AA
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if 
otherwise. 
it (the 
independent variable) is positive across all time periods (see Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and 
statistically (i) insignificant for 2001 (p-value = 0.1267 (see Column 2)), (ii) significant for 
2003 (p-value<0.10 (see Column 4)), (iii) insignificant for 2005 (p-value = 0.5066 (see 
Column 6)) and (iv) significant for the cumulative years to 2001 to 2005 (where n = 600 and 
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p-value<0.05 (see Column 8)). A closer examination of Table 7.8, however, suggests that the 
significant result between the alternative measure of audit fees (that is, ASSETSit) and the 
dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor attributes is most likely driven by 
the natural logarithm of total assets (p-value<0.01 across all time periods (see Columns 2, 4, 
6 and 8)) which is inserted as a control variable in the multivariate regression.55 Given the 
likelihood, therefore, that ASSETSit is driving the relationship between the predictor and 
dependent variables, Table 7.8 results support the main results in Chapter Six. Specifically, 
the dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor attributes is not significantly 
associated with audit fees even after utilizing an alternative measure of audit fees.56
7.5 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES 
 
Table 7.9 shows the regression results when alternative measures of auditor 
attributes (that is, alternative measures to a composite dichotomous score based on the four 
proxy measures for auditor attributes of BIG4it, SPECIALISTit, CNON-AUDITit and 
CTENUREit) are utilized and the main multivariate regression results in Chapter Six re-run. 
Specifically, the regression models utilized are amended to replace the two dichotomous 
variables of CNON-AUDITit and CTENUREit with continuous proxy measures of RNON-
AUDITit (ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor j by auditee i during time 
period t) and NTENUREit (length of time (in years up to a maximum of 10) during which the 
auditor has remained unchanged for auditee i at time period t).57
  
 The alternative measures of 
auditor attributes (tabulated in Table 7.9) are derived to determine if the main regression 
results in Chapter Six are influenced by the measures used to proxy for auditor attributes. 
                                                     
55  Similarly, the higher adjusted R2 in Table 7.8 compared to the much lower adjusted R2 in Chapter Six can also be largely 
explained by the likelihood that the natural logarithm of total assets (p-value = 0.0000) is driving the significant result 
between the alternative measure of audit fees (that is, ASSETSit) and the dichotomous composite score capturing four key 
auditor attributes. 
56  In addition to using the natural logarithm of total assets as a control variable in the multivariate regression, the natural 
logarithm of total sales was also used as a substitute to the natural logarithm of total assets. Using the the natural logarithm 
of total sales resulted in results and p-values that were of lesser significance than results using the natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
57  It is not possible to replace the two remaining dichotomous variables of BIG4it (Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) 
if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0)) and 
SPECIALISTit (Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is an industry specialist 
in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0)) as there are no continuous measures in the prior 
literature to operationalize the two dichotomous variables. 
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Table 7.9: 
  BIG4it, SPECIALISTit, RNON-AUDITit and NTENUREit (Decomposed AAit
 
 Scores) - OLS Regression 
Results 
Audit Fees for 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2001 to 2005 inclusive 
2001 
(n=200) 
2003 
(n=200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
2001 – 2005 
(n=600) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0054 0.1938 0.0155 0.1380 0.0148 0.0002 0.0169 0.0709 
Independent Variable         
BIG4 -0.0010 it 0.5322 -0.0007 0.6787 -0.0012 0.4295 -0.0010 0.2818 
SPECIALIST 0.0017 it 0.3240 0.0026 0.1205 0.0023 0.1617 0.0020 0.0156 
RNON-AUDIT -0.0038 it 0.2102 -0.0044 0.1717 -0.0057 0.1257 -0.0046 0.0121 
NTENURE -0.0001 it 0.5268 -0.0002 0.4125 -0.0005 0.0507 -0.0002 0.0866 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.4802 -0.0001 0.6598 -0.0001 0.7046 -0.0001 0.3677 
LNNBS -0.0010 it 0.4246 -0.0014 0.2703 -0.0012 0.3209 -0.0013 0.0639 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0032 it 0.0017 -0.0075 0.0001 0.0022 0.2062 -0.0028 0.0002 
CURRENT 0.0000 it 0.2301 -0.0001 0.2816 0.0000 0.2077 0.0000 0.1600 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0033 it 0.3520 0.0011 0.7449 -0.0031 0.2545 -0.0005 0.7801 
BODMEET -0.0002 it 0.1511 -0.0002 0.2449 -0.0001 0.4827 -0.0002 0.0194 
FINEXPAC 0.0013 it 0.3478 0.0008 0.6488 -0.0033 0.0425 0.0000 0.9556 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0021 it 0.4613 -0.0050 0.6096 0.0061 0.0204 -0.0039 0.6684 
MATERIALS 0.0008 it 0.7099 -0.0078 0.4470 -0.0008 0.7159 -0.0077 0.4103 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0010 it 0.6850 -0.0093 0.3721 -0.0009 0.7256 -0.0081 0.3832 
CONSUMERDISC 0.0004 it 0.8530 -0.0078 0.4449 -0.0009 0.6906 -0.0077 0.4063 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0008 it 0.7602 -0.0103 0.3249 -0.0011 0.6564 -0.0091 03277 
HEALTH CARE 0.0045 it 0.1022 -0.0054 0.5856 0.0013 0.5951 -0.0049 0.5905 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0088 it 
0.0055 -0.0009 0.9338 0.0038 0.2134 -0.0012 0.9015 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0086 it 
0.0114 -0.0010 0.9204 0.0041 0.1860 -0.0015 0.8766 
UTILITIES 0.0016 it 0.6815 -0.0080 0.4511 -0.0019 0.6085 -0.0075 0.4279 
F-statistic (p-value) 2.8104 0.0000 2.9420 0.0000 1.9734 0.0117 5.7632 0.0000 
Adjusted R 0.1474 2 0.1633 0.0850 0.1372 
Where: 
BIG4it = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j in time period t is a Big4 audit firm; otherwise 
auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); SPECIALISTit  = Auditee i in time period t is scored one (1) if the incumbent auditor j 
in time period t is an industry specialist in industry k; otherwise auditee i in time period t is scored zero (0); RNON-AUDITit  = 
Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor j by auditee i during time period t; NTENUREit  = Length of time (in years 
up to a maximum of 10) during which the auditor has remained unchanged for auditee i at time period t; SRSUBSIDit  = Square 
root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business segments for 
firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; CURRENTit = 
Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board of directors of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of directors of directors 
meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the audit 
committee consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the consumer 
discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is 
in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 
if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise;  UTILITIESit
Regression results in Table 7.9 provide support for the main results of this study. 
Specifically, the results from Table 7.9 Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 suggest that the coefficient on 
AA
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
it (the independent variable) is negative (the exception being SPECIALISTit for the 2001 
to 2005 time period) and statistically insignificant for all four decomposed auditor attributes 
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across the time periods of 2001, 2003 and 2005 (see Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). However, there 
are two exceptions to this: (1) NTENUREit which is significant (p-value<0.10) in 2005 (see 
Column 6); and (2) three variables (SPECIALISTit, RNON-AUDITit and NTENUREit
7.6 PRE- VERSUS POST- CLERP 9 ANALYSIS 
) have 
significant p-values (<0.05, <0.05 and <0.10 respectively) for the period 2001- 2005 (see 
Column 8). Nevertheless, Table 7.9 results support the main results in Chapter Six. That is, 
the decomposed score capturing each of the four individual auditor attributes is not 
significantly associated with audit fees even after utilizing alternative measures of auditor 
attributes. 
Table 7.10 documents the results of OLS regressions using a dichotomous composite 
score of auditor attributes (that is, AAit) as an explanatory variable in analyzing the variation 
of audit fees for the years – ended 2001 and 2005 and also the change in audit fees for 2001 
to 2003 compared to 2003 to 2005. The objective in undertaking this partitioning is to 
determine if the introduction of CLERP 9 in 2003 improved the relationship between AAit 
and audit fees both before and after the introduction of CLERP 9 (that is, between 2001 and 
2005) in Australia. 
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Table 7.10: 
  AAit
 
 (Composite Score) - OLS Regression Results 
Audit Fees for 2001, 2005 and Change in Audit Fees over 2001 to 2003 and 2003 to 2005. 
2001 
(n=200) 
2005 
(n=200) 
Change from 2001 to 
2003 
(n=200) 
Change from 2003 to 
2005 
(n=200) 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Constant 0.0048 0.2540 0.0122 0.0013 0.0011 0.6035 0.0036 0.4795 
Independent Variable         
AA -0.0002 it 0.8373 -0.0004 0.5362 0.0001 0.6061 0.0006 0.5135 
Control Variables - Firm Complexity Variables 
SRSUBSID -0.0002 it 0.4067 -0.0002 0.3081 0.0000 0.8913 0.0001 0.7050 
LNNBS -0.0007 it 0.5575 -0.0010 0.4137 -0.0001 0.5750 0.0000 0.9863 
Control Variables - Firm Risk Variables 
ROA -0.0036 it 0.0006 0.0017 0.3229 -0.0009 0.0167 0.0052 0.0281 
CURRENT -4.2754 it 0.2105 0.0000 0.4861 0.0000 0.9028 0.0000 0.8724 
Control Variables - Corporate Governance Variables 
PERNEXBD 0.0031 it 0.3860 -0.0039 0.1584 -0.0006 0.3946 -0.0051 0.1721 
BODMEET -0.0003 it 0.1123 -0.0002 0.2890 0.0000 0.6391 -0.0001 0.4462 
FINEXPAC 0.0012 it 0.3895 -0.0036 0.0304 0.0001  0.7542 -0.0012 0.5866 
Control Variables - Industry Variables 
ENERGY 0.0009 it 0.7426 0.0062 0.0207 -0.0001 0.9665 0.0022 0.5490 
MATERIALS 0.0004 it 0.8403 -0.0006 0.7719 -0.0006 0.7841 -0.0015 0.6260 
INDUSTRIALS 0.0006 it 0.7520 -0.0008 0.6970 -0.0007 0.7298 -0.0016 0.7050 
CONSUMERDISC -0.0001 it 0.9605 0.0001 0.9653 -0.0006 0.7630 -0.0013 0.6708 
CONSUMERSTAP -0.0003 it 0.9027 -0.0004 0.8668 -0.0007 0.7409 0.0005 0.8825 
HEALTH CARE 0.0029 it 0.2546 0.0010 0.6906 -0.0006 0.7696 -0.0024 0.4817 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 0.0084 it 
0.0068 0.0044 0.1526 -0.0001 0.9799 -0.0043 0.3005 
TELECOMM 
UNICATIONS 0.0071 it 
0.0253 0.0038 0.2200 -0.0020 0.3350 -0.0004 0.9164 
UTILITIES 0.0010 it 0.7858 -0.0008 0.8171 -0.0010 0.6413 -0.0002 0.9642 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.1004 0.0000 1.7721 0.0378 1.2174 0.2545 1.0329 0.4241 
Adjusted R 0.1445 2 0.0585 0.0182 0.0026 
Where: 
AAit = ∑ (BIG4it , SPECIALISTit , CNON-AUDITit , CTENUREit). A composite dichotomous score based on the four proxy 
measures for auditor attributes: Big4, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and length of tenure; SRSUBSIDit  = 
Square root of number of subsidiaries for firm i at time period t; LNNBSit  = Natural logarithmic of 1 plus number of business 
segments for firm i at time period t; ROAit = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets for firm i at time period t; 
CURRENTit = Current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i at time period t; PERNEXBDit = The percentage of non-
executive directors on the board of directors of directors for firm i at time period t; BODMEETit = The number of board of 
directors of directors meetings held during the year for firm i at time period t; FINEXPACit  = A dummy variable given the value of 
1 if the audit committee consists of at least one financial expert during the year for firm i at time period t; ENERGYit  = A dummy 
variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in the energy industry and 0 if otherwise; MATERIALSit  = A dummy variable given the 
value of 1 if the firm is in the materials industry and 0 if otherwise; INDUSTRIALSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if 
the firm is in the industrials industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERDISCit = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is 
in the consumer discretionary industry and 0 if otherwise; CONSUMERSTAPit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm 
is in the consumer staples industry and 0 if otherwise; HEALTH CAREit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm is in 
the health-care industry and 0 if otherwise; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYit  = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the firm 
is in the information technology industry and 0 if otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATIONSit  = A dummy variable given the value of 
1 if the firm is in the telecommunications industry and 0 if otherwise; UTILITIESit
The results from Table 7.10 suggest that the coefficient on AA
 = A dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
firm is in the utilities industry and 0 if otherwise. 
it (the independent 
variable) is negative and statistically insignificant for the stand-alone years of 2001 and 
2005. The coefficient on AAit has a p-value that changes from 0.8373 in 2001 to 0.5362. As 
the coefficient on AAit continues to be negative, it appears that, cross-sectionally, the 
introduction of CLERP 9 has not improved the relationship between AF/ASSETSit and AAit. 
However, when analyzing the association between changes in audit fees (AF/ASSETSit) and 
auditor attributes (AAit), the direction and significance of the relationship changes for the 
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period 2001 to 2003 relative to 2003 to 2005 (see Columns 5 to 8). Specifically, the 
coefficient on AAit (the independent variable) is positive and statistically insignificant for the 
longitudinal years of 2001 to 2003 and 2003 to 2005. However, the coefficient on AAit has a 
p-value that changes from 0.6061 in 2001 to 0.5135 suggesting that the introduction of 
CLERP 9 has improved the strength relationship between AF/ASSETSit and AAit
7.7 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
. The 
relationship, however, is not statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
This chapter discussed the robustness and sensitivity of the main results in Chapter 
Six. The sample was partitioned by four key auditee characteristics and the regression in 
Chapter Six re-run using a dichotomous composite score capturing four key auditor 
attributes. Subsequently, the sample was partitioned by three corporate governance features 
and the main results in Chapter Six re-run again. Alternative measures of audit fees and 
auditor attributes were utilized before a pre- versus post- CLERP 9 analyses undertaken of 
the main results. 
Chapter Eight will outline the implications of the results and an overall conclusion to 
this study. In this respect, the major hypotheses of this study will be answered. Subsequently, 
the overall implications, contributions and limitations of this study will be detailed. Finally, 
there will be a summarization of this study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter Seven detailed the main findings from the comprehensive robustness and 
sensitivity tests completed. Specifically, results of regressions – based on Chapter Six 
analysis – were shown following partitioning of the sample by auditee characteristics and 
corporate governance features. In addition, the results of regressions using alternative proxy 
measures for both audit fees and auditor attributes were reported and discussed. Finally, an 
analysis of tests performed on pre-CLERP 9 and versus post-CLERP 9 data was reported. 
Chapter Eight summarizes this study’s major conclusions and implications. 
Justification for the acceptance or rejection of the major hypotheses based on the empirical 
results and analysis is detailed, in conjunction with elucidating this study’s key findings. 
Implications and contributions are then drawn with limitations and future research 
opportunities also highlighted. An overarching final summary of the entire study is provided 
at the end of the chapter. 
8.2 STUDY OVERVIEW 
This study investigated both the existence and extent of competitive audit pricing in 
the Australian audit services market during a five-year time frame to determine if there is 
any evidence of cartel pricing and, hence, anti-competitive behavior by the Big4 during the 
five-year period.58 Specifically, the primary objectives of this study are twofold. First, this 
study sought to provide a comprehensive analysis of the association between four pivotal 
auditor attributes (that is, auditor brand name, industry specialization, provision of non-audit 
services and tenure) and audit fees paid by Australian publicly listed firms. Second, this 
study aimed to determine if the four aforementioned auditor attributes are influential 
determinants of changes in audit fees paid by Australian publicly listed firms.59
The empirical analysis presented in this study adopted both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal perspectives. The longitudinal perspective was critical  given that changes in 
auditor attributes, and the resulting impact on audit fees (if any), provides important 
evidence on the extent to which auditor attributes truly impact changes in audit fees and the 
long-term impact of regulations governing the conduct of audits. For purposes of this study, 
 
                                                     
58  The public debate on the matter of auditor concentration and the possibility of cartel pricing and anticompetitive behavior 
in Australia by the Big4 has resulted in the ACCC examining the issue and agreeing that the international accounting firms 
mergers raises concerns for competition in the Australian audit market (ACCC 1999). 
59  This study also considered a number of important secondary research questions. For example, as described in Section 1.1, 
new corporate governance regulations impacting the auditor were introduced in Australia in the form of CLERP 9. A 
secondary aim of this study was to determine if associations between auditor attributes and audit fees pre-CLERP 9 persist 
post-CLERP 9 thereby providing insight on the extent of the success of CLERP 9 recommendations. Please refer to Section 
1.1 for a discussion of other secondary research questions explored in this study. 
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agency theory (within the context of contracting theory) was adopted as the overarching 
theoretical perspective. The agency theory theoretical perspective best befits the analytical 
approach of this study, and is the most relevant given the focus on a major corporate 
governance issue (that is, external audit).60
Drawing on the underlying tenets of agency theory and findings of related prior 
research, a number of directional hypotheses postulating the association between the four 
selected auditor attributes (independent variables) and audit fees (dependent variable) were 
developed. For purposes of empirical analysis to formally test the derived hypotheses, the 
independent variables of interest were regressed in two different ways with the dependent 
variable. First, to determine the combined influence of the four key auditor attributes on 
contemporaneous audit fees and changes in audit fees across time, a dichotomous composite 
score based on four proxy measures (that is, for auditor brand name, industry specialization, 
provision of non-audit services and length of tenure respectively) was developed. Second, 
the composite score was decomposed into each of the auditor attributes constituting the score 
and each individual auditor attribute was regressed against audit fees and changes in audit 
fees. 
 
For the analysis, an initial pool of all Australian publicly listed firms continuously 
registered on the ASX across the observation window comprising the 2001, 2003 and 2005 
calendar years was established. From this pool and after necessary exclusions, 100 of the 
remaining largest firms were selected from the ASX (based on market capitalization for the 
2001 calendar year).61 To enhance the ability to generalize results, a further 100 firms were 
selected using an industry derived stratified-random approach.62
8.3 MAJOR HYPOTHESES CONCLUSIONS 
 The resulting initial sample 
comprised 600 firm-year observations (200 observations for each of the years 2001, 2003 
and 2005). Data to construct the independent and dependent variables (in addition to control 
variables) was extracted from annual reports collected from the Annual Reports Collection 
(Connect 4 Pty Ltd). 
The overall acceptance or rejection of the testable hypotheses (based on the 
empirical analysis in Chapters Six and Seven) is summarized in this section. Table 8.1 
                                                     
60  Agency theorists argue that corporate governance structures (for example, board of directors, audit committees and the 
external audit function) are mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts (Collier and Gregory 1999; Eisenhardt 1989; Fama 
1980; Hill and Jones 1992). Such mechanisms are postulated to play a crucial role in monitoring managers in order to 
minimize agency costs and, therefore, safeguarding shareholder wealth (Stiles and Taylor 2001). 
61  This time frame was selected as the time frame will transcend key periods in the financial accounting and corporate 
governance landscape in Australia such as the adoption of IFRS, implementation of CLERP 9 recommendations and the 
ASX CGC’s 2003 recommendations. 
62  This was done by industry in order to capture an appropriate cross-section of all the industries on the ASX. Additionally, the 
firms were the same for each of the three years examined. This has adverse implications in relation to the independence of 
samples and this is discussed in Section 8.6. 
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summarizes each testable hypotheses formulated and examined in this study, and the 
respective acceptance or rejection of that hypothesis. A detailed discussion of the 
acceptance/rejection of each hypothesis is subsequently provided in the sub-sections 8.3.1 – 
8.3.10. 
Table 8.1: 
  Acceptance/Rejection of All Hypotheses 
Variable Hypothesis Description Accepted/Rejected 
Auditor attributes 
dichotomous composite score 
- Cross-sectional 
GH An auditee engaging an auditor composed of a higher 
set of quality attributes will pay higher audit fees than 
an auditee engaging an auditor with a lower set of 
quality attributes. 
1 Rejected 
Auditor attributes 
dichotomous composite score 
- Longitudinal 
GH An auditee engaging an auditor composed of a higher 
set of quality attributes will have higher changes in 
audit fees across time than an auditee engaging an 
auditor with a lower set of quality attributes. 
2 Rejected 
Big4 auditor - Cross-sectional H An auditee engaging a Big4 auditor will pay a higher 
audit fee than an auditee engaging a Non-Big4 auditor. 
1a Rejected 
Big4 auditor - Longitudinal H An auditee engaging a Big4 auditor will have higher 
changes in audit fees paid across time than an auditee 
engaging a Non-Big4 auditor. 
1b Rejected 
Industry specialist auditor – 
Cross - sectional 
H An auditee engaging an industry specialist auditor will 
pay a higher audit fee than an auditee engaging a non-
industry specialist auditor. 
2a Rejected 
Industry specialist auditor - 
Longitudinal 
H An auditee engaging an industry specialist auditor will 
have higher changes in audit fees across time than an 
auditee engaging a non-industry specialist auditor. 
2b Rejected 
Non-audit fees - Cross-
sectional 
H An auditee paying higher non-audit fees to the auditor 
will also pay higher audit fees than an auditee paying 
lower non-audit service fees to the incumbent auditor. 
3a Rejected 
Non-audit fees - Longitudinal H An auditee paying higher non-audit fees to the auditor 
across time will also have higher changes in audit fees 
than an auditee paying lower non-audit service fees to 
the incumbent auditor across time. 
3b Rejected 
Tenure - Cross-sectional H An auditee engaging an auditor with a longer tenure 
period will pay higher audit fees than an auditee 
engaging an auditor with a shorter tenure period. 
4a Rejected 
Tenure - Longitudinal H An auditee engaging an auditor with a longer tenure 
period will have higher changes in audit fees across 
time than an auditee engaging an auditor with a shorter 
tenure period. 
4b Rejected 
8.3.1 Auditor attributes dichotomous composite score – cross-sectional 
Based on the main results shown in Table 6.1, the empirical analysis indicated an 
auditee engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality attributes did not pay 
significantly higher audit fees than an auditee engaging an auditor with a lower set of quality 
attributes. The association between the auditor attribute composite score (capturing the four 
key auditor attributes) and audit fees was consistently insignificant for the pooled period 
(that is, all firm-year observations combined) and across each individual cross-sectional year 
(that is, 2001, 2003 and 2005) within the observation window. Further, across each 
individual cross-sectional observation year, the coefficient on the auditor attribute composite 
score (that is, AAit) did not change (either upward or downward) in magnitude or direction by 
any discernible trend. Therefore, GH1 is rejected based on the main findings. 
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However, when conducting the sensitivity analysis, it was noted that when the 
natural logarithm of the audit fees paid to the external auditor for the provision of external 
audit services for firm i at time period t (that is, AFit) is used as an alternative measure of 
audit fees, there was a statistically significant positive association between an auditee 
engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality attributes and the audit fee compared 
to an auditee engaging an auditor with a lower set of quality attributes (see Table 7.8 Column 
4). Results using 2001 and 2005 firm-year observations, however, still supported the non-
significance of the main results (as reported in Table 6.1). Furthermore, other sensitivity tests 
(for example, partition of the sample by auditee characteristics (specifically, auditee size, 
complexity, risk and industry) and corporate governance features (specifically, number of 
non-executive board of directors members, number of board of directors meetings annually 
and the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee) undertaken (see Tables 7.1 
through 7.7)) also indicated no statistical significance in the association between an auditee 
engaging an auditor composed of a higher set of quality attributes and audit fees compared to 
an auditee engaging an auditor with a lower set of quality attributes.63
Whilst the results shown in Table 7.8 Column 4 related to the 2003 observation year 
imply some caution, as a result of the overall empirical analysis (for example, see Table 6.1, 
sensitivity results for 2001 and 2005 in Table 7.8 and partitioning of sample results in Tables 
7.1 through 7.7), GH1 is rejected. 
 
8.3.2 Auditor attributes dichotomous composite score – longitudinal 
The main results reported in Table 6.2 indicated no statistically significant difference 
in the amount of audit fees paid across time by an auditee engaging an auditor composed of a 
higher set of quality attributes than an auditee engaging an auditor with a lower set of quality 
attributes. The lack of association between the composite score capturing four key auditor 
attributes and changes in audit fees persisted across all of the temporal time period examined 
(that is, 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005, see Table 6.2 for the results). 
Therefore, GH2 is rejected. 
8.3.3 Big4 auditor - cross-sectional 
It was postulated in H1a that an auditee engaging a Big4 auditor will likely pay a 
higher audit fee than an auditee engaging a Non-Big4 auditor. The main results tabulated in 
Table 6.3 fail to support H1a.64
                                                     
63  Please refer to Section 7.2 for details of the process adopted. 
 Specifically, the empirical results indicated the lack of a 
64  It is not possible to undertake sensitivity tests on the auditor brand name variable since there are no alternative measures in 
the prior literature to operationalize the variable. 
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statistically significant association when using either the pooled sample or samples for 
individual observation years (that is, 2001, 2003, and 2005). Therefore, H1a is rejected. 
8.3.4 Big4 auditor - longitudinal 
The premise of H1b was that an auditee engaging a Big4 auditor will have 
significantly higher changes in audit fees paid across time than an auditee engaging a Non-
Big4 auditor. The main results reported in Table 6.7, however, do not support H1b. The lack 
of a statistically significant association persisted regardless of testing the pooled sample or 
using samples from individual observation years. Therefore, H1b is rejected. 
8.3.5 Industry specialist auditor - cross-sectional 
The main results from Table 6.4 do not support H2a with findings indicating a non-
association when the sample tested included either all firm-year observations or only firm 
observations for a specific time period.65
8.3.6 Industry specialist auditor - longitudinal 
 Specifically, H2a suggested that an auditee engaging 
an industry specialist auditor will pay a higher audit fee than an auditee engaging a non-
industry specialist auditor. Given the lack of empirical support for this association, H2a is 
rejected. 
For H2b it was argued an auditee engaging an auditor defined as an industry 
specialist will have significantly higher changes in audit fees across time than an auditee 
engaging a non-industry specialist auditor. Main results tabulated in Table 6.8, however, 
failed to indicate a significant difference. The insignificant association between industry 
specialist auditor and the change in audit fees paid across time persisted across all temporal 
time periods examined (that is, 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005). Based on 
these empirical findings H2b is rejected. 
8.3.7 Non-audit fees – cross-sectional 
With regards to H3a, it was postulated an auditee paying higher non-audit fees to the 
auditor was also likely to be paying pay higher audit fees than an auditee paying lower non-
audit service fees to the incumbent auditor. Whilst a range of empirical tests were performed 
using the pooled sample and partitioned proportions based on temporal time period, results 
(as tabulated in Table 6.5) do not support H3a. Therefore, based on the main results, H3a is 
rejected. 
However, some caution must be taken before universally rejecting H3a when the ratio 
of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor j by auditee i during time period t (that is, 
                                                     
65  It is not possible to undertake sensitivity tests on the industry specialist auditor variable since there are no alternative 
measures in the prior literature to operationalize the variable. 
158 
 
RNON-AUDITit) is used as an alternative measure. Specifically, additional regression results 
(tabulated in Table 7.9 Column 8) where the alternative measure and pooled sample were 
used, indicated a statistically significant negative association. As the additional tests yielding 
a significant association appeared to be an isolated case, H3a was, on the balance of all 
empirical tests, rejected. Nonetheless, some caution may be warranted as results may have 
some minor sensitivity to the manner of measuring non-audit services. 
8.3.8 Non-audit fees – longitudinal 
In the case of H3b, it was suggested in this study that an auditee paying higher non-
audit fees to the auditor will have higher changes in audit fees than an auditee paying lower 
non-audit service fees to the incumbent auditor. Again, main regression results (tabulated in 
Table 6.9) do not provide support for H3b. The lack of an association was consistent for all 
temporal time periods examined (that is, 2001 to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005). 
Based on these findings, H3b is rejected. 
8.3.9 Tenure – cross-sectional 
The main results in Table 6.6 do not support H4a which predicted an auditee 
engaging an auditor with a longer tenure period will pay higher audit fees than an auditee 
engaging an auditor with a shorter tenure period.  The main results held regardless of using 
the pooled sample of observations or the individual temporal time periods. Therefore, H4a is 
rejected. However, though the main results did not yield a significant association, sensitivity 
analysis showed some statistically significant results. Specifically, when the length of time 
(in years to a maximum of 10) during which the auditor remained unchanged for auditee i at 
time period t is used, Table 7.9 Columns 6 and 8 results indicate that for the regression (a) 
using only 2005 firm-year observations, and (b) all firm-year observations (that is, pooled 
sample), there is a statistically significant negative association between an auditee engaging 
an incumbent auditor with a longer tenure period and the quantum of audit fees. 
Overall, as the majority of empirical tests failed to support the notion an auditee 
engaging an auditor with a longer tenure period will pay higher audit fees than an auditee 
engaging an auditor with a shorter tenure period, H4a is rejected though with caveat that the 
result be interpreted with caution. 
8.3.10 Tenure – longitudinal 
Finally, H4b suggested an auditee engaging an auditor with a longer tenure period 
will have higher changes in audit fees than an auditee engaging an auditor with a shorter 
tenure period. The main results from Table 6.10 do not support H4b. The association between 
an auditee engaging an auditor with a longer tenure period and changes in audit fees paid 
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across time is consistently insignificant for all temporal time periods examined (that is, 2001 
to 2003, 2003 to 2005 and 2001 to 2005). Therefore, H4b is rejected. 
8.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
Findings from this study provide a number of important insights into audit fee 
determinants and by association, audit quality. In addition, results provide important 
inferences with implications for key stakeholders (for example, regulators, investors, 
scholars and auditees/corporate management). The implications for the respective key 
stakeholders are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
8.4.1 Regulators 
The audit fee modelling literature since Simunic (1980) has clearly established the 
link between audit fees and audit quality. This literature maintains that a high quality audit 
involves a greater number of audit procedures (both in terms of nature and extent) 
undertaken by experienced and capable auditors. The greater the amount of audit effort 
inevitably results in higher audit fees (Boo and Sharma 2008; Clatworthy and Peel 2007; 
Hay et al. 2008; Jeong et al. 2005). 
Results from this study suggested that the selected auditor attributes in this study 
(that is, auditor reputation, industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and 
auditor tenure) do not have a statistically significant association with audit fees and, 
therefore, are unlikely to have a significant influence on audit quality. A major consequence 
of this lack of association for regulators is that if they (regulators) seek to influence audit 
quality by introducing policies and/or requirements based on auditor attributes, this may 
inevitably (and potentially unwittingly) impose increased costs on firms without yielding any 
effective benefits. By way of illustration, regulators in the past have sought to mandate 
compulsory audit partner rotation with the aim of increasing audit quality. Based on the 
results of this study, the introduction of mandatory requirements in Australia to rotate audit 
partners at regular intervals may not significantly improve audit quality. Indeed, compulsory 
audit partner rotation may result in firms/auditees unnecessarily bearing increased costs and 
additional time for a new audit partner to learn the nuances of a client. 
If regulators persist in attempting to influence audit quality via factors within the 
purview of the audit engagement, results of this study imply such factors need to be beyond 
the scope of the four attributes examined. Other audit engagement factors could include (but 
not be limited to) attempts to reduce the workload compression of external auditors (that is, 
increasing the duration of the busy season), increasing audit lag (that is, allowing a greater 
lag between balance sheet date and the date of the audit report thereby reducing the time 
pressure on the external auditor) and requiring the external auditor to actively utilize work 
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already completed by internal auditors66
Aside from factors associated with the audit engagement, regulators attempting to 
improve audit quality could aim to strengthen other key firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, by regulating the structure, composition, authority levels and 
diligence of a firm’s audit committee, there may be a greater likelihood of increased audit 
quality by external auditors such that benefits outweigh the costs associated with mandating 
audit committee features. Support for this view is based on the premise that audit committees 
are increasingly charged with overseeing the financial reporting process by firms (and, 
therefore, actively liaise with and monitor external auditors).
 within firms (as is the case in the USA). Such 
factors may be more effective mechanisms in increasing audit quality. 
67
8.4.2 Investors 
 Specific ways in which 
regulators can improve  monitoring by the audit committee of the external auditor may 
include requiring minimum levels of financial literacy/expertise among audit committee 
board members, mandating minimum audit committee meeting frequency and stipulating 
independence levels amongst audit committee members (Abbott, Park, and Parker 2000; 
Carcello and Neal 2000; DeFond et al. 2005). 
Investors require reliable information to make economic decisions on whether to 
buy, sell or hold investments. A fundamental purpose of an external audit is to add 
credibility to the financial information reported by firms (Jubb et al. 2008; Leung et al. 
2007). Therefore, the greater the quality of the external audit process, the higher the 
credibility of the financial information reported by firms and the better the quality financial 
information available to investors to base the decision-making process upon. It has also been 
suggested (particularly within the IPO literature) that investors can also use audit quality as a 
mechanism for differentiating between investment choices (Copley and Douthett 2002; Firth 
and Liau-Tan 1998; Lee, Stokes, Taylor, and Walter 2003b). 
Traditionally, an avenue available to investors to assess auditor quality has been to 
use publicly available information to gather details on the identifiable auditor attributes (such 
as the four examined in this study) since such details are available from such sources for 
example, annual reports. Based on the information collected, investors can use the 
information to form an opinion on audit quality (Bushman and Smith 2001; Singh and 
Newby 2010). However, based on the findings of this study (that is, no statistically 
                                                     
66  Given that internal auditors spend significant time, effort and resources in evaluating the design and monitoring the 
operating effectiveness of a firm’s internal control structure, it is reasonable to expect external auditors to utilize such work 
already completed by the internal auditor in verifying the efficacy of internal controls within the financial reporting process 
in firms. 
67  Refer to Principle 4.2 of the ASX CGC’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendation 
(ASX CGC 2003). 
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significant determinants of audit fees and, therefore, no influential predictors of audit quality 
amongst the four auditor attributes investigated) investors in the Australian capital market 
will have difficulty in: (a) determining the expected quality of an audit; and (b) 
differentiating between alternative equity investment opportunities based on drawing a 
distinction between credibility of financial information and/or quality of the audit. Results of 
this study imply Australian capital market investors need to exercise caution when 
attempting to discern audit quality based on auditor attributes as results from this study 
indicate such attributes may not yield differences between auditors and the subsequent 
quality of the audit. 
Overall, results of this study suggest Australian capital market investors may need to 
identify alternative ways of determining audit quality when making investing decisions 
within their (that is, investors’) individual risk management framework rather than rely on 
traditional auditor attributes routinely offered in the extant literature. Other such ways may 
include assessing the strength of the corporate governance mechanisms within firms and 
giving such mechanisms greater weighting than auditor attributes when making resource-
allocation decisions. Specifically, such corporate governance mechanisms may include audit 
committee features (see Section 8.4.1) and the board of directors. In relation to the latter, 
investors may be able to discern audit quality by assessing factors such as the extent of 
independence of board of directors, CEO duality and COE compensation packages. Given 
that the board of directors within a firm interacts with the external auditor during the audit of 
the firm’s financial statements, effective board of directors may potentially increase audit 
quality (Andersen et al. 2003; Carcello et al. 2002; Chen and Zhou 2007). Capital market 
investors in Australia may also wish to assess other auditor attributes beyond the four 
stipulated in this study. However, the increased concentration of audit firms within the 
market during the past several decades that service publicly listed firms may have negated 
any benefits of assessing audit quality via such auditor attributes. 
8.4.3 Scholars 
Given the substantial role that financial reporting plays in ensuring the efficient 
operation of capital markets, scholars have worked prodigiously in investigating the quality 
of financial reporting by firms. The achievement of high quality financial reporting is 
underpinned by agency theory and agency theory can be mitigated by, amongst other things, 
audit quality.68
                                                     
68  Please refer to Section 3.2.1 for a more detailed discussion of agency theory. 
 Results from this study indicate that the four auditor attributes investigated 
are not significantly associated with audit fees. This, in turn, suggests that the four attributes 
do not influence audit quality and therefore do not play a significant role in reducing the 
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agency costs for firms.69
This study utilized multiple regressions as the principal statistical tool to analyze the 
association between the selected auditor attributes and audit fees. Given that this study is, 
therefore, quantitative in nature, scholars should include the use of other qualitative 
techniques such as interviews and case studies.
 Scholars undertaking future research need to exercise caution when 
using auditor attributes (certainly the attributes examined in this study) as a means of 
measuring audit quality. Instead, scholars should consider utilizing other measures of audit 
quality including variables related to the audit process such as planning, evaluation of 
internal controls and audit risk. Whilst agency theory remains central to the issue of both 
audit quality and financial reporting quality, scholars may need to recognize that choice of 
variable selection is an important consideration when improving the explanatory power of 
models of audit fees. 
70
8.4.4 Auditees/corporate management 
 This observation is particularly valid given 
that audit quality is a complex and multi-dimensional construct and may require a number of 
different approaches to capture it (audit quality) best. Finally, given that this study adopted a 
single nation focus (that is, Australia), this also has implications for scholars in that only one 
dimension of economic, social, cultural and institutional settings was examined. Scholars 
undertaking future research, therefore, should consider other settings across national 
boundaries and differing economic conditions. 
The results of this study also have important implications for auditees/corporate 
management. Given that this study indicates that auditee (that is, demand-side) features (as 
opposed to the auditor (that is, supply-side) features examined) are significantly associated 
with audit fees, and changes in audit fees, auditees can utilize this information to their 
(auditee’s) advantage. Specifically, the results from this study indicate that auditee size, 
complexity, risk and corporate governance features predominantly drive audit fee and audit 
fee variation. Hence, an auditee can implement initiatives in an effort to mitigate audit fee 
costs. 
One initiative could involve the introduction of an internal audit function (IAF). 
Internal auditors within an internal audit function (IAF) traditionally spend at least 50 per 
cent of the time reviewing and monitoring the design and operating effectiveness of internal 
controls within the auditee (Brody and Lowe 2000; Carey, Craswell, and Simnett 2000; 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006b). The reviewing and monitoring of internal controls by 
                                                     
69  Prior literature indicates that audit quality reduces agency costs (Abbott et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2007; Venkataraman et 
al. 2008). 
70  It may also be appropriate for scholars to adopt other quantitative techniques such as factor analysis and simultaneous 
equation modelling. 
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internal auditors has a direct impact on the quality of financial information produced by an 
auditee, a key responsibility of the external auditor. The external auditor, therefore, can 
potentially rely on the work completed by the internal auditors during the course of the 
external audit.71 The reliance by the external auditor on work already completed by internal 
auditors can ultimately reduce the audit procedures undertaken by the external auditor and, in 
turn, reduce audit fees and hence, costs to auditees.72
Aside from development of an effective IAF, auditees can also reduce audit fees by 
strengthening key in-house corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, as elaborated in 
greater detail in prior sub-sections, the audit committee can play an important monitoring 
role. By increasing audit committee effectiveness through greater diligence, appropriate 
resourcing, adequate authority and structural composition, the audit committee may reduce 
the possibility of errors occurring in the financial statements. In turn, this can reduce reliance 
on the external audit leading to lower audit fees. 
 
8.4.5 The auditing profession 
Notwithstanding fears of increased supplier concentration in the audit market and 
(potentially) the existence/charging of cartel pricing by the remaining providers of 
international auditing services (that is, Big4), the results of this study indicate that the four 
pivotal auditor attributes examined in this study are not significantly associated with audit 
fees/variation in audit fees, that is, supply-side features of an audit engagement do not drive 
audit fees/variation in audit fees. Instead, results clearly indicate that demand-side features of 
the audit engagement largely influence audit fees/variation in audit fees (for example, 
auditee size, complexity, risk and corporate governance features). The absence of cartel 
pricing by the Big4 has important ramifications for competition within the auditing 
profession in the sense that public firms continue to have choice among audit firms from 
which to select auditors. Although the reputation and market concentration of the Big4 
remains strong, many other international, regional and national auditing firms can also 
expect to gain appointment as external auditors for publicly listed firms. In essence, there 
remains scope for auditing firms apart from the Big4 to audit large public firms. The 
existence of both choice and competition within the auditing profession, therefore, suggests 
that neither regulatory nor market intervention is necessary. Specifically, calls for 
compulsory auditor rotation, joint audit engagements and even the mandatory division/break-
up of large audit firms may be unwarranted. 
                                                     
71  This is entirely consistent with Australian Auditing Standard 610 ‘Using the Work of Internal Auditors’. 
72  The extent of the reliance by the external auditor on work completed by internal auditors within the IAF depends on a 
number of important factors such as the organisational status of the IAF, the scope of the IAF function, the technical 
competence of the internal auditors and the level of due professional care exercised by the internal auditors (AuASB 2006). 
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8.5 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
Results from this study make various important contributions: First, the results 
suggest that the four pivotal auditor attributes examined in this study are not significantly 
associated with variation in audit fees (both cross-sectionally and longitudinally). This 
provides evidence contrary to concerns about the existence/charging of cartel pricing and 
anticompetitive behavior by auditors who provide such services nationally and 
internationally (that is, Big4). The result, therefore, has important consequences for the 
efficient and effective operation of capital markets, scholars, auditors and auditee operations. 
Second, by examining a number of composite auditor attributes and audit fees (both 
on an aggregated and dis-aggregated basis) and by focusing on the supply side of the demand 
for auditing, this study provides a much deeper understanding of an important monitoring 
mechanism (that is, auditing) and the extent to which supply-side features impact audit fees. 
Third, results of this study indicate that CLERP 9 regulations have not impacted 
auditor attributes significantly enough to vary audit fees.73
Fourth, given that the results suggest that the four pivotal auditor attributes examined 
in this study are not significantly associated with variation in audit fees (both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally), regulators, scholars, and auditors can utilize the results to 
investigate/regulate other key corporate governance mechanisms which may play a more 
effective role in promoting increased audit quality and, therefore, improving the integrity of 
a firm’s financial reporting process. The results of this study, therefore, have real economic 
consequences for regulators, scholars, and auditors. 
 Table 7.10 points out that the 
introduction of CLERP 9 has only (marginally) improved the relationship between AAit and 
audit fees between 2001 and 2005 although the association is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The non-significant result, on the other hand, may be due to the fact that 
other auditor attributes (not examined in this study) may have been impacted by the CLERP 
9 regulations or that there is a lag between the introduction of the CLERP 9 regulations and 
time the regulations impact auditor attributes and by association, audit fees. At this stage, 
however, results indicate that, based solely on the auditor attributes examined in this study 
and the timeframe examined, CLERP 9 regulations have not been successful in achieving the 
objectives of using the statutory external auditing process to improve audit quality (via an 
increase in audit fees) and thus the quality of reported earnings by firms. 
                                                     
73  This study attempted to answer a number of secondary research questions, including questions pertaining to the 
effectiveness of CLERP 9 recommendations enacted in 2003. The objective is to determine if the introduction of CLERP 9 
in 2003 improved the relationship between a dichotomous composite score of auditor attributes (that is, AAit) and audit fees 
before and after the introduction of CLERP 9 (that is, between 2001 and 2005) in Australia. 
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Fifth, given that this study captured a cross-section of industries, results provide evidence on 
the existence of an industry-effect on the quantum of audit fees charged by auditors, for 
example, whether certain industries are more expensive to audit than others. Results reveal 
that firms in the energy, information technology and telecommunications industries pay a 
statistically higher amount of audit fees than other industries.74 This result is contrary to the 
prior literature (Balsam et al. 2003; DeFond et al. 2000; Gerrard et al. 1994; Willenborg 
2002) but the difference can be explained by the fact that post-2005, external auditors 
(particularly the Big4) have changed their (auditor’s) audit strategy with clients and adopted 
a ‘balance sheet’ approach to an audit engagement as opposed to the prior approach which 
was ‘profit and loss’ based. The change in auditor’s approach has necessitated a more 
rigorous approach to balance sheet items (compared to profit and loss items) thus increasing 
the associated audit fee.75
Overall, this study will benefit a number of key stakeholders. Policymakers and 
regulators are able to determine the effectiveness of legislation introduced to improve the 
quality of financial reporting by firms. This has a flow-on effect of minimizing poor 
corporate reporting and, potentially, subsequent corporate failure thereby benefiting capital 
market participants. Both auditors and auditees benefit by knowing that demand-side 
features of an audit engagement largely drive audit fees. Auditors can use the information to 
make strategic decisions on whether it is beneficial to invest heavily in a particular industry 
to the extent of becoming an industry specialist or to provide non-audit services to clients in 
addition to the annual statutory external audit. Auditees also benefit from knowing which 
demand-side characteristics they (auditees) exhibit either increase or decrease the audit fees 
auditees pay. Scholars will also benefit from the results of this study by being able to 
examine demand and supply-side features of an audit engagement in greater detail and the 
associated links with audit fees and audit quality. 
 
8.6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this study has a number of strengths, it is not without limitations. For instance, 
audit quality is a multi-dimensional, complex construct that can be determined by a number 
of auditor attributes. This study only examined four specific auditor attributes. Though the 
attributes selected are the most commonly used and cited in prior empirical literature 
(Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Balsam et al. 2003; Beatty 1989; Carcello et al. 1992; Carcello and 
                                                     
74  In accordance with prior literature, firms in the financial industry are excluded from the sample and hence, this study (Felix 
et al. 2001; Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt 2007; Singh and Newby 2010). 
75  Firms in the telecommunication services and utilities industry have relatively large assets and were therefore thought easier 
to audit prior to 2005 compared to firms with extensive receivables and inventories such as manufacturers (Gerrard et al. 
1994; Simunic 1980). 
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Nagy 2004; Francis 2006; Hogan and Jeter 1999; Kim et al. 2003) as being pivotal factors 
underpinning audit quality, other attributes (albeit of lesser importance) may be significantly 
associated with audit fees. 
Also, sample firms in this study are identical for each calendar year examined during 
the observation window (that is, 2001, 2003 and 2005). This raised possible concern with 
independence of sample (that is, repeated measures) concerns (Hair et al. 1995). However, 
this is not considered detrimental to this study for two reasons. First, the independence of 
samples issue only applies to the longitudinal OLS regression models used. Second, almost 
all of the published past literature (in both accounting and finance fields) using firm-year 
observations for multivariate testing suggest that there is no other parsimonious way to 
undertake longitudinal analysis where the changes in selected firm’s results are of interest to 
the researcher/s (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Gigler and Hemmer 2001; Krishnan 2003; Lara 
et al. 2005; Pae 2007; Reynolds and Francis 2001; Wallace 1984). In addition, this study 
addresses its research objectives utilizing the 2001 to 2005 timeframe. Although this 
timeframe may appear outdated, the period was selected so that results from this study could 
offer some commentary on whether key financial and corporate governance changes in 
Australia such as the introduction on IFRS and CLERP 9 influenced the impact of auditor 
attributes on audit fees.76
Another limitation was the fact that this study used data from only one country, 
namely Australia. This single-nation focus potentially limits the ability to generalize study’s 
empirical results to other domestic and institutional settings. Australia, however, has a 
mature and well developed capital market with active participation by regulators, investors 
and audit firms alike (Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Gerrard et al. 1994; Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent 2006a). Furthermore, the institutional structures present in Australia are 
founded on principles and values entrenched in many other developed economies, 
particularly those with a historical linkage to the UK. Consequently, this provides confidence 
that results from this study can be used as guidance for research based on alternative 
domestic settings. Therefore, notwithstanding the limitation of a focus on a single nation, 
this study’s results does provide useful points of reference to other countries and economies 
which are (or may be in the future) grappling with issues of cartel pricing and 
anticompetitive behavior by Big4 auditors. 
 Nevertheless, the timeframe selected for examination is 
acknowledged as a potential limitation. 
                                                     
76  In addition, time-periods 2007 and 2008 were excluded from this study on the basis of potential undue influences arising 
from the credit-crunch and GFC during this period. 
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A further limitation was that in order to test the hypotheses, data for all of the 
variables used in this study were collected from annual reports. Such an approach to data 
collection potentially limits the amount and type of data that can be collected. For example, 
other alternative (firm-specific) proxy measures for the auditor attributes used in this study 
may exist. However, such proxy measures were excluded given the proprietary nature of the 
measures. Also, this study only used data from publicly firms. As publicly listed firms make 
up only a fraction of all businesses, the narrow focus implies results may not be applicable to 
business as a whole. Also, the sample represented a snapshot of full population of publicly 
listed firms in Australia. Notwithstanding these limitations, stratification of the sample 
(across all firms listed on the ASX) and partitioning used when undertaking aspects of the 
data analysis, ensured that smaller public firms were included in the sample. As such, results 
from this study are not overwhelmed (or driven solely) by the largest firms. Also, results are 
likely to still be applicable to non-public firms both large and small.77
The scope, objectives and findings of this study opens avenues for further research. 
At a minimum, future research can begin by addressing the limitations identified above. 
Therefore, future research should consider other auditor features to assess the validity of 
findings from this study and any resulting association with audit fees.
 
78 To assess the 
external validity of the findings from this study, future research can be undertaken outside 
Australia particularly in developing countries where capital markets and economies are in 
formative stages.79
                                                     
77  The limitations listed and discussed in this section are not designed to provide an exhaustive list. Rather, limitations 
discussed are used as examples to highlight the boundaries of this study and scope to which results may be applied without 
application of caution. A full exhaustive list will provide little incremental value, and is be beyond the scope of this study. 
 It may also be particularly useful to undertake subsequent research by 
examining countries with different regulatory and institutional settings (for example, 
jurisdictions with differing levels of legal and investor protection and the degree of 
institutional ownership in corporate entities). Additionally, this study examined the 2001 to 
2005 time period. Subsequent research can adopt a more contemporaneous timeframe or 
shorter time periods to consider the impact of a specific event. For example, in the case of 
the former, this study can be re-performed after the effects of the GFC (which started in 
2007) have passed. 
78  Examples of auditor features include (but not limited to) auditor location (to measure a ‘city effect’), number of reports 
generated by the auditor for the auditee, and the issuance of a qualified audit report. In addition, future research can collect 
auditor attributes not only from secondary data but also from firm-specific sources (through the use of questionnaires and 
interviews) given the proprietary nature of some of the alternative auditor attribute measures. Collection of such data, 
therefore, may involve the adoption of other research methods beyond archival collection. 
79  Future research can also include smaller public and private firms although such a research option may be of limited benefit 
given the results of this study that audit fee variation is driven by demand-side features of an audit engagement such as 
auditee size, complexity, risk and, such demand-side features are more prevalent in larger public firms. 
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8.7 SUMMARIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
The cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of this study yielded important insights 
into the association between four pivotal auditor attributes (that is, auditor brand name, 
industry specialization, provision of non-audit services and tenure) and the quantum of audit 
fees paid by Australian publicly listed firms. An investigation into the auditor attributes - 
audit fee linkage is of regulatory, professional and capital market investor interest with 
significant concerns having been expressed about the growing possibility of cartel auditing 
pricing within the Australian audit services market and the resulting prospect of 
anticompetitive behavior by large accounting practices, particularly the Big4 auditors. 
Findings from this study suggest that audit fee variation is not driven by supply-side features 
of an audit engagement (that is, auditor attributes) but rather is influenced by demand-side 
features such as auditee size, complexity and risk. Therefore, this study finds no evidence to 
suggest the existence of cartel pricing and anticompetitive conduct by Big4 auditors. The 
findings/results of this study are based on a substantial sample of Australian publicly listed 
firms thereby providing an in-depth cross-sectional coverage of the Australian capital 
market. Results provide essential information to key stakeholders on the determinants of 
audit fees. However, this study is not without limitations but the limitations also provide a 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
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